Showing posts with label IBM. Show all posts
Showing posts with label IBM. Show all posts

Friday, 28 September 2012

Identity assurance – the clock is ticking, your moderation is awaiting comment

28 September 2012 and a reply to yesterday's enquiry has whizzed in from GDS, followed by a reply to the reply:

steve #

Thanks for your comment, David.

Firstly, please don’t take our lack of posts as evidence of inaction. We’ve actually been incredibly busy over the summer and are expecting a bumper crop of posts in October, to share what we’ve been up to. So, watch this space.

Secondly, DWP are still working to resolve final contractual issues. The outcome will only be made public when final contracts are signed.

Steve

28/09/2012

steve #

Furthermore, this notification will come from DWP, not Cabinet Office or GDS, as it is their framework.

28/09/2012


dmossesq #

Please Note: Your comment is awaiting moderation.

Dear Mr Wreyford

Thank you for your reply.

I don’t mistake the absence of posts for inactivity – as I said, surely there must have been some activity in view of the importance of Universal Credit.

You say that “DWP are still working to resolve final contractual issues”. Ex-Guardian man Mike Bracken made it clear on 1 March 2012 that Identity Assurance belongs to the Cabinet Office and not DWP: “… this approach ensures that, ultimately, HMG-wide Identity Assurance is supplied across central departments via a common procurement portal (to HMG agreed standards) and governed by the Cabinet Office”. Presumably GDS are involved in those “final contractual issues” just as much as if not more than DWP*.

The absence of posts does create a vacuum, though, which draws in all sorts of flotsam …

The Department for Business Innovation and Skills (BIS) midata initiative, for example. Why are GDS using BIS to try to legislate for Personal Data Stores/Inventories (PDSs/PDIs) instead of doing it themselves?

And GOV.UK – why waste a lot of time and money re-writing central government websites? Is it to provide consistent hooks for PDS-based identity assurance in all government communications over the web?

A PDS is a dynamic dematerialised ID card, isn’t it. The public won’t “wear it”. Neither will the banks if the Cabinet Office try to insert PDSs into the nation’s payment systems.

If Google and/or Facebook turn out to be on the list of GDS-approved suppliers of identity assurance services, then DWP and everyone else will have wasted their time negotiating any contractual issues, final or otherwise. Again, the public won’t wear it.

And the GOV.UK team will have wasted their time.

And BIS will have wasted their credibility …

Goodness, just look at all that dust, you never can tell what the vacuum’s going to draw up, can you. The sooner GDS can tell an expectant public what you’ve come up with identity assurancewise, the better.

———-

* While writing this reply of mine, your second reply popped up, trying to push responsibility back on to DWP. Too late, Mr Wreyford. The Cabinet Office burnt their bridges when they made DWP withdraw their December 2011 OJEU notice. You know that. If Universal Credit fails for lack of identity assurance, that will be the Cabinet Office’s fault now and not DWP’s.

28/09/2012
The last comment will only appear on the GDS blog after moderation by them and only if they want it to appear.

Identity assurance – the clock is ticking, your moderation is awaiting comment

28 September 2012 and a reply to yesterday's enquiry has whizzed in from GDS, followed by a reply to the reply:

Thursday, 27 September 2012

Identity assurance – the clock is ticking, your comment is awaiting moderation

27 September 2012 9:30-ish, posted on the Government Digital Service (GDS) blog here and here:
dmossesq #

Please Note: Your comment is awaiting moderation.

Steve Wreyford’s post on OIX is the latest on the ID assurance blog and is dated 14 June 2012, three months ago.

Has there been no activity on identity assurance since then?

Surely there must have been some, GDS are due to announce by the end of September – 85 hours time – which bidders have been approved to provide identity assurance services as per the 1 March 2012 notice in OJEU.

When will we be told who the winners are?

27/09/2012

Identity assurance – the clock is ticking, your comment is awaiting moderation

27 September 2012 9:30-ish, posted on the Government Digital Service (GDS) blog here and here:
dmossesq #

Please Note: Your comment is awaiting moderation.

Steve Wreyford’s post on OIX is the latest on the ID assurance blog and is dated 14 June 2012, three months ago.

Has there been no activity on identity assurance since then?

Surely there must have been some, GDS are due to announce by the end of September – 85 hours time – which bidders have been approved to provide identity assurance services as per the 1 March 2012 notice in OJEU.

When will we be told who the winners are?

27/09/2012

Tuesday, 25 September 2012

Identity assurance – the clock is ticking, ex-Guardian man Mike Bracken's chickens are coming home to roost

The Government Digital Service (GDS) is part of the Cabinet Office and has six projects on hand, including Identity Assurance:
The ID Assurance team are working on accrediting and approving third party identity to facilitate digital transactions between citizens and government.
If "citizens" and the government are to transact business on-line, there must be a rock solid identity assurance service so that each party knows who it's dealing with. Invitations to tender for the service were issued earlier this year.

GDS haven't so far publicly approved any third parties to provide identity assurance, but we shouldn't have long to wait – no more than five days, in fact:
The tendering process will run for several weeks and is expected to report successful bidders in September 2012.
Delays are only to be expected. Identity assurance for the entire population of the UK is a big project.

But in this case there can't be any delays. The joint GDS/DWP notice of the identity assurance project states that identity assurance is required to be ...
... fully operational from spring 2013.
That's six months time if we measure to the start of next spring, or nine months if we measure to the end. Either way, DWP's Universal Credit (UC) scheme has to be up and running by October 2013 and UC depends on identity assurance as Lord Freud, the welfare reform minister, has emphasised – no identity assurance, no UC.

