IPS temporarily Rapsonless

The Identity & Passport Service (IPS) doesn't exist any more, of course, it's now HM Passport Office (HMPO) and the Home Office is IPSless.

The executive director of IPS between about June 2010 and March 2013 was Sarah Rapson. Her predecessor, James Hall, presided over the British public being over-charged for passports by about £300 million a year. He also presided over the disaster of Whitehall's attempted introduction of state-produced ID cards.

Ms Rapson has delivered a £5 reduction in the cost of a 10-year adult passport since then, from £77.50 to £72.50. Otherwise her tenure seems to have been without incident.

She is perhaps lucky that IPS/HMPO were banned from having anything to do with Whitehall's latest attempt to re-enact the ID cards massacre – that honour goes to the Cabinet Office (individual electoral registration and the Identity Assurance Programme) and the Department for Business Innovation and Skills (midata). If you hold futures in either organisation, sell, sell, sell.

Now her luck has broken.

Home Office press release, 16 April 2013:

New interim Directors General appointed Two interim Directors General have been appointed to lead the new immigration commands in the Home Office that were announced by the Home Secretary on 26 March. Sarah Rapson will lead UK Visas and Immigration, bringing her experience of managing a successful customer-focused organisation as Chief Executive of the Identity and Passport Service. David Wood will lead Immigration Enforcement, drawing on his background with the Metropolitan Police and as Director of Operations for UKBA ...

The history of the UK Border Agency (UKBA) is spectacular and its demise under Rob Whiteman even more so. The Home Office is now UKBAless. It's shattered into three pieces – the UK Border Force, Immigration Enforcement (ambiguous name) and the piece Ms Rapson has picked up, UK Visas and Immigration (UKV&I).

Interim Director General Sarah Rapson gave evidence in front of the Home Affairs Committee on 11 June 2013:



Next day, the Times newspaper reported the session and found themselves with an over-abundance or superfluity or excess or nimiety of scoops. Too many to handle. They settled for Visa system might never be up to job, admits chief.

A month later, the Home Affairs Committee published their report, and they went with Backlogs hit half a million at immigration service. This followed Ms Rapson's revelation that there are 190,000 unresolved immigration cases that her predecessors unfortunately forgot to tell the Committee about.

The Times and the Committee and the BBC could equally well have led with Ms Rapson's management approach – she wants her staff to discover for themselves how to do the job, she doesn't intend to issue "decrees" (16:34:40 to 16:35:44), instead, she's holding "workshops". She has 7,400 staff in 150 countries and an annual budget of £450 million. There's something missing from the concept of leadership there or "command" as Ms Rapson keeps calling it.

Or they could have led with Ms Rapson's repeated claim to have only just started in the job – e.g. "I'm 54 days in" (16:59:43). According to the DMossEsq slide rule, that's nearly eight weeks. Eight weeks in, and she still doesn't know how many categories there are for the cases UKV&I deal with and didn't realise that the category with 190,000 cases in it was new to the Committee. Clearly it takes some time for a new boss to get their feet under the table, but surely eight weeks is long enough to get to grips with some of the basic metrics of the business. If eight weeks isn't long enough, is it ever going to happen?

IPS temporarily Rapsonless

The Identity & Passport Service (IPS) doesn't exist any more, of course, it's now HM Passport Office (HMPO) and the Home Office is IPSless.

The executive director of IPS between about June 2010 and March 2013 was Sarah Rapson. Her predecessor, James Hall, presided over the British public being over-charged for passports by about £300 million a year. He also presided over the disaster of Whitehall's attempted introduction of state-produced ID cards.

Ms Rapson has delivered a £5 reduction in the cost of a 10-year adult passport since then, from £77.50 to £72.50. Otherwise her tenure seems to have been without incident.

She is perhaps lucky that IPS/HMPO were banned from having anything to do with Whitehall's latest attempt to re-enact the ID cards massacre – that honour goes to the Cabinet Office (individual electoral registration and the Identity Assurance Programme) and the Department for Business Innovation and Skills (midata). If you hold futures in either organisation, sell, sell, sell.

Now her luck has broken.

Dead fish Home Office has lost sight of the "public" in "public service" – Rob Whiteman

Thanks to Anna Leach writing in The Register magazine, the following astonishing interchange at a Home Affairs Committee evidence session (15 May 2012) is brought to everyone's attention. The Chair of the Committee is Rt Hon Keith Vaz MP and Rob Whiteman is Chief Executive of the UK Border Agency, part of the Home Office:

Q151 Chair: ... over the issue of your computer system that crashed at Lunar house. Hundreds of people were turned away, and we hear that some were in tears at the fact that the system did not work. What went wrong? Have we got compensation from the IT company? Will it happen again, and have we rearranged all the appointments? Rob Whiteman: We contacted people over the bank holiday weekend and rearranged appointments. Around 500 appointments that were cancelled were rearranged. The issues around IT are incredibly frustrating for my staff, as well as for our customers. When I meet staff, it is a constant frustration that systems do not work all the time and that some of the resilience issues do not conform to common standards. In terms of morale and other issues, it is absolutely vital that we get to the heart of these IT problems. They are complex, yes, but- Q152 Chair: Yes, but we do not want to go into that now. Do we know why it broke down? Rob Whiteman: We do know why it broke down. It was an error on the network that affected the way appointments were queued from the system, and therefore they could not travel properly around the network. It was an IT failure, but, to answer your question, I have discussed this several times with the Chief Executive of the IT company that is the primary IT provider. Q153 Chair: What is the company? Rob Whiteman: I would rather not say. Q154 Chair: I am sorry, Mr Whiteman; this is a Select Committee of the House- Rob Whiteman: It is Atos. Q155 Chair: There is no need to be secret with us; we will find out. It is public money. It is not coming out of your pocket. The taxpayer is paying. What is the name of the company? Rob Whiteman: Atos. Q156 Chair: And what was his explanation as to why it broke down? Rob Whiteman: The reason I was reluctant, Chairman, is that we have a contract with Atos. It is trying its best to resolve the issues, but obviously we are being a demanding client and saying that performance is not good enough. Q157 Chair: As you should be. Rob Whiteman: I would not want to cast aspersions on the effort that it is making. It has put an additional team in to try to analyse the problem, and I receive daily and weekly reports from them. The point I would make is that in terms of UKBA improving over the next couple of years ...

