Wednesday 19 December 2012

Cloud computing supplier raises doubts about cloud computing suppliers – "suicidal mission with no exit"

It should be made clear that Mr Peter Dawes-Huish, the chief executive officer of LinuxIT, is in favour of cloud computing. "G-Cloud is a great opportunity for government", he is quoted as saying in computing.co.uk.

This has provoked fury in the Twittersphere where Chris Haslam has re-Tweeted Mark_Anthony's scorn: "RT @Mark_Antony: Worst article on the @G_Cloud_UK I have ever had the misfortune to read: http://bit.ly/XzwKw0  - shameful drivel...”".

The shameful drivel Mr Dawes-Huish is guilty of uttering is presumably where he described G-Cloud as a military mission "with an entry route and no exit route" that is "not just dangerous, but suicide".

G-Cloud, of course, is the government cloud, a military mission in the safe hands of the Cabinet Office and the Government Procurement Service (GPS). GPS, if you remember, are the people whose procurement service broke down because it didn't have enough space to store the tenders submitted by prospective suppliers in response to GPS's invitation.

In the worst article ever, Messrs Haslam and Mark_Anthony had the further misfortune to read "if you move your applications and data to a cloud service in the proprietary model then you'll be held to ransom" and "some government departments indicate that using G-Cloud is illegal, or against government policy". Drivel. Shameful.

HMRC's decision to store local tax office data in the cloud is perfectly sensible. So is the Government Digital Service's decision to host GOV.UK in the cloud.

Let there be no doubt about that, both decisions have been made with the support of GPS. There is nothing untoward in the fact that the supplier concerned in each case, Skyscape Cloud Services Ltd, is owned 100% by just one individual (when last checked on Companies House) and provides a map on the web how to get to its data centre. That will not stay CESG's hand for a moment, they will be pleased to confirm that Skyscape meets all security requirements.

Cloud computing is the flavour of the month, Mr Dawes-Huish suggests. It is based on the attractions of the utility model, you only pay for the IT services you actually use. The utility model is in some disrepute in the gas and electricity world at the moment but it would be shameful drivel to suggest that the same fate awaits cloud computing – quasi-monopolists ramping prices, consumers helpless in the face of.

What happens, though, Mr Dawes-Huish asks, when there is a new flavour of the month round at GPS Towers? Will the Gadarene lemmings who have signed up with G-Cloud be able to escape and take advantage of the new flavour? Or will HMRC's records and the entire single government domain GOV.UK be locked in to/held hostage by last month's flavour?

Cloud computing supplier raises doubts about cloud computing suppliers – "suicidal mission with no exit"

It should be made clear that Mr Peter Dawes-Huish, the chief executive officer of LinuxIT, is in favour of cloud computing. "G-Cloud is a great opportunity for government", he is quoted as saying in computing.co.uk.

This has provoked fury in the Twittersphere where Chris Haslam has re-Tweeted Mark_Anthony's scorn: "RT @Mark_Antony: Worst article on the @G_Cloud_UK I have ever had the misfortune to read: http://bit.ly/XzwKw0  - shameful drivel...”".

The shameful drivel Mr Dawes-Huish is guilty of uttering is presumably where he described G-Cloud as a military mission "with an entry route and no exit route" that is "not just dangerous, but suicide".

G-Cloud, of course, is the government cloud, a military mission in the safe hands of the Cabinet Office and the Government Procurement Service (GPS). GPS, if you remember, are the people whose procurement service broke down because it didn't have enough space to store the tenders submitted by prospective suppliers in response to GPS's invitation.

Monday 17 December 2012

GDS deal death blow to midata

The Government Digital Service (GDS) are currently re-writing all central government websites and moving them to https://www.gov.uk (GOV.UK).

No-one knows why.

Just because the exercise is pointless doesn't mean that it has no effect.

The Department for Business Innovation and Skills (BIS) is a recent victim. The content previously available at http://www.bis.gov.uk should now be available at GOV.UK and browsing old content should redirect you automatically to the new location.

That's the idea.

But it doesn't work with the famous BIS press release A midata future: 10 ways it could shape your choices. That used to be available at http://www.bis.gov.uk/policies/consumer-issues/consumer-empowerment/personal-data/midata-future-10-ways-it-could-shape-your-choices. Click on that link now and, however hard you try, you're not going to find the press release, not on GOV.UK, nowhere.

Apart from DMossEsq.com. Luckily there's a copy there, at http://www.dmossesq.com/2012/11/identity-providers-electronic-mary.html So it is still possible to read about the great benefits of midata, BIS's grand plan to satisfy the pent-up demand among the public for a "contracts and warranties dashboard". But no thanks to the butterfingers at GDS.

midata is utterly footling anyway, you may say, depriving it of the oxygen of the BIS publicity machine is neither here nor there.

Quite right, as long as it's only that one press release that's gone missing during GDS's clumsy spring clean.

But is it? What else has gone missing? Maybe something important?

GDS deal death blow to midata

The Government Digital Service (GDS) are currently re-writing all central government websites and moving them to https://www.gov.uk (GOV.UK).

No-one knows why.