Appearing before the House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee, Lord Freud was asked what is the biggest risk facing UC. His answer – identity assurance.

Why did DWP allow this dependency/risk? Why didn't they write their own invitation to tender?

They did. Then they withdrew it. Apparently at the command of the Cabinet Office. Because next thing, GDS announced that:
... this approach ensures that, ultimately, HMG-wide Identity Assurance is supplied across central departments via a common procurement portal (to HMG agreed standards) and governed by the Cabinet Office.
"Governed by the Cabinet Office" – GDS have put themselves on the spot. If UC fails now, is it Iain Duncan Smith's fault? Or Francis Maude's?

GDS must approve several accredited suppliers of identity assurance services in the next 120 hours. Who's likely to be on the list?

GDS are only offering up to £30 million for the identity assurance service and they're only letting contracts for 18 months.

The Home Office tried for eight years to issue us all with ID cards. They failed.

Which companies can afford to assure the identities of everyone in the UK – or at least the identities of the 21 million expected claimants for UC – for only £30 million? Which companies can afford to take the risk of losing their contract to a competitor only 18 months later? Not many of them. It can only be a short list.

The banks/credit card companies/PayPal, the phone companies, the utility companies and IBM might be big and competent enough. But they have to think about the failure of the Home Office and about reputational risk.

They wouldn't be in control of the identity assurance service. GDS would be, and if anything went wrong, even if it wasn't the contractors' fault, the banks/phone companies/utility companies/IBM would see their brands destroyed.

Any chief executive of a bank/phone company/... who signs up for one of these GDS identity assurance contracts would be roasted by the equity analysts and by their shareholders. Which means they won't.

We can probably forget the insurance companies and the credit rating agencies. Who else does that leave?

Google and Facebook.

In no more than 118 hours now and counting, ex-Guardian man Mike Bracken, executive director of the Government Digital Service and Senior Responsible Officer Owner for the Identity Assurance programme, is going to have to host a press conference at which he announces that he thinks it's a good idea for Google and Facebook to provide the electronic identities of everyone in the UK.

If you get an invitation, don't miss it.

Identity assurance – the clock is ticking, ex-Guardian man Mike Bracken's chickens are coming home to roost

The Government Digital Service (GDS) is part of the Cabinet Office and has six projects on hand, including Identity Assurance:
The ID Assurance team are working on accrediting and approving third party identity to facilitate digital transactions between citizens and government.
If "citizens" and the government are to transact business on-line, there must be a rock solid identity assurance service so that each party knows who it's dealing with. Invitations to tender for the service were issued earlier this year.

GDS haven't so far publicly approved any third parties to provide identity assurance, but we shouldn't have long to wait – no more than five days, in fact:
The tendering process will run for several weeks and is expected to report successful bidders in September 2012.
Delays are only to be expected. Identity assurance for the entire population of the UK is a big project.

Wednesday, 12 September 2012

Universal credit, national apathy

Writing in Monday's Guardian, The universal credit programme is on course for disaster, Frank Field concludes that:
It was brave of IDS [Iain Duncan Smith, Secretary of State at the Department for Work & Pensions (DWP)] to insist on occupying the command on the bridge, but it was the prime minister's wish to avert a catastrophe that drove him to try to move his work and pensions secretary so that the government could quietly shut down the whole reform. His failure to act leaves the disaster on course.
Mr Field believes that means-testing systems like UC, universal credit, create dependency and rot the souls of their parishioners. As the acknowledged authority on welfare, called upon by both the coalition government and their predecessors, his opinion is worth considering.

The idea behind UC was to "sweep together the main means-tested benefits and tax credits into one 'universal' benefit", Mr Field says, but DWP have given up on that.

In the unlikely event that UC is deployed, it won't do what it was meant to do and it will rot people's souls. That's what Mr Field says, and he says that the Prime Minister believes it, too – UC is on course for disaster.

They are not alone, Messrs Field and Cameron.

Intellect, the trade body of the UK IT industry, investigated UC and reported to DWP that the timescales for the project are unlikely to be met and that the promise that no-one will be worse off under UC is unlikely to be deliverable.

So that's Mr Field, Mr Cameron and Intellect. And the Local Government Association (LGA), who describe DWP's insistence on using so-called "agile" systems development methods for UC and on UC being online only – no old-fashioned paper forms to fill in – as:
... not grounded in reality.
The LGA isn't alone, either. It is one of no less than 70 organisations that have criticised UC.

70 organisations, and Liam "there's no money left" Byrne, who says:
Universal Credit is overdue and over budget and now everyone from the chancellor to charities, the CBI to local councils is warning this is a car-crash about to happen.

We've been warning of this for months and we're summoning Iain Duncan Smith to the Commons for a full scale debate.
DWP's response is that there's nothing to worry about:
Liam Byrne is quite simply wrong. Universal Credit is on track and on budget. To suggest anything else is incorrect.
But that's not their only response. DWP also commissioned reports on UC by IBM and McKinsey. Can we see these reports, please, Tony Collins, the campaigning journalist, asked and was told by DWP:
Disclosure would ... give the general public an unbalanced understanding of the Programme and potentially undermine policy outcomes, cause inappropriate concern (which in turn would need to be managed) and damage progress to the detriment of the Government’s key welfare reform and the wider UK economy.
Ministers may to some extent devise policy but it is officials who implement it, as the BBC's Nick Robinson was told in no uncertain terms by Rachel Lomax, the former mandarin. "To suggest anything else is incorrect". It is officials and not IDS:
  • who decided that they couldn't "sweep together the main means-tested benefits and tax credits into one 'universal' benefit" ...
  • and who decided that waving the magic word "agile" around would keep UC "on track and on budget" ...
  • and who decided that UC should be available online only.
How will DWP identify people online? As we now know, DWP hope that it will be through the Cabinet Office's Identity Assurance programme, currently being spearheaded for them by the Department for Business Innovation and Skills's midata initiative. According to midata, everyone will have a PDI, a personal data inventory, and so UC will work. Maybe. But not in this world, it's just "not grounded in reality".