The first reaction of a senior civil servant like Mr Whiteman is meant to be in favour of the public. That's what the public service ethos is. But when Mr Whiteman is asked to name the contractor responsible for the failure of a major IT system his first reaction is "I would rather not say".

His first reaction is to try to hide information. From Parliament and from the public.

His first reaction is in favour of the producer. "I would rather not say". This is producer capture.

The relationship between the Home Office and its suppliers in this case and others is pathological. Mr Whiteman's posture is craven. He isn't meant to be beholden to his suppliers. That's the wrong way round. Instead of serving the public, he finds himself serving UKBA's consultants and contractors. Which leaves the public paying and unserved.

Dead fish Home Office has lost sight of the "public" in "public service" – Rob Whiteman

Thanks to Anna Leach writing in The Register magazine, the following astonishing interchange at a Home Affairs Committee evidence session (15 May 2012) is brought to everyone's attention. The Chair of the Committee is Rt Hon Keith Vaz MP and Rob Whiteman is Chief Executive of the UK Border Agency, part of the Home Office:

Q151 Chair: ... over the issue of your computer system that crashed at Lunar house. Hundreds of people were turned away, and we hear that some were in tears at the fact that the system did not work. What went wrong? Have we got compensation from the IT company? Will it happen again, and have we rearranged all the appointments? Rob Whiteman: We contacted people over the bank holiday weekend and rearranged appointments. Around 500 appointments that were cancelled were rearranged. The issues around IT are incredibly frustrating for my staff, as well as for our customers. When I meet staff, it is a constant frustration that systems do not work all the time and that some of the resilience issues do not conform to common standards. In terms of morale and other issues, it is absolutely vital that we get to the heart of these IT problems. They are complex, yes, but- Q152 Chair: Yes, but we do not want to go into that now. Do we know why it broke down? Rob Whiteman: We do know why it broke down. It was an error on the network that affected the way appointments were queued from the system, and therefore they could not travel properly around the network. It was an IT failure, but, to answer your question, I have discussed this several times with the Chief Executive of the IT company that is the primary IT provider. Q153 Chair: What is the company? Rob Whiteman: I would rather not say. Q154 Chair: I am sorry, Mr Whiteman; this is a Select Committee of the House- Rob Whiteman: It is Atos. Q155 Chair: There is no need to be secret with us; we will find out. It is public money. It is not coming out of your pocket. The taxpayer is paying. What is the name of the company? Rob Whiteman: Atos. Q156 Chair: And what was his explanation as to why it broke down? Rob Whiteman: The reason I was reluctant, Chairman, is that we have a contract with Atos. It is trying its best to resolve the issues, but obviously we are being a demanding client and saying that performance is not good enough. Q157 Chair: As you should be. Rob Whiteman: I would not want to cast aspersions on the effort that it is making. It has put an additional team in to try to analyse the problem, and I receive daily and weekly reports from them. The point I would make is that in terms of UKBA improving over the next couple of years ...

The first reaction of a senior civil servant like Mr Whiteman is meant to be in favour of the public. That's what the public service ethos is. But when Mr Whiteman is asked to name the contractor responsible for the failure of a major IT system his first reaction is "I would rather not say".

His first reaction is to try to hide information. From Parliament and from the public.

His first reaction is in favour of the producer. "I would rather not say". This is producer capture.

The relationship between the Home Office and its suppliers in this case and others is pathological. Mr Whiteman's posture is craven. He isn't meant to be beholden to his suppliers. That's the wrong way round. Instead of serving the public, he finds himself serving UKBA's consultants and contractors. Which leaves the public paying and unserved.

UKBA – what do the Board do for £1 million p.a.?

They're a busy lot on the Home Affairs Committee. On 11 April 2012, they published their 21st report since September 2010, Work of the UK Border Agency (August - December 2011).

No advance on their 17th report back in January, Inquiry into the provision of UK Border Controls, the Committee draw attention to the UK Border Agency's contemptuous lack of co-operation with parliament (para.79-81). Parliament is meant to be supreme. The Executive, in the form of UKBA, continues to behave as though it is supreme.

As with the 17th report, the Committee make the obvious point that the UK Border Agency is not an agency of the Home office at all, it is an integral part of the Home Office. The word "Agency" appears accordingly in inverted commas throughout the report.

The failings of UKBA do not stop at the Board of UKBA, they go to the top of the Home Office, to Dame Helen Ghosh, the permanent secretary. And they did not start with her, they go back to the incumbency of her predecessor, Sir David Normington.

The Committee expect not only the chief executive of UKBA to co-operate with them but also the permanent secretary (para.12, 37, 73). UKBA's failings are her failings as much as Rob Whiteman's.

And what are those failings?

The Committee list them under 23 headings in this report.

They start by listing the salaries of eight executive members of the UKBA Board, roughly £1 million per annum. £1 million should buy any organisation a lot of management and direction. Especially when, as in this case, it doesn't stop there, there is further input from the top levels of the Home Office.

