#3 of many lessons about GDS and the external digital thought leaders

Each week, ex-Guardian man Mike Bracken, executive director of the Government Digital Service (GDS) and senior responsible officer owner for the government-wide Identity Assurance Programme (IDAP), writes up his diary for the previous seven days and publishes it. And on 11 January 2013, it was published in the form of a video. Tune in and learn, as he explains that:

Martha gave us our publishing mandate. And we've now got our transaction mandate [now that there are digital strategies for each government department].

"Martha", of course, is Martha Lane Fox DBE, the UK Machiavelli de nos jours, the Prime Minister's digital champion and chairman of the GDS advisory board (and now also a member of Richard Branson's/Virgin Media's 'Our Digital Future' campaign). It is thanks to her 14 October 2010 letter to Francis Maude – Directgov 2010 and beyond: revolution not evolution – that GDS exists.

Actually, that's not true.

None of it.

Ms Lane Fox's letter asserted that GDS should be responsible for publishing all central government information. It also asserted that GDS should be in charge of all on-line transactions between government and the public. You can hardly miss it. That was recommendation #1 in her letter:

Recommendation 1 Make Directgov [= GOV.UK] the government front end for all departments' transactional online services to citizens and businesses, with the teeth to mandate cross Government solutions, set standards and force departments to improve citizens' experience of key transactions.

Ex-Guardian man Mike Bracken's neat little distinction between his publishing mandate and his transaction mandate is false.

Doubly so. Because the mandate doesn't come from Ms Lane Fox. How could it? She's in no position to tell Whitehall how to organise itself. The mandate can only have come from very senior civil servants and from politicians. It's thanks to them that GDS exists, not Ms Lane Fox.

Ms Lane Fox is a salesman. An exceptionally good one but nevertheless that's all. A salesman. She has no experience of running an enormous organisation like DWP, for example, and no experience of supplying life-supporting services to millions of members of the public.

You may disagree.

Who's right? DMossEsq or you? How can we tell?

You can settle the matter easily thanks to ex-Guardian man Mike Bracken's having organised Sprint 13, the must-be-there party at the Queen Elizabeth II Conference Centre tomorrow Monday 21 January 2013 from 08:45 to 13:00 (GMT).

300 of Whitehall's best + "Government and Agency Board Members, Officials, Policy Makers, Ministers, Press and External Digital Thought-Leaders", all assembled in one place and Martha Lane Fox is due to make a speech. DMossEsq won't be there. But you will. You can just ask her.

Remember, according to Ms Lane Fox you don't have a strong grasp of government policy. And your woodentopped insistence on obeying the law is merely obstructive:

It seems to me that the time is now to use the Internet to shift the lead in the design of services from the policy and legal teams to the end users ... Directgov [=GDS] SWAT teams ... should be given a remit to support and challenge departments and agencies ... We must give these SWAT teams the necessary support to challenge any policy and legal barriers which stop services being designed around user needs ... This person [in the event, ex-Guardian man Mike Bracken] should have the controls and powers to gain absolute authority over the user experience across all government online services ... and the power to direct all government online spend. The CEO for Digital should also have the controls and powers to direct set and enforce standards across government departments ...

While you're at it, you may as well take advantage of his presence to ask ex-Guardian man Mike Bracken a few questions, too.

Sprint 13, after all, is the event at which he explains that those 300 of Whitehall's best have been doing their job wrong for the past several decades and insists that they now do it his way. The Estonian way.

#3 of many lessons about GDS and the external digital thought leaders

Each week, ex-Guardian man Mike Bracken, executive director of the Government Digital Service (GDS) and senior responsible officer owner for the government-wide Identity Assurance Programme (IDAP), writes up his diary for the previous seven days and publishes it. And on 11 January 2013, it was published in the form of a video. Tune in and learn, as he explains that:

Martha gave us our publishing mandate. And we've now got our transaction mandate [now that there are digital strategies for each government department].

"Martha", of course, is Martha Lane Fox DBE, the UK Machiavelli de nos jours, the Prime Minister's digital champion and chairman of the GDS advisory board (and now also a member of Richard Branson's/Virgin Media's 'Our Digital Future' campaign). It is thanks to her 14 October 2010 letter to Francis Maude – Directgov 2010 and beyond: revolution not evolution – that GDS exists.

Actually, that's not true.

#2 of many lessons about GDS and the external digital thought-leaders

Would you trust an organisation that promises the impossible?

