Showing posts with label USA PATRIOT. Show all posts
Showing posts with label USA PATRIOT. Show all posts

Thursday, 27 June 2013

The Tragedy of the Commons

Public cloud benefits
outweigh security and data sovereignty risks,
says head of Parliament IT

Back in the 1970s, few organisations could afford their own computer. Timesharing bureaux grew up as a result. You'd nip round to your local IBM or Burroughs or ICL bureau with a deck of punched cards and a couple of tapes and come back with a printout. Timesharing wasn't cheap. But it made computing a bit more widely affordable.

That all changed with the advent of microcomputers and cheap high-speed telecommunications. The timesharing bureaux went out of business during the 1980s.

30 years later, they're back. Cloud computing suppliers are the timesharing bureaux de nos jours.

It's the same pitch. Outsourcing to a cloud computing supplier is cheaper than running your own data centre. There's more flexibility. You can get up and running more quickly. Backup and security are handled by dedicated experts and not by your own staff.

(Of course, prices could go up once there's no alternative to the cloud. And the cloud computing suppliers' backup and security staff could turn out to be just as flaky as your own. But these points are rarely made. Your attention is distracted by the modern and exciting hippy lure of the web, which is somehow deemed to be a good in itself.)

Outsourcing in government IT has been going on for decades. During which time an oligopoly of systems integrators (SIs) has developed in the UK and has allegedly grown used to charging the government eye-wateringly disproportionate fees for their services.

The SIs operate expensive data centres. Shifting to the government cloud (G-Cloud), it is hoped, will cut costs hugely while at the same time reducing development lead times and improving the response to change.

That's the pitch. That's the picture which is drawn for you to admire. And if that's all there was to it, there could hardly be any objection to cloud computing.

... the Houses of Parliament [are] now in the process
of moving a number of applications to the public cloud
as part of plans to create a ‘digital parliament’

From the dept of useless statistics:
  • 325 posts have been published on this blog, starting on 3 October 2011.
  • 61 of them are tagged "G-Cloud".
Clearly, DMossesq thinks there is something more to it, some important problem with cloud computing that needs to be communicated to readers.

He is not alone.

The OECD think that "cloud computing creates security problems in the form of loss of confidentiality if authentication is not robust and loss of service if internet connectivity is unavailable or the supplier is in financial difficulties".

ENISA think that "its adoption should be limited to non-sensitive or non-critical applications and in the context of a defined strategy for cloud adoption which should include a clear exit strategy".

Larry Ellison, the President of Oracle, says "maybe I'm an idiot, but I have no idea what anyone is talking about. What is it? It's complete gibberish. It's insane. When is this idiocy going to stop?".

Richard Stallman, venerable IT person, says "cloud computing [is] simply a trap aimed at forcing more people to buy into locked, proprietary systems that [will] cost them more and more over time ... It's stupidity. It's worse than stupidity: it's a marketing hype campaign".

Sergey Brin, one of the founders of Google, "acknowledged that some people were anxious about the amount of their data that was now in the reach of US authorities because it sits on Google's servers. He said the company was periodically forced to hand over data and sometimes prevented by legal restrictions from even notifying users that it had done so".

Gordon Frazer, managing director of Microsoft UK, "gave the first admission that cloud data — regardless of where it is in the world — is not protected against the USA PATRIOT Act".

... there were challenges around
the legal requirements of where data is stored,
explained Joan Miller, Director of Parliamentary ICT,
... at the
Think G-Cloud event in London.

Then there's Mayer Brown, the US lawyers, who tell us that "US law enforcement authorities may serve FISA Orders, NSLs, warrants or subpoenas on any cloud service provider that is US based, has a US office, or conducts systematic or continuous US business—even if the data is stored outside the United States".

And, further, "US law enforcement authorities may serve FISA Orders, NSLs, warrants or subpoenas on any cloud service customer that is US based, has a US branch, or conducts systematic or continuous US business—even if the data is stored outside the United States".

There's the indefatigable Caspar Bowden, former chief privacy adviser to Microsoft Europe, who has issued more warnings of the coming war than Cassandra, see for example Experts warn on wire-tapping of the cloud.

And there's the larger-than-life Kim Dotcom whose cloud computing company, megaupload.com, was put out of business by the FBI.

“The big outstanding element was data sovereignty,”
said Miller. “We needed to know
what was happening to that data in the cloud,
and that anything that happened to that data
was in our control.”

Which is where we get to the nub of the cloud computing problem.

Customers of megaupload.com had their data hosted in the cloud by Carpathia, acting under contract to megaupload.com. When the business was shut down, the customers lost access to their data which, in some cases, imperils their business.

Kyle Goodwin is one of these customers and his lawyers say "the [US] government maintains that Mr. Goodwin lost his property rights in his data by storing it on a cloud computing service ... both the contract between Megaupload and Mr. Goodwin ... and the contract between Megaupload and the server host, Carpathia ..., likely limit any property interest he may have in his data".

Sign a cloud computing contract in other words and you lose the rights to your property.

You lose control of it.

“We were thinking we have to go back ...
and make sure that what we have done to measure the risk
is adequate to deal with ... the American government’s use of data 
...
In fact, we are reassured 
that everything we thought about
is still covered in the work we have already done.”

You already knew that – the media report the activities of hackers every day. Even the US military seem to be helpless in the face of cyberattacks allegedly carried out by the Chinese. You knew that the web is a dangerous place to store your data. There is no such thing as a secure website. "Secure website" is an oxymoron.