In the event, with failings in 23 areas reported here, and more being signalled for upcoming Committee enquiries, the expected management and direction are not being delivered.

John Vine, the Independent Chief Inspector of UKBA, made the point in his report on the Brodie Clark affair that (p.6):

There is nothing I have discovered which could not have been identified and addressed by senior managers exercising proper oversight.

The question arises, if they're not exercising proper oversight, what are Dame Helen and Rob Whiteman and the other senior civil servants doing?

UKBA – what do the Board do for £1 million p.a.?

They're a busy lot on the Home Affairs Committee. On 11 April 2012, they published their 21st report since September 2010, Work of the UK Border Agency (August - December 2011).

No advance on their 17th report back in January, Inquiry into the provision of UK Border Controls, the Committee draw attention to the UK Border Agency's contemptuous lack of co-operation with parliament (para.79-81). Parliament is meant to be supreme. The Executive, in the form of UKBA, continues to behave as though it is supreme.

PressRelease: Brodie Clark and the scoop the media missed

PRESS RELEASE

To:

Home Office

OIG (re US-VISIT)

IDABC (re OSCIE)

China (re Golden Shield)

Pakistan (re NADRA)

FBI (re NGI)

UIDAI (re Aadhaar)

Agencies

Brodie Clark and the scoop the media missed

9 January 2012

It was such an easy story to write when the pack was let loose last November. Brodie Clark had endangered us all by suspending biometric checks at the border.

It was so easy that, when Brodie Clark gave evidence to the Home Affairs Committee, no-one noticed the bombshell he smuggled in.

Border security in the UK, the control of migration and the safety of the 2012 Olympics all depend, we are told by the UK Border Agency, on biometric checks. Hundreds of millions of pounds of public money – your money and mine – have been spent since the coalition government came to power on security systems which depend for their success on the biometrics used being reliable.

And what did Brodie Clark say? In a six-minute passage of his testimony, between 12:18 and 12:24 on 15 November 2011, he said that the fingerprint check is the least reliable security/identity check available at the border, it is the ninth and bottom priority for officers of the Border Force and when push comes to shove (literally) in the marshalling areas for airport arrivals, it is “very sensible” to suspend fingerprint checks, that is a practice of his former staff, he was at pains to emphasise, that he approved at the time and still approves of.

To paraphrase, Theresa May is quite right to be furious, but not with Brodie Clark. Her fury should properly be directed at the credulous adoption of expensive technology that doesn’t work. That is what threatens the security of the border and the control of migration and the safety of the Olympics.

It’s a major story. And the media missed it.

Luckily, the opportunity will soon be with us for the media to make good. Some time in the next few weeks John Vine, the Independent Chief Inspector of the UK Border Agency, will present his report on the Brodie Clark affair to the Home Office.

All eyes on John Vine and that report of his. Let’s get it right this time.

For background briefing, please see:

1. Lin Homer, Brodie Clark and Ron Noble

2. Brodie Clark and Jackie Keane

3. Theresa May, Damian Green, Helen Ghosh, John Vine, Jonathan Sedgwick, Brodie Clark and Jackie Keane

4. Theresa May, Keith Vaz, John Vine and Brodie Clark

---

About Business Consultancy Services Ltd (BCSL):
BCSL has operated as an IT consultancy since 1984. The past 9 years have been spent campaigning against the Home Office's plans to introduce government ID cards into the UK. It must now be admitted that the Labour government 1997-2010 were much better at convincing people that these plans are a bad idea than anyone else, including BCSL.

Press contacts: David Moss, BCSL@blueyonder.co.uk

PressRelease: Brodie Clark and the scoop the media missed

PRESS RELEASE

To:

Home Office

OIG (re US-VISIT)

IDABC (re OSCIE)

China (re Golden Shield)

Pakistan (re NADRA)

FBI (re NGI)

UIDAI (re Aadhaar)

Agencies

Brodie Clark and the scoop the media missed

9 January 2012

It was such an easy story to write when the pack was let loose last November. Brodie Clark had endangered us all by suspending biometric checks at the border.

It was so easy that, when Brodie Clark gave evidence to the Home Affairs Committee, no-one noticed the bombshell he smuggled in.

Border security in the UK, the control of migration and the safety of the 2012 Olympics all depend, we are told by the UK Border Agency, on biometric checks. Hundreds of millions of pounds of public money – your money and mine – have been spent since the coalition government came to power on security systems which depend for their success on the biometrics used being reliable.

And what did Brodie Clark say? In a six-minute passage of his testimony, between 12:18 and 12:24 on 15 November 2011, he said that the fingerprint check is the least reliable security/identity check available at the border, it is the ninth and bottom priority for officers of the Border Force and when push comes to shove (literally) in the marshalling areas for airport arrivals, it is “very sensible” to suspend fingerprint checks, that is a practice of his former staff, he was at pains to emphasise, that he approved at the time and still approves of.

To paraphrase, Theresa May is quite right to be furious, but not with Brodie Clark. Her fury should properly be directed at the credulous adoption of expensive technology that doesn’t work. That is what threatens the security of the border and the control of migration and the safety of the Olympics.

It’s a major story. And the media missed it.

Luckily, the opportunity will soon be with us for the media to make good. Some time in the next few weeks John Vine, the Independent Chief Inspector of the UK Border Agency, will present his report on the Brodie Clark affair to the Home Office.

All eyes on John Vine and that report of his. Let’s get it right this time.