It's a week now since ex-Guardian man Mike Bracken, executive director of the Government Digital Service (GDS) and senior responsible officer owner for the government-wide Identity Assurance Programme (IDAP), issued his invitation to Sprint 13, The Future is Here.

What a party it promises to be. Come and meet "Government and Agency Board Members, Officials, Policy Makers, Ministers, Press and External Digital Thought-Leaders" in uptown SW1 at the Queen Elizabeth II Conference Centre on Monday 21 January 2013 from 08:45 to 13:00 (GMT) – "jealousy" hardly begins to describe the state of those of us who have been uninvited.

Still, at least the uninvited don't face the invidious choice of the select band of party-goers – which workshop to attend:

• AGILE working methods?	• Why do we need digital delivery?	• Electoral Registration Transformation?
• Assuring identity in a digital environment?	• Going digital?	• ‘You be the judge’?
• Aid information platform?	• Digital policy engagement?	• Open changes everything?
• The use of social media?	• Open policymaking?	...

Very tempting to try Electoral Registration Transformation. So many questions:

• Can the law be changed to allow the data-sharing which its advocates believe would facilitate a complete and accurate electoral roll?
• Would data-sharing help?
• How do you reconcile Whitehall's claim that they don't want to create a single national identity register with the plan to store the complete electoral roll with the credit referencing agencies?
• Would that complete electoral roll provide the basis for a new way to conduct the national census?
• ...

But in the end the choice surely must be Assuring identity in a digital environment:

• If there's no on-line identity assurance, then GDS have been wasting their time.
• If we can't transact with the government on the web, then digital-by-default collapses.

What are the chances of GDS delivering on-line identity assurance? Slim-to-nil.

We have the lesson of the National Identity Scheme to go by. After eight years of unstinting political support and taxpayers' money, it collapsed, with nothing to show for it, except the nervous breakdown from which the Identity & Passport Service still haven't recovered.

It would be a hard job in any circumstances to get digital-by-default off the ground. The news every day carries stories of security breaches on even the most exalted websites. And even whole countries – including ex-Guardian man Mike Bracken's favourite Estonia.

After years of security failures, GDS start with no trust. Which means they can't start.

No-one believes any more that there is any such thing as a secure website. The belief in secure websites is right up there with the belief in unicorns.

It would be hard enough, to recap, to make digital-by-default work in any circumstances, but GDS have made it even harder for themselves than it need be.

With the quasi-religious light of web zealots in their eye, GDS want to make access to public services just as easy as access to Facebook and Google and Twitter. That means abandoning the clunky old Government Gateway. The Gateway is relatively secure. Precisely because it's so clunky. Having separate user IDs and passwords for each person/company for each public service is precisely what makes it relatively secure. Get rid of the clunkiness and you lose the relative security.

GDS have appointed eight national so-called "identity providers" (IDPs). The name is either laughable or sinister. Neither quality promotes trust.

They were late naming seven of the IDPs, please see Identity assurance – one under the eight. And the name of the eighth – PayPal – only came to light about 48 hours ago, by such a devious route that their appointment looks suspicious, please see The identity of the UK's eighth identity provider has now been provided, reluctantly.

Why are GDS so embarrassed about PayPal? Or why are PayPal so embarrassed about GDS? Either way, it does nothing for trust.

Last March, 2012, GDS told us that IDAP would be "fully operational from spring 2013", please see Universal Credit and the December putsch. Now we learn that "systems will need to be fully operational from March 2013". The beginning of March? 41 days away. Or the end? 72 days. Either way, it's impossible. Would you trust an organisation that promises the impossible?

All that, and GDS want to put public services in the cloud, acknowledged as the single most efficacious way to lose control of your data. In this case of course, our data. Another own goal by GDS.

It promises to be a lively congregation on Monday and it's an infuriating shame to miss it.

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Updated 23.11.14

It was January 2013 when we wrote the following, please see above – all but two years ago:

GDS have appointed eight national so-called "identity providers" (IDPs). The name is either laughable or sinister. Neither quality promotes trust.

It's all change now. The Identity Assurance scheme (IDA) is now known as "GOV.UK Verify" and as GDS were telling us the other day in How does a certified company establish that it’s really you? ...

When you want to access a service using GOV.UK Verify for the first time, you’ll be asked to choose from a list of certified companies (also known as ‘identity providers’ – they can actually be any type of organisation that is certified).