Cloud computing adds to the risks:
  • The website is no longer in-house.
  • The staff who operate the equipment are not on your payroll and have not been vetted by you.
  • Your contractor will have sub-contractors, like Carpathia, which makes the line of command longer.
  • And, thanks to the internet, your data can pop up on servers anywhere in the world, in or out of the jurisdiction of English law.
And as we have discovered this month thanks to Edward Snowden, you also need to know that the National Security Agency in the US and the UK's GCHQ will also have access to the data in the cloud and may share it with anyone.

The advocates of cloud computing know all that. They know about the loss of control and the hacking. And yet they persist.

According to Miller
much of the data held by the Houses of Parliament
is actually relatively low risk.
She explained that, other than in certain circumstances,
the majority of the data is already destined for the public domain.

If your lawyers promise to keep your data confidential and then store it in the cloud, you can fire them. That threat is sufficient to force all but the mad to try hard to keep your data confidential.

It is the tragedy of the commons that that incentive doesn't work with the UK public sector.

You won't catch the US losing control of their data if they can help it, nor China, nor Russia, nor Germany – GCHQ surveillance: Germany blasts UK over mass monitoring. Those are states that clearly aim to survive.

But in the UK, local government, central government and now Parliament itself seem to be determined knowingly to risk storing our data in the cloud. They are abdicating their sovereignty and with it their responsibility. Has the state lost the will to survive?

----------

(Hat tip: The tragedy of the commons)
(Hat tip: Matthew Finnegan from whom the big italic quotations above are taken)
(Hat tip: Glyn Moody)
(See also House of Lords Management Board Minutes 16 January 2013)
(And Think G-Cloud 2013)

----------

Update 3.3.14

Last June when the post above was written we were assured that the security arrangements for the UK parliamentary website are adequate.

Just under nine months later, what do we learn?
The official website of the UK Parliament contained basic flaws that left it vulnerable to hacking, a programmer has discovered.

In a well-known loophole that has now been closed, the internal search engine on www.parliament.uk allowed users to enter computer code that meant it displayed images, video and even requests for passwords where the results would ordinarily appear.
See Revealed: key UK websites vulnerable to hackers in today's Telegraph.

From today's Telegraph
don't worry,
just their little joke
"Basic flaw"?

"Well-known loophole"?

The Telegraph are talking about the website. Or are they talking about Joan Miller, Director of Parliamentary ICT? And all the other officials in Westminster and Whitehall who just can't take security seriously, headed by Public Servant of the Year ex-Guardian man Mike Bracken CBE?

Public Servant of the Year ex-Guardian man Mike Bracken CBE, you will remember, is the executive director of the Government Digital Service. He is the "head of digital", as they say, for the whole of Whitehall. And, setting a dubious example, he told a conference last October that security ought to be relaxed because he'd just had a daughter. He was so tired as a result that he couldn't remember the answers to all the Whitehall security questions he had to answer to use his account:


And as for Ms Miller, Director of Parliamentary ICT, it's the old story – just because someone tells you a website is secure doesn't mean it's true. Even if your interlocutor has a technical- and senior-sounding job title and works for the most respected organisation in the world.

On-line security is like unicorns.

And if that website is in the cloud, forget it.


Updated 4.4.14

Terence Eden, the blogger who discovered the security hole in the UK Parliament website and brought it to their attention, is too polite to use the word "muppet". Instead, he says:
The UK Parliament website is pretty great. It houses a huge amount of historical information, lets people easily see what's happening in the Commons and the Lords, and is run by some really clever people.

That's why it's so depressing to see such a basic error as this XSS flaw in their search engine.
He goes on to explain how the website security weakness could be exploited, explaining the procedures step by step and giving examples.

This is the first in a series he hopes to publish on what he calls The Unsecured State. Perhaps Whitehall and Westminster will take note.


Updated 7.4.14

Joan Miller steps down from role as director of parliamentary ICT

The Tragedy of the Commons

Public cloud benefits
outweigh security and data sovereignty risks,
says head of Parliament IT

Back in the 1970s, few organisations could afford their own computer. Timesharing bureaux grew up as a result. You'd nip round to your local IBM or Burroughs or ICL bureau with a deck of punched cards and a couple of tapes and come back with a printout. Timesharing wasn't cheap. But it made computing a bit more widely affordable.

That all changed with the advent of microcomputers and cheap high-speed telecommunications. The timesharing bureaux went out of business during the 1980s.

30 years later, they're back. Cloud computing suppliers are the timesharing bureaux de nos jours.

Wednesday, 30 January 2013

Skyscape loose ends – still loose

  • Skyscape are late submitting their first statutory accounts to Companies House
  • There are more reasons to believe that HMG will lose control of our data once it is hosted in the cloud on Skyscape's servers
  • It looks as if GOV.UK is still not being hosted by Skyscape
----------

Skyscape's non-existent track record
Source: Companies House, 30 January 2013
Skyscape Cloud Services Ltd were due to submit their first set of accounts to Companies House by 31 December 2012 and, so far, they're a month late.

How did the Government Procurement Service (GPS) and the G-Cloud team determine that it is safe to offer Skyscape's services on the Cloudstore?

What were the Government Digital Service (GDS) going on when they chose Skyscape to host GOV.UK, the soon-to-be-single face of government on the web?

How did HMRC decide to entrust its local office data to Skyscape?

No answers. It remains baffling that all this responsibility for public administration should be put on a one-man company.

And now it transpires that the MOD are relying on Skyscape, too.