For background briefing, please see:

1. Lin Homer, Brodie Clark and Ron Noble

2. Brodie Clark and Jackie Keane

3. Theresa May, Damian Green, Helen Ghosh, John Vine, Jonathan Sedgwick, Brodie Clark and Jackie Keane

4. Theresa May, Keith Vaz, John Vine and Brodie Clark

---

About Business Consultancy Services Ltd (BCSL):
BCSL has operated as an IT consultancy since 1984. The past 9 years have been spent campaigning against the Home Office's plans to introduce government ID cards into the UK. It must now be admitted that the Labour government 1997-2010 were much better at convincing people that these plans are a bad idea than anyone else, including BCSL.

Press contacts: David Moss, BCSL@blueyonder.co.uk

Theresa May, Keith Vaz, John Vine and Brodie Clark

The allegations against Brodie Clark are listed in Rt Hon Theresa May MP's statement to the House on 7 November 2011:

First, biometric checks on EEA nationals and Warnings Index checks on EEA national children were abandoned on a regular basis, without ministerial approval. Biometric checks on non-EEA nationals were also thought to have been abandoned on occasions, without ministerial approval. Second, adults were not checked against the Warnings Index at Calais, without ministerial approval. Third, the verification of the fingerprints of non-EEA nationals from countries that require a visa was stopped, without ministerial approval.

The suggestion is that Brodie Clark has deliberately endangered us all. No wonder the Home Secretary was furious. If the allegations are proven, then Mr Clark's behaviour was monstrous.

The Home Office have launched three investigations into the matter:

Mr Speaker, there is nothing more important than the security of our border, and because of the seriousness of these allegations, I have ordered a number of investigations. Dave Wood, head of the UKBA Enforcement and Crime Group and a former Metropolitan Police Officer, will carry out an investigation into exactly how, when and where the suspension of checks might have taken place. Mike Anderson, Director General of Immigration, is looking at the actions of the wider team working for Brodie Clark. And John Vine will conduct a thorough review to find out exactly what happened across UKBA in terms of the checks, how the chain of command in Border Force operates and whether the system needs to be changed in future.  And, for the sake of clarity, I am very happy for Mr Vine to look at what decisions were made and when by ministers. That investigation will begin immediately and will report by the end of January. I will place the terms of reference for these inquiries in the House of Commons Library. Mr Speaker, border security is fundamental to our national security and to our policy of reducing and controlling immigration.

John Vine CBE QPM is the Independent Chief Inspector of UKBA. It was in the course of his duties that he inspected Heathrow Terminal 3 in October 2011 and questioned Brodie Clark about the number of times biometric security/identity checks had been halted. It was when he reported his findings to Rob Whiteman, the Chief Executive of UKBA, that Brodie Clark was suspended. And now he is in charge of one of the investigations.

There are obvious questions here about just how independent Mr Vine can be. Very properly, Rt Hon Keith Vaz MP, chairman of the Home Affairs Committee, has allowed that matter to be raised. Mr Vine will be under considerable pressure to demonstrate his independence when he reports some time in the next few weeks.

Brodie Clark argues that he did not endanger border security. Agreeing to drop biometric checks, he says, was sensible in the circumstances, they are the ninth and bottom priority in the pecking order of identity/security checks, they are the least reliable check (testimony given between 12:18 and 12:24, 15 November 2011):



That defence cannot be ignored. Not in an independent report.

Given that Brodie Clark's testimony can't be swept under the carpet, Mr Vine has a choice:

1. He can declare himself to be no expert in mass consumer biometrics and leave it up to someone else to decide whether they are reliable enough to make a cost-effective and material contribution to border security.
2. Or he can use his report to say categorically, one way or the other, whether Brodie Clark is right.

If he says that Brodie Clark is wrong, he will have to be able to prove it. He will have to be able to prove that the biometrics chosen by UKBA are reliable. UKBA themselves have never offered any evidence to support that claim*. The suppliers of the biometric technology have never offered any warranties. There is a large body of respectable, published evidence suggesting that the technology is unreliable and the considered opinion is that the discipline of biometrics is out of statistical control. It is unlikely that Mr Vine will be able, in the time available to him, to prove that Brodie Clark is wrong.

Which leaves just one option – Mr Vine could report that Brodie Clark is right. In other words, paraphrasing Mr Clark loosely, UKBA have been wasting their time and the public's money on biometrics, biometrics do not help to secure the border and control immigration, and they will do nothing to make the Olympics safe.

Whichever option Mr Vine chooses, it is to be hoped that the media will be paying attention. They missed the scoop that Brodie Clark gave them on 15 November 2011. They mustn't miss it again.

---

* UKBA vigorously resist attempts under the freedom of Information Act to get them to disclose the evidence they claim to have. Freedom of Information Request No.13728 celebrated its second birthday last week, on Friday 6 January 2011, Twelfth Night, Epiphany and the scene is set for many happy returns.

Theresa May, Keith Vaz, John Vine and Brodie Clark

The allegations against Brodie Clark are listed in Rt Hon Theresa May MP's statement to the House on 7 November 2011:

First, biometric checks on EEA nationals and Warnings Index checks on EEA national children were abandoned on a regular basis, without ministerial approval. Biometric checks on non-EEA nationals were also thought to have been abandoned on occasions, without ministerial approval. Second, adults were not checked against the Warnings Index at Calais, without ministerial approval. Third, the verification of the fingerprints of non-EEA nationals from countries that require a visa was stopped, without ministerial approval.

The suggestion is that Brodie Clark has deliberately endangered us all. No wonder the Home Secretary was furious. If the allegations are proven, then Mr Clark's behaviour was monstrous.