... they're not called "identified providers" any more. Now they're called "certified companies". Stuck in their own terrarium, it's taken GDS two years and more to notice how ridiculous the idea of an "identity provider" is.

That's not all that's changed.

Three of the original "identity providers" have pulled out – Cassidian, Ingeus and PayPal want nothing to do with IDA/GOV.UK Verify.

And of the remaining five, only one is certified – Experian. The other four – Digidentity, Mydex, the Post Office and Verizon – have yet to be certified trustworthy by tScheme, an organisation no-one has heard of and no-one has any reason to trust.

#2 of many lessons about GDS and the external digital thought-leaders

Would you trust an organisation that promises the impossible?

It's a week now since ex-Guardian man Mike Bracken, executive director of the Government Digital Service (GDS) and senior responsible officer owner for the government-wide Identity Assurance Programme (IDAP), issued his invitation to Sprint 13, The Future is Here.

What a party it promises to be. Come and meet "Government and Agency Board Members, Officials, Policy Makers, Ministers, Press and External Digital Thought-Leaders" in uptown SW1 at the Queen Elizabeth II Conference Centre on Monday 21 January 2013 from 08:45 to 13:00 (GMT) – "jealousy" hardly begins to describe the state of those of us who have been uninvited.

midata – the simple question posed by Which?

BIS – abandon midata as a bad job. Now.

Is it safe? Yes or no?
In their 3 November 2011 press release Government, business and consumer groups commit to midata vision of consumer empowerment, the Department for Business Innovation and Skills (BIS) said:

The following consumer groups and regulators are working with midata to represent consumers' interests and concerns. As well as working towards potential benefits, their input plays an important role in identifying potential risks and helping determine how these can be addressed: - Citizens Advice - Communications Consumer Panel - Consumer Focus - Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) - OFCOM - Office of Fair Trading (OFT) - Which?

Now, 14 months later, we are still none the wiser how midata would "empower" consumers.

If the regulators in the list above had succeeded in their task, then no-one would be considering midata. We are still none the wiser how midata could succeed where the regulators have failed.

Jo Swinson MP is the Minister responsible for midata and she posted an article on the Which? blog last month, What if companies gave me control of my data?. What indeed. We are still none the wiser how midata could give consumers control of their data. That control depends on changes in the law worldwide and those changes are not in BIS's gift.

What about Which? themselves? The Consumers' Association. Where do they stand on midata?

The Which? response to BIS's midata consultation opens by saying that midata is a good idea and then spends several pages describing the dangers of identity theft which would be exacerbated by midata. So which is it? Are they in favour, or not?

As you would expect from the most respected consumer group in the country, with 56 years of worthy service behind them, Which? run a commendably open blog. And in one of the comments on the Jo Swinson article Which?'s in-house lawyer, Georgina Nelson, highlights the risks associated with midata and says (17 January 2013 at 11:40 am):

Our position has always been that our support for the midata programme is contingent upon addressing these issues.

The title of BIS's 3 November 2011 press release is misleading. Which?, at least, are not "committed to the midata vision". Their support is, quite rightly, contingent.

It's up to BIS to demonstrate that midata would be safe. Failing that, Which? can't support it.

It's hard to imagine that anyone else could support it either.

So – question: can BIS demonstrate that midata would be safe for consumers? Yes or no? They can't tell us how it would empower us or how it would give us control over our data but can they at least convince us that midata would be safe?

If not, perhaps BIS would like to abandon midata as a bad job now and promote consumer empowerment in some effective way.

Which? could no doubt make several suggestions how BIS could spend their time and our money better.

midata – the simple question posed by Which?

BIS – abandon midata as a bad job. Now.

Is it safe? Yes or no?
In their 3 November 2011 press release Government, business and consumer groups commit to midata vision of consumer empowerment, the Department for Business Innovation and Skills (BIS) said:

The following consumer groups and regulators are working with midata to represent consumers' interests and concerns. As well as working towards potential benefits, their input plays an important role in identifying potential risks and helping determine how these can be addressed: - Citizens Advice - Communications Consumer Panel - Consumer Focus - Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) - OFCOM - Office of Fair Trading (OFT) - Which?

Now, 14 months later, we are still none the wiser how midata would "empower" consumers.

If the regulators in the list above had succeeded in their task, then no-one would be considering midata. We are still none the wiser how midata could succeed where the regulators have failed.