Losing control of our data
Does the following snippet give you confidence in Skyscape?
ScienceLogic streamlines IT management for Skyscape Cloud Services
Date: 24 Jan 2013

Skyscape Cloud Services, “the easy to adopt, easy to use, and easy to leave” Assured Cloud Services Company, has selected and deployed the ScienceLogic™ Inc. IT infrastructure management platform to optimize IT operations and rapidly automate processes in their large-scale, Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) offerings. Skyscape is a supplier to the UK government through the G-Cloud Framework initiative, helping deliver a highly-scalable, secure community cloud for the provision of public services. The innovative service provider is using the robust ScienceLogic platform to simplify the complexities of providing mission-critical cloud services to multiple government organizations including GOV.UK and the Ministry of Defence.

“We needed to take a more proactive, cost-effective approach to managing our government customer IT cloud resources,” said Peter Rossi, Head of Orchestration & Automation at Skyscape ...
It shouldn't.

ScienceLogic is a US company based in Reston, VA.

So what?

Once HMG put our data in the cloud, it passes beyond their jurisdiction. What happened to Megaupload.com could happen to us, too. The FBI impounded all the data on Megaupload's servers and no-one has been able to get their data back since.

According to Megaupload's lawyers, the prosecution's case amounts to saying that you lose your property rights if you store data in the cloud – if you'd wanted to retain those rights, so goes the argument, you wouldn't have used the cloud.

The FBI have the powers of the USA PATRIOT Act available to them and of the Foreign Intelligence and Surveillance Amendments Act (FISA).

The USA PATRIOT Act powers can be exercised wherever in the world the cloud data is stored and, as they say on the G-Cloud website, "public cloud is often non-geographically specific" – HMG often won't know where our data is. Location doesn't matter to the FBI. All that matters is that a US-registered company should be involved or any other company with a substantial business in the US.

Skyscape were already known to be involved with EMC, QinetiQ, VMware and Cisco. Then they emphasised the involvement of EMC with the release of a promotional film, Skyscape Cloud Services – Storage as a Service on EMC Atmos. EMC is a US company based in Hopkinton, MA. And now their Head of Orchestration has added ScienceLogic to the list.

FISA was recently "renewed", please see U.S. Spy Law Authorizes Mass Surveillance of European Citizens.

The reasons why the FBI might be interested to take a look at our data are manifold. It was suspected copyright infringement in the case of Megaupload. In our case, it might be that or anything else. Now that the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) has come into force, they might for example just want to see if there are any US citizens or companies or trusts in the UK evading US tax.

And that's the US, the kindred country we know and trust. HMG will have even less control over our data in other jurisdictions.

Where is GOV.UK?
Back in October 2012, GDS announced that GOV.UK would be hosted on Skyscape.

30 January 2013
This came as news to its then current host, a cloud services company called Akamai. Has GOV.UK moved to Skyscape now? It doesn't look like it. It looks as though it's still hosted with Akamai.

What's going on? Was the GDS announcement about Skyscape nonsense? Who knows. GDS don't answer questions. Four months after Skyscape came into public view, we're none the wiser.

----------

Added 31.1.13:
US authorities can spy on the iCloud without a warrant

Skyscape loose ends – still loose

  • Skyscape are late submitting their first statutory accounts to Companies House
  • There are more reasons to believe that HMG will lose control of our data once it is hosted in the cloud on Skyscape's servers
  • It looks as if GOV.UK is still not being hosted by Skyscape
----------

Skyscape's non-existent track record
Source: Companies House, 30 January 2013
Skyscape Cloud Services Ltd were due to submit their first set of accounts to Companies House by 31 December 2012 and, so far, they're a month late.

How did the Government Procurement Service (GPS) and the G-Cloud team determine that it is safe to offer Skyscape's services on the Cloudstore?

What were the Government Digital Service (GDS) going on when they chose Skyscape to host GOV.UK, the soon-to-be-single face of government on the web?

How did HMRC decide to entrust its local office data to Skyscape?

Wednesday, 17 October 2012

PRESS RELEASE: GOV.UK/digital by default – 17 questions for Mr Maude

The following press release has been issued:



PRESS RELEASE


To:

Home Office
OIG (re US-VISIT)
IDABC (re OSCIE)
China (re Golden Shield)
Pakistan (re NADRA)
FBI (re NGI)
UIDAI (re Aadhaar)
Agencies
GOV.UK/digital by default – 17 questions for Mr Maude
17 October 2012
Francis Maude, Cabinet Office Minister, has announced today that public services are in future to be delivered on-line: "... t
oday marks the start of a new way of delivering public services digitally. GOV.UK is a platform for future digital innovation".



Public services are to become “digital by default”, to use the term popularised by Martha Lane Fox, the Prime Minister’s digital champion, who first proposed the development of GOV.UK.