It seems likely that, as we all sit around with our rotting souls and our "unbalanced understanding", ruminating on our summer holidays, the Olympics and the Paralympics, billions of our pounds are once again being incinerated by Whitehall. We can't hear the crackling or see the smoke. All in good time. The National Audit Office report will be published in five years time. Plenty of time to worry about it then.

And while they survey the olympically apathetic British public – no sign of concern at all, not even "inappropriate concern" – what are Whitehall thinking about?

Themselves.

Peter Thomas is Director – Whitehall Transformation at the Institute for Government. He was previously Director then Interim Head at the Prime Minister's Delivery Unit in the Cabinet Office, Non-executive Director at the Improvement and Development Agency, Director of Performance Development at the Audit Commission, Associate Director then interim Director of the Public Services Research Directorate at the Audit Commission, Director of Policy and Regeneration at Westminster City Council and Head of Strategy and Support at Westminster City Council.

And meditating on a number of permanent secretaries jumping ship, Mr Thomas soliloquises as follows, although it's hard to see why:
Senior civil servants are people, not just bloodless lightning conductors, punchbags or beasts of burden for downsizing and cuts. They need to feel engaged, supported and valued at a time when more is being asked of them than ever – and their number is being reduced by as much as a third in some departments ...

We should watch the ranks of director, director general and permanent secretary to judge whether the Civil Service is beginning to see an exodus of too many of its best and brightest to somewhere they feel more valued and better supported to perform – somewhere that allows them to restore their dwindling sense of personal accomplishment.

Such an exodus would be bad for ministers, advisers, parliament and the country.

Universal credit, national apathy

Writing in Monday's Guardian, The universal credit programme is on course for disaster, Frank Field concludes that:
It was brave of IDS [Iain Duncan Smith, Secretary of State at the Department for Work & Pensions (DWP)] to insist on occupying the command on the bridge, but it was the prime minister's wish to avert a catastrophe that drove him to try to move his work and pensions secretary so that the government could quietly shut down the whole reform. His failure to act leaves the disaster on course.
Mr Field believes that means-testing systems like UC, universal credit, create dependency and rot the souls of their parishioners. As the acknowledged authority on welfare, called upon by both the coalition government and their predecessors, his opinion is worth considering.

Monday, 13 August 2012

Home Office soon to be Ghoshless

Home Office press release, 13 August 2012:
Dame Helen Ghosh to leave civil service
Dame Helen Ghosh DCB is to step down as Permanent Secretary of the Home Office to take up the role of Director General of the National Trust, she announced today.

Dame Helen will leave the department in September after a 33 year career in the civil service ...

Head of the Civil Service Sir Bob Kerslake said: 'As Permanent Secretary at Defra and the Home Office, Helen has delivered extraordinary change including departmental reform, the independent UK Border Force and support for the successful London Olympics.

'She has been an inspiring leader, who has made a very strong corporate contribution, both via the Civil Service Board, leading the capability strand of our Civil Service Reform Programme and as a vibrant role model and champion of talent and diversity. I wish her every success in her new leadership role at the National Trust.'

Helen Kilpatrick, Director General of the Financial and Commercial Group, will stand in as interim Permanent Secretary until a replacement for Helen Ghosh is appointed.
National Trust press release, 13 August 2012:
Dame Helen Ghosh DCB will be the next Director-General of the National Trust
... She will take over from Fiona Reynolds who has been at the helm for nearly 12 years ...

Fiona Reynolds ... moves on to become Master of Emmanuel College, Cambridge in 2013 ...
Emmanuel College past events, 6 March 2012:
London Drinks
Café Koha in London’s Leicester Square once again played host to informal drinks on the evening of Tuesday 6th March ...

The timing of the event meant that members were able to mark the sad passing of Lord St. John of Fawsley (which meant a wealth of affectionate anecdotes about his time as Master) and also celebrate the news from earlier in the day of the appointment of Dame Fiona Reynolds as our next Master.
Emmanuel can give six months notice of the Master's successor. The National Trust can give six weeks notice of the Director-General's successor. That is orderly and proper. The Home Office can't tell us who Dame Helen's successor will be, six weeks or so before she leaves. That looks messy – lessons there for Sir Bob from Emma and the NT.

Dame Helen's move could hardly be announced before the Olympics were over. They didn't exactly wait for long after the closing ceremony, though, did they.

The Sunday Times told us on 15 July 2012:
Originally, it was decided that 10,000 guards, including any military contingent, would be required on peak days. By December, that figure was revised up to 23,700 with G4S providing 13,700 trained guards, including 3,300 students.

Dame Helen Ghosh, the Home Office permanent secretary, admitted last December that the initial estimate had been a “finger in the air” estimate, based on information from the 2002 Commonwealth Games in Manchester and the 2006 Winter Olympic Games in Turin.
That finger in the air was Sir David Normington's, Dame Helen's slippery predecessor. He left her a mess. She didn't sort it out and the army had to be called in at undignified short notice.