GDS, data-sharing, privacy and dignity

In February 2007 a man called Chris Lightfoot committed suicide. Many people paid tribute to him including Phil Booth, the National Coordinator of NO2ID, who wrote in memoriam Chris Lightfoot, 1978 – 2007:

Chris, more than most, understood how important it is that we should all have the choice of what about ourselves we share with others. His intellectual honesty and keen appreciation of human dignity informed all that he did ...

Now another man has committed suicide, Aaron Swartz, and again there are many tributes including one from Sir Tim Berners-Lee ...

Aaron dead.World wanderers, we have lost a wise elder.Hackers for right, we are one down.Parents all, we have lost a child. Let us weep. — Tim Berners-Lee (@timberners_lee) January 12, 2013

... and one from ex-Guardian man Mike Bracken, executive director of the Government Digital Service (GDS) and senior responsible officer owner for the UK's pan-government Identity Assurance Programme (IDAP), please see Standing on the shoulders of giants:

We are shocked and saddened by the death of Aaron Swartz. Some of us at GDS were fortunate to have met him ... Here in the UK, it inevitably brings back the pain six years ago of losing Chris Lightfoot ... We should also mourn as citizens, because Aaron and Chris embodied an unbridled eagerness to apply the toolkit of the internet age in the service of civil society ... Much of the work we do, and the way we do it, drew inspiration from the work of Aaron and Chris ... >> About this post: Many people contributed to this short post. We are in their debt. I wasn’t entirely sure that this was an appropriate post for our blog, so I’ve also published this at mikebracken.com. I understand this may seem the wrong place for these sentiments but we also believe in openness and we think that government departments should behave as though there are humans in them. This is from our human side. I apologise in advance if anyone thinks I made the wrong call. That decision was all mine.

It is Sir Isaac Newton who described himself as standing on the shoulders of giants.

Sir Tim believes that the web can know more about us than we do.

GDS with their IDAP hat on want us all to use personal data stores (PDSs). They want those PDSs to be maintained on the web, in the cloud. And they want the existing laws prohibiting data-sharing between government departments to be repealed or ignored, using as an excuse individual electoral registration, the national census and putative cuts in public administration costs.

This looks like the opposite of Chris Lightfoot's appeal to human dignity.

GDS, data-sharing, privacy and dignity

In February 2007 a man called Chris Lightfoot committed suicide. Many people paid tribute to him including Phil Booth, the National Coordinator of NO2ID, who wrote in memoriam Chris Lightfoot, 1978 – 2007:

Chris, more than most, understood how important it is that we should all have the choice of what about ourselves we share with others. His intellectual honesty and keen appreciation of human dignity informed all that he did ...

Now another man has committed suicide, Aaron Swartz, and again there are many tributes including one from Sir Tim Berners-Lee ...

The identity of the UK's eighth identity provider has now been provided, reluctantly

The acknowledged problems with public administration in the UK are to be solved, it is proposed, by making public services digital by default, which requires us all to have electronic identities (eIDs). These are to be provided by eight so-called "identity providers" of whom only seven were previously announced, please see Identity assurance – one under the eight.

The eighth identity provider is PayPal.

How do we know that?

Did the Government Digital Service (GDS) make an announcement? No.

Did the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) make an announcement? Not really. DWP posted a notice on the Contracts Finder service of businesslink.gov.uk, a website which GDS say no longer exists – it's supposed to have been replaced by their GOV.UK.

So how?

Answer:

DWP publishes details of eight IDPs for ID Assurance services, including Paypal contractsfinder.businesslink.gov.uk/Common/View%20… — OIX UK (@OIXUK) January 16, 2013

This is not an open way to deal with the public.

Check the Contracts Finder link in the Tweet above and you'll find that PayPal have been on the ID assurance list of suppliers for months. Why the delay in making an announcement? Who was reluctant? Why?

Hundreds of millions of pounds are scheduled to be wasted on the failure of GDS's identity assurance programme. The appointment of a national identity provider is an important matter. Why is its announcement buried on Twitter?

And what is the rôle of OIX in the UK's new Constitution?

The identity of the UK's eighth identity provider has now been provided, reluctantly

The acknowledged problems with public administration in the UK are to be solved, it is proposed, by making public services digital by default, which requires us all to have electronic identities (eIDs). These are to be provided by eight so-called "identity providers" of whom only seven were previously announced, please see Identity assurance – one under the eight.

The eighth identity provider is PayPal.

How do we know that?