Digital by default is to be delivered via GOV.UK, a website developed by the Government Digital Service (GDS). The chief executive of GDS is ex-Guardian man Mike Bracken, who is also the senior responsible officer owner for identity assurance, please see below.
17 questions for Mr Maude:
1. “Digital by default” means replacing people with computers. How many public servants will be made redundant and how much money will the taxpayer save?
2. Between eight and ten million adults in the UK have still never used the web. Will they be excluded by default from public services?
3. GOV.UK is to be hosted in the cloud by Skyscape Cloud Services Ltd, a start-up which has not yet submitted any accounts to Companies House, which has no company secretary and only one director, a Mr Jeremy Robin Sanders, who also owns 100% of the £1,000 paid-up share capital in the company. What reason is there to believe that Skyscape are reliable, competent and big enough for this enormous task?
4. Starting from Skyscape’s own website it is easy to work out where its data centre is. ARK Continuity Ltd, the property company that built it, even provide a map how to get there. GOV.UK is an important national asset. How will our data be kept secure?
5. HMRC also, like GDS, intend to store our data with Skyscape. Will the Minister please comment on the professionalism of Whitehall procurement which entrusts national assets to a one-man company the location of whose servers is revealed on the web for all to see including terrorists?
6. Even with the big cloud services companies like Amazon, Google, Microsoft and Apple it is commonly understood that cloud computing entails the customer – in this case GDS and HMRC – losing control of their data. Their data may be stored on any machines anywhere in the world and managed by staff the customer has no control over. Why is Whitehall following the fashion and embracing cloud computing?
7. In connection with cloud computing, Microsoft and Google have warned the British public that under the powers of the USA PATRIOT Act and other legislation the FBI can demand to see any data stored by any US company anywhere in the world. These powers extend to non-US companies which also happen to operate a substantial business in the US, e.g. QinetiQ. Does the Minister wish to join Microsoft and Google in warning the British public that their GOV.UK data can be inspected by the US authorities?
8. Individuals and companies already have a tool for transacting with the government on-line – the Government Gateway – and have done for the past ten years and more. How can throwing away that tried and tested tool and replacing it with GOV.UK be called a saving?
9. The Government Gateway has tried and tested identity assurance procedures which minimise on-line fraud and error. Individuals and companies have user IDs issued to them by DWP, who operate the gateway. GDS are said to want to throw away that security and use Facebook, Google and Twitter user IDs instead. What reason is there to believe that these social network user IDs are as reliable as the Government Gateway’s?
10. ... and what qualifications do GDS have to make these foreign companies which pay very little UK tax, not to mention Mr Jeremy Robin Sanders, a part of the British Constitution?
11. GDS are also said to want to take advantage of the logon details the public use for on-line banking to help with identity assurance. UK banks tend to have strong security but nevertheless the problem of on-line fraud persists. Given which, what is the benefit of incorporating the banks’ identity assurance procedures into GOV.UK?
12. Operating through the Department for Business Innovation and Skills (BIS), GDS are trying to issue everyone with PDSs, personal data stores. The provisions for PDSs are part of a BIS initiative called midata and statutory powers to mandate PDSs are tucked away in the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill currently going through Parliament. Would the Minister confirm that a PDS is no more than the software equivalent of an ID card and that PDSs are the real vehicle for identity assurance advocated by GDS?
13. On 5 September 2012, GDS, BIS and the Foreign Office hosted an event at which GCHQ explained how badly British companies deal with cybercrime. Why is GDS simultaneously trying to exacerbate the problem by putting all public services on-line?
14. CESG is the information assurance arm of GCHQ and has published recommendations on the requirements for the secure delivery of on-line public services (RSDOPS). Will the Minister please show the public the documentation proving that GOV.UK satisfies RSDOPS?
15. All public services are on-line in Estonia and in 2007 Russia found it easy as a result to bring the country to its knees with a simple distributed denial of service attack. What is to stop the same fate befalling the UK if digital by default succeeds?
16. This is not the first time digital by default has been tried in the UK. Back in 2005 when Tony Blair called for joined up government, Sir Gus O’Donnell and Ian Watmore devised a programme called “transformational government”. That failed principally because the other departments of state wouldn’t co-operate with the Cabinet Office. What is there to make them co-operate this time?
17. Universal Credit (UC) is an important coalition government policy designed to spring the poverty trap and make work pay, for millions of benefits claimants. The biggest risk faced by UC according to Lord Freud, the DWP Minister responsible, is the lack of identity assurance. Control over its own identity assurance was wrested away from DWP by GDS. DWP couldn’t make any progress on the matter as a result, and GDS haven’t made any progress either. It looks as though the needs of real people are being side-lined while a few senior civil servants indulge their fascination with computers. Would the Minister care to comment?
It is timely to pose these questions today, the day on which GOV.UK goes live. Or next Monday 22 October 2012 when GDS are due to make a major announcement about identity assurance. Or the following Friday 26 October 2012 when Whitehall's G-Cloud team (government cloud) also have a major announcement to make.
ARK Continuity Ltd, by the way, boast the Rt Hon The Baroness Manningham-Buller, formerly the Director General of MI5, as a non-Executive Director.

About David Moss
David Moss has worked as an IT consultant since 1981. The past 9 years have been spent campaigning against the Home Office's plans to introduce government ID cards into the UK. It must now be admitted that the Home Office are much better at convincing people that these plans are a bad idea than anyone else, including David Moss.
Press contacts: David Moss, BCSL@blueyonder.co.uk

PRESS RELEASE: GOV.UK/digital by default – 17 questions for Mr Maude

The following press release has been issued:



PRESS RELEASE


To:

Home Office
OIG (re US-VISIT)
IDABC (re OSCIE)
China (re Golden Shield)
Pakistan (re NADRA)
FBI (re NGI)
UIDAI (re Aadhaar)
Agencies
GOV.UK/digital by default – 17 questions for Mr Maude
17 October 2012

Tuesday, 16 October 2012

GDS – the user experience of misfeasance in public office

Tomorrow's news
17 October 2012 – GOV.UK goes live
22 October 2012 – major announcement on IdA (identity assurance)
26 October 2012 – G-Cloud II
Who knows when? – midata

What does that all add up to?

Whitehall and others wasting your money with impunity – the disgraceful state of public administration in the UK.

You want DMossEsq to draw you a map?

OK:



A map



Transacting with the government
Top left, at the moment, if members of the public including companies want to submit their tax returns to HMRC, for example, they log on via the Government Gateway and do it. That's how we transact with government over the web. It's not a thing of beauty. You have to register separately for each of the various services offered by our public administration and they post us separate user IDs for each one.