Theresa May, Damian Green, Helen Ghosh, John Vine, Jonathan Sedgwick, Brodie Clark and Jackie Keane

In their Annual Report and Accounts for the year ending 31 March 2011, signed by Jonathan Sedgwick, Acting Chief Executive at the time, UKBA say (p.12):

The average number of full-time equivalent (FTE) active staff we paid for either directly or indirectly during 2010-11 was 23,426 (compared with 24,474 in 2009-10) The size of the agency’s workforce reduced by around 1,900 (8 per cent) during 2010-11. We plan to achieve further efficiencies, resulting in further workforce reductions, in the period between April 2011 and March 2015.

UKBA plan to reduce the headcount by a further 4,500 by 31 March 2015 (p.13).

How?

Answer, by replacing people with technology. 900 of those 4,500 were dealt with by Dame Helen Ghosh DCB, Permanent Secretary at the Home Office, who told the Home Affairs Committee when she gave evidence on 22 November 2011 (Q358) that:

... there are plans, over the SR10 period*, to reduce the staff of the Border Force by around 900 people, from almost 8,000 people at the start of the period. But that is driven as much by technological introductions like e-gates, as well as a risk-based approach. Border Force will be getting smaller ...

"e-gates"? Electronic gates, or smart gates, use biometrics based on facial geometry to verify a traveller's identity. That's the theory. Do they work in practice? They never have in the past^†. Do UKBA have any reason to believe that they work now? According to John Vine CBE QPM, the Independent Chief Inspector of UKBA, no. In his May 2010 inspection report on Manchester Airport, he said:

5.29 We could find no overall plan to evaluate the success or otherwise of the facial recognition gates at Manchester Airport and would urge the Agency to do so [as] soon as possible.

"risk-based approach"? "risk-based" seems to be used interchangeably with "intelligence-led", "eBorders" and "Warnings Index". Rt Hon Theresa May MP, Home Secretary, dealt with the matter when she gave evidence to the Home Affairs Committee on 8 November 2011:

Q33 Michael Ellis: ... can you elaborate on what is meant by intelligence-led security measures? ... Theresa May: Indeed. The basis on which the pilot was to operate was that it was to enable a greater focus on those who were at higher risk. Intelligence-led, led also at the discretion of the officers at the border so that they would be assessing within the two categories of EEA nationals and the biometric chips, and EEA national children ...

Damian Green MP, Immigration Minister, returned to the question when he gave evidence on 22 November 2011:

Q423 Dr Huppert: I would certainly provide a steer towards risk-based, intelligence-led controls. What options are there for taking this further? How can we become sharper at using that? Damian Green: The root of it is early intelligence and information. That is why this Government, even through the difficulties of getting rid of the previous e-Borders main contractor, because it was running behind so badly, are determined to carry on with e-Borders. We already have 90% of flights from outside Europe covered by that. It is that kind of early intelligence-intelligence before people get on a plane-that will help us make our borders secure. The old idea that the border starts at Dover or Heathrow will become increasingly old-fashioned. I want to export our borders, so that they start at airports around the world, and so that, as is the case now, if people come through France, the borders start at Calais or Gare du Nord, or at Brussels rather than Dover. We have already stopped 68,000 people who would otherwise have got on planes flying in the past year, because of intelligence that we have collected. It seems to me that that is the route that we need to go down.

The "main contractor" Mr Green refers to, the organisation in charge of delivering eBorders^† – the seat of intelligence-led, risk-based border control – is Raytheon Systems Ltd, manufacturers of the Cruise missile. One of the coalition government's first acts was to fire Raytheon. Raytheon are now suing us for £500 million.

In the meantime, IBM have taken over the eBorders contract. Sheikh Raed Salah flew into the UK despite being on the eBorders Warnings Index, the problem being, according to the BBC, that IBM's system relies on little slips of paper being distributed to Immigration Officers and the slips don't always get to the right IO and another problem being, also according to the BBC, that a lot of the information on the Warnings Index is false, put there by malicious people denouncing someone they don't like.

Along with Dame Helen's "e-gates" and the "risk-based approach", of course, we also have Jackie Keane's IABS to secure the border and to control immigration and to make the Olympics safe. Except that Brodie Clark considers the technology of IABS to provide the least reliable of any identity/security check at the border.

Is this an optimal allocation of resources?

• 900 officers of the Border Force will be lost to all this dubious technology.
• Since the coalition government came to office, between 12 May 2010 and 31 October 2011, the Home Office has spent £491,304,533.51^† with the contractors involved in the smart gates, ePassports, eBorders and IABS initiatives. Using the figures in Jonathan Sedgwick's accounts, that is enough money to pay all 900 officers for 12 years.

Is all that public money – your money and mine – being wisely invested?

----------
* SR10 is the four-year period 1 April 2011 to 31 March 2015 covered by the 2010 Spending Review
^† It should be made clear that the Wikipedia article linked to here is two-thirds written by DMossEsq

Theresa May, Damian Green, Helen Ghosh, John Vine, Jonathan Sedgwick, Brodie Clark and Jackie Keane

In their Annual Report and Accounts for the year ending 31 March 2011, signed by Jonathan Sedgwick, Acting Chief Executive at the time, UKBA say (p.12):

The average number of full-time equivalent (FTE) active staff we paid for either directly or indirectly during 2010-11 was 23,426 (compared with 24,474 in 2009-10) The size of the agency’s workforce reduced by around 1,900 (8 per cent) during 2010-11. We plan to achieve further efficiencies, resulting in further workforce reductions, in the period between April 2011 and March 2015.

UKBA plan to reduce the headcount by a further 4,500 by 31 March 2015 (p.13).

How?