The independent UK Border Force, for the creation of which Sir Bob praises Dame Helen, was the clumsy response to an absolute fiasco – the Brodie Clark affair.

Dame Helen will find it very different working with the great Simon Jenkins at the National Trust after decades of more or less biddable ministers.

Who called the shots in what looks like Dame Helen's ejection? Ministers? Maybe. Sir Bob Kerslake? Sir Jeremy Heywood? Maybe. Considerable power lies with the suppliers these days, IBM, CapGemini, HP, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, Fujitsu, CSC, Atos and suchlike. Did they want her out? Was she standing up to them? Will we miss her as a result? None of us on the outside has a clue what's going on. We are left making convoluted surmises like this because so much of Whitehall is cloaked in secrecy. That is not, in the end, did they but know it, to the advantage of senior civil servants.

And for us, the public? Dame Helen's successor? We'll see. Let's hope for one who is more open with the Home Affairs Committee and, indeed, the public.

----------

BBC Radio 4, Profile: Dame Helen Ghosh

Home Office soon to be Ghoshless

Home Office press release, 13 August 2012:
Dame Helen Ghosh to leave civil service
Dame Helen Ghosh DCB is to step down as Permanent Secretary of the Home Office to take up the role of Director General of the National Trust, she announced today.

Dame Helen will leave the department in September after a 33 year career in the civil service ...

Head of the Civil Service Sir Bob Kerslake said: 'As Permanent Secretary at Defra and the Home Office, Helen has delivered extraordinary change including departmental reform, the independent UK Border Force and support for the successful London Olympics.

'She has been an inspiring leader, who has made a very strong corporate contribution, both via the Civil Service Board, leading the capability strand of our Civil Service Reform Programme and as a vibrant role model and champion of talent and diversity. I wish her every success in her new leadership role at the National Trust.'

Helen Kilpatrick, Director General of the Financial and Commercial Group, will stand in as interim Permanent Secretary until a replacement for Helen Ghosh is appointed.
National Trust press release, 13 August 2012:

Thursday, 31 May 2012

A suggestion for Jon Ungoed-Thomas and Philip Johnston, published on a blog provided "free" by Google

Two articles in the Sunday Times by Jon Ungoed-Thomas – Your emails, sex secrets and health details – all harvested by Google and Google grabs secrets of private lives – and one in the Telegraph next day by Philip Johnston – That car in your street was a Google Street View search engine.

While Google was filming our streets it was also collecting information about our WiFi networks. Without permission and without telling anyone. That was a mistake, said Google when they were found out, which is an odd thing for Google to say. The whole point about Google is that they don't make mistakes.

The US Federal Communications Commission are fining Google $25,000 for impeding their investigation of the matter. Google had revenues in 2011 of $37.905 billion on which it made profits of $9.737 billion. The fine amounts to 81 seconds of profits and is thought not to have dealt a mortal blow to the company's share price.

According to Jon Ungoed-Thomas, Google's telecommunications interception system was designed by Mr Marius Milner, a Trinity College Cambridge maths graduate, who handed it over to Google recommending that they'd better get a ruling from a privacy lawyer before using it.

At which point the claim that Google's Street View cars used Mr Milner's system by mistake all over the world for several years starts to look a bit threadbare.

We all know that Google record our web searches and read our email and do something with the information they glean there about our preferences and interests. We never pay them for the use of any of their excellent services. We know there's something odd there. Where does the $38 billion annual revenue come from? We latter-day Dr Faustuses prefer not to ask.

Mr Johnston muses in his article about the attitude of the young today, incontinently spraying their personal information all over the web, no sense of decency, or privacy, no dignity. Or words to that effect. He is rewarded for this perfectly sensible observation by being called an "old fart" by one of Google's astrosurfers commenting below the line.

DMossEsq made a much politer comment but it was deleted. Several times. Every time it was submitted. So quickly that it must have been deleted by an automated old fart.

No such indignity on the Sunday Times website (a website readers pay for, incidentally), where the comment was published and is still there:
... Note that the Department of Business Innovation and Skills want Google to help provide us all with "personal data stores" as part of the department's midata project.

And that the Cabinet Office look to Google to provide us with electronic identities so that public services can all become "digital by default".

And that Whitehall's plans for a G-Cloud – a government cloud – rely on Google and others storing our data on their servers in a gigantic leap of faith in so-called "cloud computing".

HMG seems to be desperate to invite Google into our lives and to hand over the responsibility for public administration to Google in a re-run of the Pied Piper of Hamelin, http://www.dmossesq.com/2012/04/amazon-google-facebook-et-al-latter-day.html

Why? Have they given up? Is government too difficult for them?
There's the story Messrs Ungoed-Thomas and Johnston should be writing, surely – in the name of modernisation and transformational government, the middle-aged delinquents of Whitehall are openly planning to hand over our personal data en masse to Google and others. How much will that free lunch cost us?

A suggestion for Jon Ungoed-Thomas and Philip Johnston, published on a blog provided "free" by Google

Two articles in the Sunday Times by Jon Ungoed-Thomas – Your emails, sex secrets and health details – all harvested by Google and Google grabs secrets of private lives – and one in the Telegraph next day by Philip Johnston – That car in your street was a Google Street View search engine.

While Google was filming our streets it was also collecting information about our WiFi networks. Without permission and without telling anyone. That was a mistake, said Google when they were found out, which is an odd thing for Google to say. The whole point about Google is that they don't make mistakes.