Not beautiful, but it seems to be fairly secure. It's hard remembering the user IDs and it's a pain in the neck for the service providers because millions of people ring up every year when they forget their user IDs but perhaps that's the price of security – if you want the security, you have to live with the pain in the neck. There may be no alternative.

It's not that different transacting with the banks on-line. Except that in addition to user IDs you often have to use PINSentry-type machines.

Even with the security of user IDs and passwords and PINSentries, there is a certain level of fraud. The banks in particular and DWP who operate the Government Gateway have done a fantastic job over the years keeping a lid on the level of fraud. Fraud remains a cost of doing business and, so far, a just about bearable cost. If the cost of fraud stops being bearable, on-line business will stop.

That's at the moment.

GOV.UK
Tomorrow we will be told about GOV.UK, the new single government domain. It goes live tomorrow and replaces Directgov and Business Link. Later, GOV.UK is due to replace all central government websites. No more homeoffice.gov.uk, no more education.gov.uk, ..., just GOV.UK.

GOV.UK is the product of the Government Digital Service (GDS) and judging by the 22 posts that have been published on their blog so far this month what we will be told is that the whole project is dedicated to satisfying user needs, it's all being done for us the public, 70+ people working hard for a year, just for us.

That's true. But it's not the whole truth.

GDS aren't just trying to improve the "user experience" as they call it, repeatedly, several times in every one of their 22 posts this month, when we use government websites. They're working towards making all public services digital by default, something not mentioned in a single one of their 22 posts so far this month. They're trying to make it so that we can only transact with government on-line. They're trying to make us Estonian, as ex-Guardian man Mike Bracken among others has being telling us for some time:

Estonia’s technology economy and online service provision- back to the future?

by Mike Bracken on 04/05/2012



... Whilst we met dozens of people at breakneck speed, many of whom we hope to see in the UK soon, over the next week I will be explaining the wider points we have uncovered which reflect directly on our challenge to make public services in the UK digital by default, and how the Estonian experience links to our core principles ...
IdA
Ex-Guardian man Mike Bracken is the Chief Executive of the (UK) Government Digital Service. He is also the senior responsible officer owner for identity assurance (IdA). You can't make public services digital by default if you can't identify the people you're dealing with. GOV.UK needs IdA, please see middle of the map.

Once you've decided that public services should be digital by default you have to try to prove that it works. You need a guinea pig. DWP drew the short straw and digital by default will be tested on Universal Credit (UC).

UC is the coalition government's attempt to spring the poverty trap and make work pay. It could hardly be more important to millions of human beings in the UK. Instead, it has become a sandpit, for adults who haven't outgrown their fascination with technology, to play in.

Asked by the Select Committee on Work and Pensions what are the biggest risks faced by UC Lord Freud, the minister responsible, fingered identity assurance. With no IdA, there can be no UC.

Having wrested control over its own identity assurance from DWP and having thus made himself responsible for it, ex-Guardian man Mike Bracken was due to name the companies he has chosen as the UK's "identity providers" by 30 September 2012.

("Identity providers" may seem an odd locution at first but you've got used to "hate crime", haven't you, and by the same process "identity provider" will soon link to your Estonian core principles.)

He missed the September deadline but the announcement of the winners should finally be made next Monday 22 October 2012.

What to expect?

Facebook, Google, Twitter and the British Constitution
There have been leaks, including a very full one to the Independent newspaper on 4 October 2012, National 'virtual ID card' scheme set for launch (Is there anything that could possibly go wrong?).
If you’d like to know more the Q&A in The Independent gives a pretty good overview (the only thing we’d really quibble with is the headline).
That's what GDS say about the Independent article. It seems fair to assume that they wrote the whole thing apart from the headline.

The article mentions social media sites, mobile phone companies, banks, large retailers, the Post Office, Facebook, Microsoft, Google, PayPal, BT and Experian, the credit referencing agency – please see middle right of the map, nothing new there for DMossEsq readers. We should expect between five and 20 organisations to be appointed as identity providers next Monday, thereby becoming an unlikely part of the British Constitution.

It confirms the link between IdA, GOV.UK and UC and it sets IdA in the context of the US National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace (NSTIC) and the Open Identity Exchange (OIX) – who are GDS trying to impress?

The Independent article also claims that IdA will "prevent login fatigue", the suggestion being that as long as you can remember your Facebook or bank login details, then you can "apply for services ranging from tax credits to fishing licences and passports".

Abandoning the Government Gateway in this way may well prevent login fatigue, you won't have to remember your Gateway user IDs and passwords any more, but it reduces security and that threatens the future of on-line business.

The Cabinet Office sandpit may be prepared to take that risk. It is hard to believe that the banks, the mobile phone companies and the major retailers are. They would see their own brands destroyed when IdA goes wrong, even if the problem is caused by Whitehall. That's not a risk worth taking. The chairmen and chief executives of these companies don't normally act against their own best interests. They won't this time. Let's see just how committed the banks, telcos and retailers are, in next Monday's announcements.

Cybercrime
CESG is the information assurance arm of GCHQ. They have issued three reports on RSDOPS – the requirements for the secure delivery of on-line public services, please see top right of the map. Let's see if GDS will show us the documentation certifying that their plans for IdA satisfy the RSDOPS conditions.

On 5 September 2012, GCHQ, the Foreign Office, the Cabinet Office and BIS, the Department for Business Innovation and Skills, got together to tell senior UK businessmen how bad they all are at cybersecurity. Why are GDS in that case entrusting IdA to them?