Brodie Clark and Jackie Keane

UK Border Agency News is published bi-monthly. Issue 6, the March 2011 edition, includes this article (p.5):

The Immigration & Asylum Biometric System (IABS) The latest in biometric matching technology will be introduced to the agency in 2011. The Immigration & Asylum Biometric System (IABS) will replace our current fingerprint system (IAFS) at the end of 2011 with the latest in biometric matching technology. Biometrics are used overseas, at the border and in country to establish a unique identity for each applicant. This is principally in the form of digital fingerprints and a facial photograph. Fingerprints are recorded and checked when individuals are applying for visas or biometric residence permits, and when asylum seekers require registration cards. The biometric information helps to ensure that decisions are made quickly and fairly and that the UK is protected. IABS will replace the current system while also incorporating additional features. It will allow biometrics to be taken, stored and matched with improved accuracy to ensure that identity is reliably established, whether at the border or within country. It will also improve the service currently offered by providing the flexibility to extend the system in the future should additional functionality be required. An exciting development has been the recent approval for the IABS technology to capture biometrics of visa national Games Family Members (GFM) during the Olympic and Paralympic Games in 2012. GFM include athletes, coaches, sporting officials, sponsors and the media who are travelling on the Olympic or Paralympic Identity and Accreditation Card. By replacing the existing fingerprint system with improved and advanced technology we are ensuring that the agency can continue to secure the border and control migration now and in the future. The IABS Programme Team, led by Programme Director Jackie Keane, is working closely with its suppliers IBM, Fujitsu and ATOS and the testing phase of the programme has started. For further information please contact Janis MacLennan IABS Partnership and Communication Manager on 0203 014 4297.

Jackie Keane is a senior civil servant. You'll find her on the UK Border Agency Senior Management Team organisation chart, November 2011. She wants you to believe that, thanks to the ability of biometrics based on facial geometry and flat print fingerprints to "establish a unique identity" quickly, accurately and reliably for everyone*, the border will be secured, migration will be controlled and the Olympics will be safe.

Brodie Clark was an even more senior civil servant. And when he gave evidence to the Home Affairs Committee on 15 November 2011 (12:18-12:24), he said that the fingerprint check at the border was the least reliable security/identity check, it is the ninth and bottom priority and, when the crowds in the Arrivals area threaten to become chaotic, it is "very sensible" to stop doing fingerprint checks.

They can't both be right.

That is the "confusion ... in this vital area of national security" that the Independent failed to identify. That is the scoop that Brodie Clark provided at his evidence session in front of the Home Affairs Committee and that the Independent and every other media organisation missed.

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* Biometrics do not have this ability. The UK Border Agency News article is misleading

Brodie Clark and Jackie Keane

UK Border Agency News is published bi-monthly. Issue 6, the March 2011 edition, includes this article (p.5):

The Immigration & Asylum Biometric System (IABS) The latest in biometric matching technology will be introduced to the agency in 2011. The Immigration & Asylum Biometric System (IABS) will replace our current fingerprint system (IAFS) at the end of 2011 with the latest in biometric matching technology. Biometrics are used overseas, at the border and in country to establish a unique identity for each applicant. This is principally in the form of digital fingerprints and a facial photograph. Fingerprints are recorded and checked when individuals are applying for visas or biometric residence permits, and when asylum seekers require registration cards. The biometric information helps to ensure that decisions are made quickly and fairly and that the UK is protected. IABS will replace the current system while also incorporating additional features. It will allow biometrics to be taken, stored and matched with improved accuracy to ensure that identity is reliably established, whether at the border or within country. It will also improve the service currently offered by providing the flexibility to extend the system in the future should additional functionality be required. An exciting development has been the recent approval for the IABS technology to capture biometrics of visa national Games Family Members (GFM) during the Olympic and Paralympic Games in 2012. GFM include athletes, coaches, sporting officials, sponsors and the media who are travelling on the Olympic or Paralympic Identity and Accreditation Card. By replacing the existing fingerprint system with improved and advanced technology we are ensuring that the agency can continue to secure the border and control migration now and in the future. The IABS Programme Team, led by Programme Director Jackie Keane, is working closely with its suppliers IBM, Fujitsu and ATOS and the testing phase of the programme has started. For further information please contact Janis MacLennan IABS Partnership and Communication Manager on 0203 014 4297.

Jackie Keane is a senior civil servant. You'll find her on the UK Border Agency Senior Management Team organisation chart, November 2011. She wants you to believe that, thanks to the ability of biometrics based on facial geometry and flat print fingerprints to "establish a unique identity" quickly, accurately and reliably for everyone*, the border will be secured, migration will be controlled and the Olympics will be safe.

Brodie Clark was an even more senior civil servant. And when he gave evidence to the Home Affairs Committee on 15 November 2011 (12:18-12:24), he said that the fingerprint check at the border was the least reliable security/identity check, it is the ninth and bottom priority and, when the crowds in the Arrivals area threaten to become chaotic, it is "very sensible" to stop doing fingerprint checks.

They can't both be right.

That is the "confusion ... in this vital area of national security" that the Independent failed to identify. That is the scoop that Brodie Clark provided at his evidence session in front of the Home Affairs Committee and that the Independent and every other media organisation missed.

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* Biometrics do not have this ability. The UK Border Agency News article is misleading

Lin Homer, Brodie Clark and Ron Noble

Ron Noble, Secretary General of Interpol, is in London to discuss security arrangements for the Olympics.

He gave an interview to the Independent. Interpol maintains a database of lost and stolen passports, and:

Britain is the only EU country to systematically check passports against those registered as missing worldwide. Last year more than 11,000 people were caught trying to enter the UK using lost or stolen passports. Britain carries out more checks against the database than the rest of Europe combined – 140 million last year. France carried out the second highest number, at 10 million. The UK Border Agency acknowledged the importance of the Interpol system, saying its high usage of the database was "indicative of the seriousness and priority we place on border security".