The US Federal Communications Commission are fining Google $25,000 for impeding their investigation of the matter. Google had revenues in 2011 of $37.905 billion on which it made profits of $9.737 billion. The fine amounts to 81 seconds of profits and is thought not to have dealt a mortal blow to the company's share price.

Wednesday, 23 May 2012

The Home Office, Heathrow Airport, the security of the UK border and the safety of the Olympics

Here's a copy of a press release that's just been issued. Forgot to mention the French. Zut. They're lapping it up, too, just like the Indians.




PRESS RELEASE

To:

Home Office

OIG (re US-VISIT)

IDABC (re OSCIE)

China (re Golden Shield)

Pakistan (re NADRA)

FBI (re NGI)

UIDAI (re Aadhaar)

Agencies

The Home Office – Misfeasance in public office
23 May 2012
Six questions for editors to ponder:
  • The Home Office have been asked to reassure the public by publishing a justification for spending public money on biometrics technology they've previously proved to be useless. For 2½ years they've refused. Nor did they present any evidence as to the reliability of their chosen biometrics to the court. Why? Is it because they can't? Is it because there is no justification and our money is, indeed, being wasted?
  • The court sees no iniquity in that potential waste of money and describes it as not "in itself or in any way material". If this isn't an iniquity, what is?
  • We are assured by the Home Office and the court that the procurement of IABS didn't break any UK or EU rules. That finding of the court is accepted but so what? The Home Office are still refusing to release the IBM trial report to the public. They go further. The Home Office say the trial was conducted under such specific constraints that reading the report wouldn’t tell the public much. In other words they admit that they have no justification whatever for spending our money on biometrics. The procurement complies with the rules but it could still be iniquitous and the Home Office could still be guilty of misfeasance in public office.
  • Dame Helen Ghosh, Permanent Secretary at the Home Office, told the Home Affairs Committee that "... there are plans ... to reduce the staff of the Border Force by around 900 people ... that is driven as much by technological introductions like e-gates, as well as a risk-based approach. Border Force will be getting smaller". Is it wise to replace human beings with technology that costs more and doesn't work?
  • Rob Whiteman, Chief Executive of what's left of the UK Border Agency, says of IABS in the March 2012 issue of the staff magazine that "the system, delivered by the agency in partnership with Suppliers IBM, Morpho, Fujitsu, Atos Origin and Software AG, is the first multi-modal biometric matching system. It provides greater accuracy in fingerprint matching together with an integrated facial matching element. It delivers a more comprehensive service, underpinning the agency’s objective to secure our border and reduce immigration". It isn't the first. Pakistan's was the first, and much good it's done that unfortunate country. The IABS biometrics provided by Morpho could be more reliable than the previous system but still useless. Just a little less useless. Is Mr Whiteman misleading his staff as to the history and the reliability of UKBA's biometrics?
  • Sir David Normington, Dame Helen's predecessor, caused Lin Homer and Brodie Clark to write to David Moss asserting that smart gates were being installed at UK airports on the basis of a trial at Manchester Airport. When John Vine, the Independent Chief Inspector of the UK Border Agency, as he then was, reported on his May 2010 inspection of Manchester Airport, he said "we could find no overall plan to evaluate the success or otherwise of the facial recognition gates at Manchester Airport and would urge the Agency to do so [as] soon as possible". This evidence of the Home Office consistently misleading the public, Parliament, ministers, the media and its staff was put before the court. The Home Office made no response. Neither did the court in its decision. The allegation is a serious one. Why doesn't it warrant a response?
At the oral hearing in the matter of David Moss v Information Commissioner and the Home Office held on 24 February 2012, David Moss turned up in court and so did the Information Commissioner's staff and his barrister, but the Home Office didn't.
Why not?
The hearing concerned the Home Office's Immigration and Asylum Biometric System. IABS was due to go live at the border by the end of 2011 under the direction of Ms Jackie Keane, a senior civil servant at the UK Border Agency. She missed that date but bits of IABS went live at the end of February, with the results we all saw in the ensuing weeks, Heathrow at 'breaking' point as Border Force struggles to cope, leaked memos warn, ‘Minister lying over Heathrow queues’ says BA chief, and so on. We may surmise that the Home Office were too busy to attend.
On the other hand, the barrister who has represented the Home Office since the case began a year ago was there in court, except that this time he was representing IBM.
Why?
Because IABS is an IBM contract. It was awarded to them in 2009.
Stacked to the rafters with Nobel prize-winners in most disciplines, nevertheless IBM had no particular expertise in biometrics and no products of their own. They arranged a competition between six biometrics companies and chose Sagem Sécurité (now Morpho) as the best. In the process, they also made good their lack of biometrics expertise – in fact, IBM played a blinder there.
IABS was initially estimated to be worth £265 million and a lot of that money – public money, your money and mine – is being wasted according to David Moss because the biometrics chosen by the Home Office don't work. That's what the case is about.
You know they don't work. You read the BBC's report on the year-long trial of biometrics, ID cards scheme dubbed 'a farce'. You read the Telegraph's report on the smart gates installed at UK airports, Airport face scanners 'cannot tell the difference between Osama bin Laden and Winona Ryder'. You watched Brodie Clark tell the Home Affairs Committee that fingerprint checks are the least reliable identity/security checks made at the border, the ninth and bottom priority for his (now ex-)Border Force officers and the most sensible check to drop when the queues build up and threaten to get out of control.
David Moss lost the case anyway. It was a 2-to-1 majority decision against, a sort of a Minority Report 2 – they may not work at Heathrow or anywhere else in the real world but biometrics are the bee's knees in Hollywood films.
With the explicit permission of the court and the Home Office and the Information Commissioner you can read IBM's evidence in the case, please see attached. IBM's Commercial Director on IABS, Mr Nicholas Swain, explains that all the testing on biometrics was done by IBM and the results belong to IBM and that's why the public aren't allowed to see them despite paying for IABS. We're just meant to suppose that IABS will help to make the border secure and keep the Olympics safe despite all the respectable published evidence to the contrary. You can read Jackie Keane's evidence, too. She agrees with Nick.
It was all IBM's idea according to Ms Keane. OK, the Home Office gave IBM five million pairs of fingerprints to use as test data. And the Home Office specified the acceptance tests that had to be passed. And the Home Office agreed to pay IBM £265 million. But that's all.
It's been a long haul. It goes back 2½ years to a Freedom of Information request submitted on 6 January 2010. And it's not over yet because the other day David Moss submitted an application for permission to appeal. This could go on for years more.
While we're waiting for closure, we have those six questions above to ponder. And this one – what's IABS really about? It's obviously nothing to do with biometrics, as the court effectively acknowledges at paragraph 8 of its decision.
All relevant documents can be discovered at:




Notes to editors

1. As the Treasury Solicitors say (30 April 2012), "the submissions and open evidence lodged with the Tribunal in this case were relied upon and put in evidence at a hearing held in public". We really do all have permission to quote from this material and to comment on it.

2. Without wishing in any way to "lead" you, it is suggested that it will be most fruitful to start with the evidence submitted by the Home Office and IBM. And the evidence of Professor Ross Anderson at the University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory who points out that the banks have rejected biometrics as being too unreliable and asks why in that case do the Home Office trust them?

3. The background to this case is set out in the first few pages of the appeal document and centres on Whitehall’s competence and its duty to acknowledge the supremacy of Parliament, a subject which you will see there exercises the Home Affairs Committee.

4. Where does this story fit in the newspaper or on the radio/TV current affairs programme? Not on the fashion pages perhaps, but certainly in horoscopes and probably almost anywhere else – UK news, international news (they're all at it, look at India), EU news (the European Commission love biometrics and "eIDs", electronic identities), Westminster/politics, Whitehall/governance, the business pages, law reports/the Constitution, travel, sport (c.f. security at the Olympics generally and specifically UKBA's trip to Istanbul for the world wrestling championships to collect biometrics), the technology pages, cartoons, the crossword, ...




About David Moss
David Moss has worked as an IT consultant since 1981. The past 9 years have been spent campaigning against the Home Office's plans to introduce government ID cards into the UK. It must now be admitted that the Home Office are much better at convincing people that these plans are a bad idea than anyone else, including David Moss.

----------

Updated 21.2.18

It's getting on for six years since the blog post above was published.

Nothing has changed as far as the Home Office are concerned:
  • Despite their record, the Home Office are still in charge of UK border control and they still find it a challenge, to put it politely, please see Border Force not ready for extra checks, claim MPs and Time has run out for May’s Brexit immigration plan.
  • The director of strategy and transformation at the UK Border Force is Mr Christophe Prince according to his LinkedIn entry, the same man who was a deputy director of the UK Border Agency (RIP) for the three years 2006-09.
  • And the UK Border Force still relies on IABS, the Immigration and Asylum Biometrics System, run for the moment by IBM and still relying on Morpho biometrics technology.
In the outside world things have moved on a little:
  • The UK Government Digital Service (GDS) have contracted with Morpho to supply "identity provider" services to GOV.UK Verify (RIP), the failed identity assurance scheme.
  • GDS have stated it as a strategic objective of theirs to incorporate more biometrics into public services on the basis that it's innovative to do so.
  • And Safran have sold Morpho to private equity investors, who have changed its name to Idemia.
Idemia gets about a bit. It always has, whatever it was called at the time.

In 2012 they were found guilty of bribery to win business in Nigeria. The bribery of which they were found guilty took place between 2000 and 2003. They appealed and had the verdict overturned in 2015.

There was a spot of bother in Kenya when the opposition party claimed that Idemia had cost them the August 2017 general election. It was the devil's own job for the Kenyan authorities to have the October re-run conducted the way they wanted, and not Idemia.

There was the earlier problem revealed by Naomi Klein in 2008 when she discovered that face recognition technology being used in Operation Golden Shield had been sold to China by L-1 Identity Solutions, Inc., a company subsequently bought by Idemia. That trade is against the law in the US. It is barred by the US Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security post-Tiananmen export controls.

Everything seemed to be going profitably enough for Idemia in India, where their products are used for biometric registration under Aadhaar, the identity assurance scheme for 1.2 billion Indians, until ...

... enter Russia. Idemia allegedly bought some Russian software and inserted it into its own products to improve performance but didn't tell anyone.

Now that some disaffected Idemia ex-employees have made this allegation, the Indians are a little non-plussed. Rather as the Americans may be, also: "The company, now named Idemia, has provided fingerprint-recognition software to the Department of Defense and agencies in 28 states and 36 cities or counties across the US — from the Orange County Sheriff’s Department to the New York Police Department", not to mention the FBI. Cue fears of cyber-espionage being carried out by software buried deep in the security, military and justice systems.

What goes around comes around. The Indians are also worried about allegations that some other software they use in Aadhaar has CIA tools hidden in it but that's another story.