In the attempt to prove that you are who you say you are before the Department for Education grants you a student loan, or whatever, once we have digital by default IdA will be looking to the identity providers to confirm a selection of your "name, date of birth, address, gender, passport and driving licence numbers, financial history, electoral roll status and telephone numbers" and other such personal data. As the Independent (almost) say, what could possibly go wrong?

Losing control of the personal data in IdA is one possible mishap. Millions of us Britestonians could wake up one morning to find all our personal data for sale on a Russian website, ready to be used to clear out our bank accounts.

Losing access to public services, following an Estonian-style distributed denial of service attack, is another.

Anonymity and book-keeping
When the Department for Education checks to see that you are who you say you are and gets confirmation from the Third National Bank of Tallinn that you are, the process goes through a so-called "hub". The Cabinet Office claim that the "hub" has no memory. No details of the identity assurance transaction are recorded.

That's good, from the point of view of privacy.

But bad from the point of view of audit trail. Surely there has to be an audit trail supporting the grant of a student loan? That's just proper book-keeping and it would be remiss of Whitehall to break proper procedures.

Even if they are breaking procedures, though, there's always the Home Office and their Communications Data Bill, please see bottom right of the map. If the Bill is enacted, all web browsing will be recorded on GCHQ black boxes installed at ISPs (Internet Service Providers). So much for anonymity.

Dematerialised ID
Which brings us to the bottom middle of the map, BIS, and their midata initiative.

There is no announcement date for midata. The Cabinet Office and BIS are keeping quiet about it and hoping that they will thereby get their legislative powers rubber-stamped in the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill currently going through Parliament.

midata would require us all to have one or more Personal Data Stores (PDSs) if the Bill is enacted as drafted. These PDSs would record all our personal data such as the names and addresses mentioned above plus all our transaction data and they – the PDSs – would be in continuous contact with all our suppliers including government departments keeping each one up to date with any change in our circumstances.

The Independent were clearly briefed to emphasise that the government has abandoned its plans to introduce material, plastic ID cards. No doubt that's true. No government department wants to suffer the fate of the Identity & Passport Service which seems to have had a corporate nervous breakdown when the last ID cards scheme failed.

But a PDS is an ID card. It's a dematerialised, dynamic, distributed ID card, but an ID card for all that. The government hasn't abandoned its plans. It's planning for something much more powerful. Something that really could provide identity assurance on-line. PDSs.

It will be worth pressing GDS next Monday on the subject of midata and its attendant PDSs. They can't pretend that it's nothing to do with them. William Heath is on the BIS strategy board for midata and he is the chairman of Mydex, a company which hopes one day to manage PDSs for us all, and he was demonstrating Mydex's wares at the 31 October 2011 identity assurance event where Francis Maude announced his £10 million investment in Mydex and others. And according to him:
We [Mydex] support midata. It will empower individuals and at last give real teeth to the good intentions behind the Data Protection Act subject access request. It goes hand in hand with the new UK and US approaches to ID assurance, which we also support. We think midata needs to apply also to other UK public services including health, education and job-seeking.
The unwebbed
You'd think that would be enough problems for GOV.UK. It's not clear how involving the Post Office, the banks, etc ... will help to provide identity assurance on-line. All that is clear is that GDS want to abandon the Government Gateway and lose the tried and tested security that it's provided for 10 years and more. What GDS really need is PDSs but it's unimaginable that the British people will let them have their way. Meanwhile, the Home Office's Communications Data Bill threatens the anonymity that the Cabinet Office are offering and we have yet to see if IdA has been certified by CESG.

But that's not all.

There are more problems.

Take a look at the map again. Middle left. The Public.

Between eight and ten million adult Britestonians have never used the web. What's the point of trying to make all public services digital by default if the people most likely to need public services can't access them?

And large parts of the country don't have reliable, cheap, fast broadband.

What's GDS doing about these problems?

Answer, they've started a project. It's got a name – "assisted digital". There's an assisted digital blog. It's had all of four posts on it since 28 July 2011. And that's it. We've still got eight to ten million people who can't use GOV.UK and IdA.

Far from offering savings, which is one of the benefits promised for all this playing in the sandpit, we'll end up paying for both the new on-line delivery method for public services and the old one, involving people, in offices, with telephones, and letters, and face-to-face interviews. The question isn't how much we'll save, it's how much more it will all cost.

Cloud computing – the Pied Pipers of Hamelin
And then from out of a blue sky comes another problem.

The IT industry is currently suffering one of its recurrent bouts of tulipmania and talking rubbish about the merits of cloud computing.

Don't take DMossEsq's word for it. Take the OECD's word for it and ENISA's. If you prefer your gurus to be bearded, try Richard Stallman. Otherwise, listen to Larry Ellison, the billionaire President of Oracle, talking about cloud computing:
Maybe I'm an idiot, but I have no idea what anyone is talking about. What is it? It's complete gibberish. It's insane. When is this idiocy going to stop?
Some 12 year-old management consultant had the bright idea of comparing IT to the utilities. Wouldn't it be good if you only paid for the IT you use. Turn on the tap and you pay, turn it off again and you don't. That way IT would be cheaper.

He or she might like to take a look at this week's newspapers, full of stories about how it's impossible to keep utility bills down, particularly energy prices.

But 12 year-olds probably don't read that bit of the newspaper.

The suppliers are talking up the merits of cloud computing and if you work in IT you can hardly hold your head up with dignity if you aren't solving all your problems by moving your applications to the cloud.