This is quite a turnaround.

In December 2004, Ron Noble lambasted the UK when he flew in and wasn't even asked for his passport number:

Interpol concern over UK borders The head of Interpol has told of his "surprise" at shortcomings in the passport controls at UK borders. Ron Noble, an American, said he was not asked for his passport serial number when he entered the UK.

The situation didn't improve and in July 2007 Ron Noble returned to the fray:

Interpol said last night that the UK makes just 50 checks a month of the database; France by comparison makes 700,000 checks and Switzerland makes 300,000 ... Mr Noble said that Gordon Brown's promise last week to share a list of potential terrorists with other countries had yet to materialize. "British citizens might be surprised to find that this watch list announced by your prime minister last week has not been sent to Interpol," he said. "Why is it that some countries make sure passengers do not carry a bottle of spring water on to a plane, yet aren't careful to ensure convicted felons aren't entering their borders with stolen passports?"

Someone took up the matter with Lin Homer, Chief Executive of the UK Border Agency at the time. Ms Homer kindly wrote back and said that UKBA had started to use the Interpol database more frequently in 2007 and, by 2010:

Around 70 million checks are made against the database per year and to date there have been 13346 hits and 5108 documents seized.

The UK has gone from 600 checks p.a. against the Interpol database to 70 million and, now, to 140 million. You don't get a turnaround like that unless someone makes a determined effort. Who? Lin Homer. Well done, Lin Homer, and thank you. And thank you, Brodie Clark, sometime head of the UK Border Force.

After their Ron Noble interview, the Independent published a leading article on 30 December 2011. Does Lin Homer get a mention? No.

Brodie Clark does. Happy New Year to you, too:

Equally, although Mr Noble may have praised UK immigration controls compared with those of our neighbours, the British system is far from perfect. Only last month, the head of the border force quit in a row over a relaxation of security which the Home Secretary claimed had been done without her knowledge. That Brodie Clark is now suing for constructive dismissal only adds to the alarming sense of confusion and buck-passing in this vital area of national security.

The Independent regards the actions of UKBA and Interpol together as praiseworthy but Brodie Clark gets no recognition from the newspaper for his part in protecting the border by making use of the Interpol database.

Certain allegations have been made against Brodie Clark and he disputes them all. The matter is being investigated by the Home Affairs Committee, the Home Office has launched three internal investigations and, at some point, an employment tribunal will be convened. What are the results of all those quasi-judicial investigations? No-one knows but the Independent feels itself already justified in pointing the finger at Brodie Clark.

There is "confusion and buck-passing" there. But in their unbalanced coverage, the Independent have not identified the seat of that confusion.

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Update 8 January 2011
Mazher Mahmood, 8 January 2011, Sunday Times, Illegals enter the UK on ‘passports for hire’:

• Mr Mahmood identifies two people who got into the UK using other people's lost or stolen ID – a Sunday Times reporter and a lady who was sent to jail by Wood Green Crown Court in 2010. All the other illegal immigrants referred to in his article are in Greece, and not the UK. It looks as though UKBA are doing rather well, checking travel documents against the Interpol database.
• Mr Mahmood's article includes a quotation from an unnamed senior police source asserting that biometric checks would be more effective – no evidence for that assertion is given. Has Mr Mahmood perhaps been deceived by an impostor, a biometrics technology salesman posing as a policeman?

Lin Homer, Brodie Clark and Ron Noble

Ron Noble, Secretary General of Interpol, is in London to discuss security arrangements for the Olympics.

He gave an interview to the Independent. Interpol maintains a database of lost and stolen passports, and:

Britain is the only EU country to systematically check passports against those registered as missing worldwide. Last year more than 11,000 people were caught trying to enter the UK using lost or stolen passports. Britain carries out more checks against the database than the rest of Europe combined – 140 million last year. France carried out the second highest number, at 10 million. The UK Border Agency acknowledged the importance of the Interpol system, saying its high usage of the database was "indicative of the seriousness and priority we place on border security".

This is quite a turnaround.

The on the spot answer

This is the (draft and subject to change) answer to a comment posted by one Mr Reader:

Dear Mr Reader

Thank you for trying to put me on the spot. I’ve been trying to put myself on the spot for years. And failing.

Assuming that that continues, when the final enquiry report is in at the end of next month, the most likely outcome is that everyone’s reputation will be tarnished – Brodie Clark, Theresa May and Helen Ghosh – but the daily round will revert to its pre-4 November 2011 pattern, the usual dismal calm will prevail in the Dark Department, there will be no more sense of sudden explosions, nasty surprises and unexpected eruptions.

That’s the 98%+ likely scenario. A dirty taste in the mouth, business as usual re-established.

The outcome with the 2%- probability of happening?

Consider the following Economist article, Friday 11 May 2012:

Brodie Clark speaks quietly and at first no-one heard him say that fingerprint verification is the ninth and lowest priority security/identity check at the border, the least reliable check and the most sensible check to suspend when the disorderly queues in Arrivals begin to threaten safety.

Well everyone’s heard him now, thanks to the alliance between Theresa May, the UK’s Home Secretary, and Helen Ghosh, Permanent Secretary at the Home Office. Their careers both shipped a lot of water in the days following 4 November 2011 and they were determined to find out why.

Clark was supposed to have endangered UK border security by suspending fingerprint checks. But May and Ghosh could find no evidence that fingerprint checks promote border security. There is none. So he hadn’t endangered anything.