The question here is, do GDS and the Home Office want anything to do with Idemia? How well-prepared are they? Why take the risk? What's the point? After all, it's not as though the biometrics works.

The Home Office, Heathrow Airport, the security of the UK border and the safety of the Olympics

Here's a copy of a press release that's just been issued. Forgot to mention the French. Zut. They're lapping it up, too, just like the Indians.




PRESS RELEASE

To:

Home Office

OIG (re US-VISIT)

IDABC (re OSCIE)

China (re Golden Shield)

Pakistan (re NADRA)

FBI (re NGI)

UIDAI (re Aadhaar)

Agencies

The Home Office – Misfeasance in public office
23 May 2012
Six questions for editors to ponder:
  • The Home Office have been asked to reassure the public by publishing a justification for spending public money on biometrics technology they've previously proved to be useless. For 2½ years they've refused. Nor did they present any evidence as to the reliability of their chosen biometrics to the court. Why? Is it because they can't? Is it because there is no justification and our money is, indeed, being wasted?
  • The court sees no iniquity in that potential waste of money and describes it as not "in itself or in any way material". If this isn't an iniquity, what is?
  • We are assured by the Home Office and the court that the procurement of IABS didn't break any UK or EU rules. That finding of the court is accepted but so what? The Home Office are still refusing to release the IBM trial report to the public. They go further. The Home Office say the trial was conducted under such specific constraints that reading the report wouldn’t tell the public much. In other words they admit that they have no justification whatever for spending our money on biometrics. The procurement complies with the rules but it could still be iniquitous and the Home Office could still be guilty of misfeasance in public office.
  • Dame Helen Ghosh, Permanent Secretary at the Home Office, told the Home Affairs Committee that "... there are plans ... to reduce the staff of the Border Force by around 900 people ... that is driven as much by technological introductions like e-gates, as well as a risk-based approach. Border Force will be getting smaller". Is it wise to replace human beings with technology that costs more and doesn't work?
  • Rob Whiteman, Chief Executive of what's left of the UK Border Agency, says of IABS in the March 2012 issue of the staff magazine that "the system, delivered by the agency in partnership with Suppliers IBM, Morpho, Fujitsu, Atos Origin and Software AG, is the first multi-modal biometric matching system. It provides greater accuracy in fingerprint matching together with an integrated facial matching element. It delivers a more comprehensive service, underpinning the agency’s objective to secure our border and reduce immigration". It isn't the first. Pakistan's was the first, and much good it's done that unfortunate country. The IABS biometrics provided by Morpho could be more reliable than the previous system but still useless. Just a little less useless. Is Mr Whiteman misleading his staff as to the history and the reliability of UKBA's biometrics?
  • Sir David Normington, Dame Helen's predecessor, caused Lin Homer and Brodie Clark to write to David Moss asserting that smart gates were being installed at UK airports on the basis of a trial at Manchester Airport. When John Vine, the Independent Chief Inspector of the UK Border Agency, as he then was, reported on his May 2010 inspection of Manchester Airport, he said "we could find no overall plan to evaluate the success or otherwise of the facial recognition gates at Manchester Airport and would urge the Agency to do so [as] soon as possible". This evidence of the Home Office consistently misleading the public, Parliament, ministers, the media and its staff was put before the court. The Home Office made no response. Neither did the court in its decision. The allegation is a serious one. Why doesn't it warrant a response?
At the oral hearing in the matter of David Moss v Information Commissioner and the Home Office held on 24 February 2012, David Moss turned up in court and so did the Information Commissioner's staff and his barrister, but the Home Office didn't.
Why not?
The hearing concerned the Home Office's Immigration and Asylum Biometric System. IABS was due to go live at the border by the end of 2011 under the direction of Ms Jackie Keane, a senior civil servant at the UK Border Agency. She missed that date but bits of IABS went live at the end of February, with the results we all saw in the ensuing weeks, Heathrow at 'breaking' point as Border Force struggles to cope, leaked memos warn, ‘Minister lying over Heathrow queues’ says BA chief, and so on. We may surmise that the Home Office were too busy to attend.
On the other hand, the barrister who has represented the Home Office since the case began a year ago was there in court, except that this time he was representing IBM.
Why?
Because IABS is an IBM contract. It was awarded to them in 2009.
Stacked to the rafters with Nobel prize-winners in most disciplines, nevertheless IBM had no particular expertise in biometrics and no products of their own. They arranged a competition between six biometrics companies and chose Sagem Sécurité (now Morpho) as the best. In the process, they also made good their lack of biometrics expertise – in fact, IBM played a blinder there.
IABS was initially estimated to be worth £265 million and a lot of that money – public money, your money and mine – is being wasted according to David Moss because the biometrics chosen by the Home Office don't work. That's what the case is about.
You know they don't work. You read the BBC's report on the year-long trial of biometrics, ID cards scheme dubbed 'a farce'. You read the Telegraph's report on the smart gates installed at UK airports, Airport face scanners 'cannot tell the difference between Osama bin Laden and Winona Ryder'. You watched Brodie Clark tell the Home Affairs Committee that fingerprint checks are the least reliable identity/security checks made at the border, the ninth and bottom priority for his (now ex-)Border Force officers and the most sensible check to drop when the queues build up and threaten to get out of control.
David Moss lost the case anyway. It was a 2-to-1 majority decision against, a sort of a Minority Report 2 – they may not work at Heathrow or anywhere else in the real world but biometrics are the bee's knees in Hollywood films.
With the explicit permission of the court and the Home Office and the Information Commissioner you can read IBM's evidence in the case, please see attached. IBM's Commercial Director on IABS, Mr Nicholas Swain, explains that all the testing on biometrics was done by IBM and the results belong to IBM and that's why the public aren't allowed to see them despite paying for IABS. We're just meant to suppose that IABS will help to make the border secure and keep the Olympics safe despite all the respectable published evidence to the contrary. You can read Jackie Keane's evidence, too. She agrees with Nick.
It was all IBM's idea according to Ms Keane. OK, the Home Office gave IBM five million pairs of fingerprints to use as test data. And the Home Office specified the acceptance tests that had to be passed. And the Home Office agreed to pay IBM £265 million. But that's all.
It's been a long haul. It goes back 2½ years to a Freedom of Information request submitted on 6 January 2010. And it's not over yet because the other day David Moss submitted an application for permission to appeal. This could go on for years more.
While we're waiting for closure, we have those six questions above to ponder. And this one – what's IABS really about? It's obviously nothing to do with biometrics, as the court effectively acknowledges at paragraph 8 of its decision.
All relevant documents can be discovered at:




Notes to editors

1. As the Treasury Solicitors say (30 April 2012), "the submissions and open evidence lodged with the Tribunal in this case were relied upon and put in evidence at a hearing held in public". We really do all have permission to quote from this material and to comment on it.

2. Without wishing in any way to "lead" you, it is suggested that it will be most fruitful to start with the evidence submitted by the Home Office and IBM. And the evidence of Professor Ross Anderson at the University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory who points out that the banks have rejected biometrics as being too unreliable and asks why in that case do the Home Office trust them?

3. The background to this case is set out in the first few pages of the appeal document and centres on Whitehall’s competence and its duty to acknowledge the supremacy of Parliament, a subject which you will see there exercises the Home Affairs Committee.

4. Where does this story fit in the newspaper or on the radio/TV current affairs programme? Not on the fashion pages perhaps, but certainly in horoscopes and probably almost anywhere else – UK news, international news (they're all at it, look at India), EU news (the European Commission love biometrics and "eIDs", electronic identities), Westminster/politics, Whitehall/governance, the business pages, law reports/the Constitution, travel, sport (c.f. security at the Olympics generally and specifically UKBA's trip to Istanbul for the world wrestling championships to collect biometrics), the technology pages, cartoons, the crossword, ...




About David Moss
David Moss has worked as an IT consultant since 1981. The past 9 years have been spent campaigning against the Home Office's plans to introduce government ID cards into the UK. It must now be admitted that the Home Office are much better at convincing people that these plans are a bad idea than anyone else, including David Moss.

----------

Updated 21.2.18

It's getting on for six years since the blog post above was published.

Nothing has changed as far as the Home Office are concerned:
  • Despite their record, the Home Office are still in charge of UK border control and they still find it a challenge, to put it politely, please see Border Force not ready for extra checks, claim MPs and Time has run out for May’s Brexit immigration plan.
  • The director of strategy and transformation at the UK Border Force is Mr Christophe Prince according to his LinkedIn entry, the same man who was a deputy director of the UK Border Agency (RIP) for the three years 2006-09.
  • And the UK Border Force still relies on IABS, the Immigration and Asylum Biometrics System, run for the moment by IBM and still relying on Morpho biometrics technology.
In the outside world things have moved on a little:
  • The UK Government Digital Service (GDS) have contracted with Morpho to supply "identity provider" services to GOV.UK Verify (RIP), the failed identity assurance scheme.
  • GDS have stated it as a strategic objective of theirs to incorporate more biometrics into public services on the basis that it's innovative to do so.
  • And Safran have sold Morpho to private equity investors, who have changed its name to Idemia.
Idemia gets about a bit. It always has, whatever it was called at the time.

In 2012 they were found guilty of bribery to win business in Nigeria. The bribery of which they were found guilty took place between 2000 and 2003. They appealed and had the verdict overturned in 2015.

There was a spot of bother in Kenya when the opposition party claimed that Idemia had cost them the August 2017 general election. It was the devil's own job for the Kenyan authorities to have the October re-run conducted the way they wanted, and not Idemia.

There was the earlier problem revealed by Naomi Klein in 2008 when she discovered that face recognition technology being used in Operation Golden Shield had been sold to China by L-1 Identity Solutions, Inc., a company subsequently bought by Idemia. That trade is against the law in the US. It is barred by the US Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security post-Tiananmen export controls.

Everything seemed to be going profitably enough for Idemia in India, where their products are used for biometric registration under Aadhaar, the identity assurance scheme for 1.2 billion Indians, until ...

... enter Russia. Idemia allegedly bought some Russian software and inserted it into its own products to improve performance but didn't tell anyone.

Now that some disaffected Idemia ex-employees have made this allegation, the Indians are a little non-plussed. Rather as the Americans may be, also: "The company, now named Idemia, has provided fingerprint-recognition software to the Department of Defense and agencies in 28 states and 36 cities or counties across the US — from the Orange County Sheriff’s Department to the New York Police Department", not to mention the FBI. Cue fears of cyber-espionage being carried out by software buried deep in the security, military and justice systems.

What goes around comes around. The Indians are also worried about allegations that some other software they use in Aadhaar has CIA tools hidden in it but that's another story.

The question here is, do GDS and the Home Office want anything to do with Idemia? How well-prepared are they? Why take the risk? What's the point? After all, it's not as though the biometrics works.