You'd better hope that your lawyers aren't following this fashion. Cloud computing amounts to losing control of your data by handing it over to other organisations like Amazon who put it on their servers which may be anywhere in the world, beyond the jurisdiction of the English courts, and under the control of staff about whose suitability you know nothing. Lawyers are meant to keep your data safe and confidential.

So is Whitehall but they've jumped on the bandwagon anyway and they just can't get enough of cloud computing. Cloud computing will make public services reliable, trusted, efficient, green, you name it, they'll believe it.

Somehow, see bottom left of the map, HMRC have agreed to put all their local office data – i.e. all our data – in the cloud. This should be impossible but when tulipmania strikes a tulip bulb really is worth ten years' salary.

HMRC's dangerous, imprudent, ill-advised, unprofessional, wrong-headed, unbusinesslike, undignified and irresponsible decision is important, but it isn't the subject of this post.

What is the subject of this post is this – not only will the public be logging on to the cloud to deal with HMRC, we will have to do the same to use GOV.UK. GOV.UK will be hosted in the cloud. To put it another way, Whitehall will have no control over the data in GOV.UK because "cloud computing" is a synonym for "no control".

There are big companies supplying cloud computing services. Notably Amazon, Apple, Microsoft and Google.

They're not very keen on paying tax in the UK. But they're big.

They're all American and so, by virtue of the USA PATRIOT Act, any data in their possession can be subpoenaed by the FBI, which may not be what you had in mind when you applied for a fishing licence. But they're big.

And being big becomes a virtue when you see who GDS and HMRC have contracted with to provide cloud computing services – a company called Skyscape Cloud Services Ltd, please see map bottom left-ish.

Skyscape Cloud Services Ltd
Skyscape is too young a start-up to have submitted any accounts to Companies House yet. But according to its annual return, it has no company secretary and just one director, a Mr Jeremy Robin Sanders. Mr Sanders is also the holder of all £1,000-worth of paid-up share capital.

HMRC and GDS have entrusted our data to the care of one man. Even in a tulipmania hospital HMRC and GDS would have to be segregated.

There's more.

When they're looking after crucial national data, the location of data centres should be kept secret for obvious security reasons. It looks as though Skyscape have inadvertently managed to announce where our data will be stored and thus where it could be attacked.

The user experience
There's a lot hanging on tomorrow's and next week's announcements.

And it's not about 70+ charming people working in the offices of GDS tirelessly in the interests of the public's needs. (They've published two more posts on their blog, by the way, since DMossEsq started this post.)

It's about GDS ignoring the fact that up to 10 million of their parishioners won't be able to experience GOV.UK at all.

It's about inviting the likes of Facebook and Google into the British Constitution.

It's about an infantile faith in technology.

It's about GDS proceeding on the unproven assumption that you can deliver on-line identity assurance for large populations. Large populations like 60 million+ Britestonians. It's not businesslike and it's not responsible to proceed on the basis of hope alone, to spend public money without first providing evidence.

And it's about holding up Universal Credit, ignoring the predicament of real people, while playing in the sand.

We're looking here at Constitutional lunacy and misfeasance in public office at the heart of Whitehall.

GDS – the user experience of misfeasance in public office

Tomorrow's news
17 October 2012 – GOV.UK goes live
22 October 2012 – major announcement on IdA (identity assurance)
26 October 2012 – G-Cloud II
Who knows when? – midata

What does that all add up to?

Whitehall and others wasting your money with impunity – the disgraceful state of public administration in the UK.

You want DMossEsq to draw you a map?

OK:

Sunday, 30 September 2012

G-Cloud, GDS, HMRC, Skyscape and the USA PATRIOT Act

At the Office 365 launch, Gordon Frazer, managing director of Microsoft UK,
gave the first admission that cloud data
— regardless of where it is in the world —
is not protected against the USA PATRIOT Act.

[Skyscape has subsequently changed its name to UKCloud: "London – August 1, 2016 – Skyscape Cloud Services Limited, the easy to adopt, easy to use and easy to leave assured cloud services company, has today renamed and relaunched as UKCloud Ltd (www.ukcloud.com), to reinforce the company’s exclusive focus on supporting the UK public sector in the digital transformation of services".]

----------  o  O  o  ----------

G-Cloud
Whitehall's G-Cloud team have taken the baffling decision to include Skyscape Cloud Services Ltd in its Cloudstore.

Cloudstore is an on-line shop the team have set up to display the wares of approved suppliers and from which government departments are supposed to be able to buy with confidence.

That confidence must be limited in the case of Skyscape which has no track record in business, is so young a company that it has yet to file any accounts and has only one director, who is also the only shareholder.

What are the G-Cloud approval procedures? Is it possible to fail them?

HMRC
HMRC have taken the baffling decision to stop storing data in their local offices and store it instead in the cloud with Skyscape. What data? PAYE and NI payments? VAT payments? Personal tax returns? Company tax returns? That's the kind of thing HMRC deal with.

In the name of efficiency and greenness, HMRC think it is wise to lose control of their data – more properly, our data – and hand it over to a company owned and directed by just one man?

GDS
The Government Digital Service (GDS) have taken the baffling decision to host GOV.UK on Skyscape's servers.

GDS are the people whose job it is to make all public services digital by default.

They don't have a lot of successes to their name. They're meant to have approved the suppliers of identity assurance services by now. Today's the deadline and they still haven't got round to it. As a result, DWP's Universal Credit scheme, among others, is left twisting in the wind, unable to proceed for lack of the necessary identity assurance.

But they have produced GOV.UK. It's still in testing, but at least there's something to show for their work. You'd think they'd look after it. But no, they're entrusting its care to a one-man business, Skyscape.