True, he had arguably disobeyed his minister. She had specifically instructed that fingerprint checks were not to be relaxed for non-EEA nationals. But did that instruction refer exclusively to the new intelligence-led border security scheme being piloted? Was the suspension of fingerprint checks covered by the 2007 HOWI procedures?

Pure noise. The real question was: why did the Home Secretary instruct that fingerprint checks should not be suspended, given that they’re no use? Answer, because she had been told by her officials that the technology is reliable. Who told her that? And why?

As May and Ghosh looked deeper and deeper into the affair, the tangled web of today’s mass consumer biometrics industry began to unravel. First in the UK Border Agency, where IBM’s National Identity Assurance Service contract was cancelled. That took out Morpho at the same time. (Morpho is a subsidiary of France’s Safran Group, their answer to our BAE Systems.) And Computer Sciences Corporation and VFS Global.

The damage spread to the National Policing Improvement Agency, where they were using Morpho’s products for mobile fingerprinting by police patrols – not any more they’re not. And to the Identity & Passport Service, where they use Morpho for biometrics in ePassports. For the moment. And to DWP, who were going to use voice biometrics for their Universal Credit system, but can only be described now as tight-lipped about their plans.

Who advised the Home office on biometrics? They got internal advice from the Home Office Scientific Development Branch and external consultancy advice from PA Consulting. Not any more they don’t.

How did this fiasco persist, the Prime Minister wants to know, under the leadership of Lord O'Donnell, until last years head of the home civil service, and Sir David Normington, Dame Helen's predecessor? We await the answer with interest.

Projects that depend on these biometrics being reliable were being cancelled all over Whitehall. The taxpayer didn’t know whether to be furious about being deceived for so long by the Home Office or deliriously happy when the savings from all these cancelled projects over the next 10 years topped £20 billion.

This sort of news doesn’t respect borders. Safran Group were relying on Morpho for 20% of their turnover. Once the news had rowed across the channel, their turnover was down by 20%. Former President Sarkozy tried to blame the Anglo-Saxons but then turned on the European Commission, blaming their 2003 OSCIE specification for a pan-European biometric ID card. The European Commission blamed the US Department of Homeland Security and the DHS blamed NIST, the US National Institute of Standards and Technology.

Which was too much for Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in India, where they’re spending billions on Aadhaar, a biometrics-based identity management scheme for 1.2 billion people. At least they were.

And so the truth rolls on, bowling around the world, knocking over civil servants like ninepins wherever it fetches up. In China,  one day Dr Tieniu Tan was a research professor with dozens of successful spin-off companies and, next day, he wasn’t. In Pakistan, first Brigadier Saleem Ahmed Moeen (Retd) was Chairman of NADRA, then there was no NADRA and now the Brigadier really is retired.

And all because of a quietly-spoken Glaswegian, speaking quietly on 15 November 2011, giving evidence to the Home Affairs Committee. Listen to him here. The good bit starts at 12:18.

The on the spot answer

This is the (draft and subject to change) answer to a comment posted by one Mr Reader:

Dear Mr Reader

Thank you for trying to put me on the spot. I’ve been trying to put myself on the spot for years. And failing.

Assuming that that continues, when the final enquiry report is in at the end of next month, the most likely outcome is that everyone’s reputation will be tarnished – Brodie Clark, Theresa May and Helen Ghosh – but the daily round will revert to its pre-4 November 2011 pattern, the usual dismal calm will prevail in the Dark Department, there will be no more sense of sudden explosions, nasty surprises and unexpected eruptions.

That’s the 98%+ likely scenario. A dirty taste in the mouth, business as usual re-established.

Brodie Clark's evidence 3

The Home office has launched three investigations into the Brodie Clark affair:

One by Dave Wood, ex-Metropolitan Police detective, currently the UKBA's head of enforcement and crime group. This is a two-week inquiry designed to discover to what extent checks were scaled down, and what the security implications might have been. One by Mike Anderson, an ex-MI6 official, presently director general of the strategy, immigration and international group at the Home Office. This will investigate wider issues relating to the performance of UKBA. It was announced on 5 November 2011 by Theresa May that an independent inquiry would also be undertaken, led by the Chief Inspector of the UK Border Agency, John Vine.

On 8 December 2011, the Home Affairs Committee released new testimony submitted to them by Mr Clark which includes this:

I remain concerned that the only independent inquiry into matters is that of the Home Affairs Select Committee. I took from some of the exchanges in evidence with others that the HASC shares some of my concern. The investigation by Mr Wood is unsafe as he is a participant. He was at the Board meeting referred to above and as the committee noted, Mr Vine is a witness.

Brodie Clark's evidence 3

The Home office has launched three investigations into the Brodie Clark affair:

One by Dave Wood, ex-Metropolitan Police detective, currently the UKBA's head of enforcement and crime group. This is a two-week inquiry designed to discover to what extent checks were scaled down, and what the security implications might have been. One by Mike Anderson, an ex-MI6 official, presently director general of the strategy, immigration and international group at the Home Office. This will investigate wider issues relating to the performance of UKBA. It was announced on 5 November 2011 by Theresa May that an independent inquiry would also be undertaken, led by the Chief Inspector of the UK Border Agency, John Vine.

On 8 December 2011, the Home Affairs Committee released new testimony submitted to them by Mr Clark which includes this:

I remain concerned that the only independent inquiry into matters is that of the Home Affairs Select Committee. I took from some of the exchanges in evidence with others that the HASC shares some of my concern. The investigation by Mr Wood is unsafe as he is a participant. He was at the Board meeting referred to above and as the committee noted, Mr Vine is a witness.