GOV.UK is only meant to replace every single central government website + Directgov + Businesslink + (this is a guess) the Government Gateway. But what the heck, let's stick it in the cloud, that's the modern way, that's where everything's heading, in a handcart ...

We're not just talking here about the businesslike behaviour of Whitehall, its responsible attitude and its grasp of reality. We're nibbling at Constitutional questions, including questions of sovereignty.

Skyscape
On their website, Skyscape say:
SOVEREIGNTY

Skyscape is a UK registered company owned exclusively by UK domiciled shareholders. All our secure operational centers and data centres for UK Public Sector clients are sited within the UK in highly secure IL6 data centres. A significant competitive differentiator is our focus on the integrity of our client’s data, including protection from potential access by overseas legislation including the US Patriot Act.
Let's sweep up some of the small stuff first:
  • Skyscape only has one shareholder, so what's all this about "UK domiciled shareholders" plural?
  • Are Skyscape promising never to have any non-dom shareholders?
  • Why can't they spell "centres" the same way twice in a single sentence?
  • How secure are their data centres given that their "partner" ARK Continuity publishes a map of how to get to one of them on their website?
  • Is a "focus on the integrity of our client’s data" a "significant competitive differentiator"? Don't other cloud service suppliers focus on exactly the same thing?
  • And what do they mean by "integrity"?
Now the big one.

The USA PATRIOT Act 2001
"USA PATRIOT" is an acronym standing for Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism. The Act was passed in the aftermath of 9/11.

It's a long document and DMossEsq hasn't read it. Bits of it, but not all of it. Mayer Brown have. Mayer Brown are a US firm of lawyers and in their paper The USA Patriot Act and the Privacy of Data Stored in the Cloud they say:
European consumers have expressed concern that the USA Patriot Act ... will afford the US government undue and unfettered access to their data if they choose to store it on the cloud servers of US providers (e.g., Microsoft or IBM) ...

Two ... mechanisms that US law enforcement could use to access data in the cloud that warrant discussion are FISA [Foreign Intelligence Security Act] Orders and National Security Letters [NSLs] ...

FISA Orders, particularly as expanded under Section 215 of the Patriot Act, have given rise to privacy concerns for several reasons. First, such orders may be granted ex parte, meaning with only the FBI presenting evidence to the court. Second, Section 215 includes a “gag” provision that prohibits the party that receives a FISA Order from disclosing that fact. This typically would prevent a cloud service provider from informing its customers that the service provider had shared their data with the FBI in response to a FISA Order ...

... the FBI may issue NSLs on its own initiative, without the authorization of any court. (This was true even before the Patriot Act.) Nothing in the Patriot Act provides for any judicial review of the FBI’s decision to issue an NSL. Second, the NSL statutes impose a gag requirement on persons receiving an NSL. In addition, the Attorney General Guidelines and various information sharing agreements require the FBI to share NSL information with other federal agencies and the US intelligence community ...

... any corporation based in the United States will be subject to US jurisdiction and, thus, can be subject to FISA Orders, NSLs, search warrants, or grand jury subpoenas. The same is generally true for a non-US corporation that has a location in the United States or that conducts continuous and systematic business in the United States ...

... an entity that is subject to US jurisdiction must produce not only materials located within the United States, but any data or materials it maintains in its branches or offices anywhere in the world. The entity even may be required to produce data stored at a non-US subsidiary ...

... US law enforcement authorities may serve FISA Orders, NSLs, warrants or subpoenas on any cloud service provider that is US based, has a US office, or conducts systematic or continuous US business—even if the data is stored outside the United States ...

... US law enforcement authorities may serve FISA Orders, NSLs, warrants or subpoenas on any cloud service customer that is US based, has a US branch, or conducts systematic or continuous US business—even if the data is stored outside the United States ...
You get the message.

In case you don't, Microsoft say the same thing more briefly, Microsoft admits Patriot Act can access EU-based cloud data:
At the Office 365 launch, Gordon Frazer, managing director of Microsoft UK, gave the first admission that cloud data — regardless of where it is in the world — is not protected against the USA PATRIOT Act.
So do Google, Web freedom faces greatest threat ever, warns Google's Sergey Brin:
Brin acknowledged that some people were anxious about the amount of their data that was now in the reach of US authorities because it sits on Google's servers. He said the company was periodically forced to hand over data and sometimes prevented by legal restrictions from even notifying users that it had done so.
Microsoft and Google are both themselves suppliers of cloud services. They're being straight with the public.

Skyscape can tell us till they're blue in the face that its one and only shareholder is domiciled in the UK. But as long as the company is somehow linked up in its mysterious partnership with QinetiQ, Cisco, VMware and EMC the claim to offer "protection from potential access by overseas legislation including the US Patriot Act" is arguably false.

Whitehall has a duty to keep control of the data we entrust to its custody. Sticking our data in the cloud is a breach of that duty.

If Whitehall, GDS, HMRC and/or the British public are relying on that claim of Skyscape's, they/we may be sadly mistaken.

----------

Cribsheet
What? Even QinetiQ? The dear old true blue DERA as was?

Yes, even QinetiQ, because of its "conduct of a systematic and continuous US business", viz. QinetiQ North America, 7918 Jones Branch Drive, McLean, VA 20165, Tel: 703-652-9595, www.QinetiQ-NA.com, contactus@qinetiq-na.com ...

Added 10.1.13
U.S. Spy Law Authorizes Mass Surveillance of European Citizens

Added 13.2.13
Yes, U.S. authorities can spy on EU cloud data. Here's how

Added 16.3.13
National Security Letters ruled unconstitutional