Just because the exercise is pointless doesn't mean that it has no effect.

Friday 14 December 2012

GDS misbriefing

The invitation to tender for the Government Digital Service (GDS) market research contract with IFF Research Ltd includes this picture of the "new identity assurance model":
The document was created on 8 November 2012, according to its Microsoft Word properties, and was last modified on 12 November 2012. Next day, 13 November 2012, the names of the UK's appointed identity providers (the electronic Mary Poppinses) were announced. Halifax weren't on the list. Neither were Lambeth and Visa. Nor Lloyds and Equifax.

Which means that GDS briefed the prospective suppliers wrongly in their invitation to tender.

Experienced consultants like IFF Research will be quite used to that. It always takes a while for the client's real requirements to come to light. By now they will have established a more accurate picture, with seven known identity providers and a mystery one:
How will the interviews go, as IFF Research set about their market research?

IFF: (to person in the street) The government is trying to cause an ecosystem of private sector suppliers to flourish. Would you feel comfortable using Visa as an identity provider?
PITS: yes.
IFF: well they're not on the list. How about Cassidian?


IFF: (to person in the street) The government is trying to cause an ecosystem of private sector suppliers to flourish. Would you feel comfortable using Ingeus as an identity provider?
PITS: are you sure that's how it's pronounced?
IFF: shall I put you down as a don't-know?


IFF: (to person in the street) The government is trying to cause an ecosystem of private sector suppliers to flourish. Would you feel comfortable using Mydex as an identity provider?
PITS: why's it called Mydex? What does it mean?
IFF: I have no idea, the question is would you feel comfortable ...
PITS: any particular reason why I should trust them?
IFF: I ask the questions.


IFF: (to person in the street) The government is trying to cause an ecosystem of private sector suppliers to flourish. Would you feel comfortable using Verizon as an identity provider?
PITS: I thought they were a US mobile phone network.
IFF: they are.
PITS: so how are they going to verify my identity for the UK government?
IFF: I don't know.


IFF: (to person in the street) The government is trying to cause an ecosystem of private sector suppliers to flourish. Would you feel comfortable using a completely unknown supplier represented on this picture by a yellow question mark as an identity provider?
PITS: yes.
IFF: thank you.


IFF: (to person in the street) The government is trying to cause an ecosystem of private sector suppliers to flourish. Would you feel comfortable using digidentity as an identity provider?
PITS: is this a wind-up?
IFF: thank you.

IFF: (to person in the street) The government is trying to cause an ecosystem of private sector suppliers to flourish. Would you feel comfortable using the Post Office as an identity provider?
PITS: the Post Office isn't a private sector supplier.
IFF: Yes it is, look it up on the Companies House website, company number 02154540.
PITS: you mean I can buy shares in it?
IFF: no, the shares in the Post Office are all held by Royal Mail and the shares in Royal Mail are all held by Vince Cable and he's not selling any but otherwise it's a private sector company.
PITS: who's paying for all this identity-providing lark?
IFF: the Department for Work and Pensions, to get Universal Credit going.
PITS: so there's nothing private sector about this at all, is there?
IFF: no, you're right, the private sector element is one of GDS's many fantasies.
PITS: pleasure talking to you, I'm sure, can't wait to see your report.
IFF: don't hold your breath.


IFF: (to person in the street) The government is trying to cause an ecosystem of private sector suppliers to flourish. Would you feel comfortable using Experian as an identity provider?
PITS: yes.
IFF: why? What's the matter with you?
PITS: that's a job they already do, isn't it, they've already demonstrated their competence, unlike any of the other suppliers on your picture.
IFF: is that true?


Why did all the banks and credit card companies refuse to become official identity providers? Why aren't there any UK mobile phone companies among their number? How long will this farce be allowed to continue? How much will it cost us? Will anyone be accountable?

GDS misbriefing

The invitation to tender for the Government Digital Service (GDS) market research contract with IFF Research Ltd includes this picture of the "new identity assurance model":
The document was created on 8 November 2012, according to its Microsoft Word properties, and was last modified on 12 November 2012. Next day, 13 November 2012, the names of the UK's appointed identity providers (the electronic Mary Poppinses) were announced. Halifax weren't on the list. Neither were Lambeth and Visa. Nor Lloyds and Equifax.

Which means that GDS briefed the prospective suppliers wrongly in their invitation to tender.

Jo Swinson on midata – How and Which?

Ms Swinson can plead ignorance. Which? can't.

Writing successful publicity material is hard. Quite beyond DMossesq. And, it seems, Jo Swinson, minister of state at the Department for Business Innovation and Skills (BIS). Here she is, trying to write with unfeigned enthusiasm about midata:
Recently I was chatting to the owner of an independent bookshop, who told me animatedly about his Christmas recommendations. In particular which ones I might enjoy most given what other books I had recently read and loved.

How great, I thought, to have that personal, tailored advice, and wouldn’t it be great if I could get that everywhere else?
That gem appears on the blog run by Which? magazine and you can see why the consumer champion Which? wants a disclaimer at the bottom of Ms Swinson's post:
Which? Conversation provides guest spots to external contributors. This is from Jo Swinson MP. All opinions expressed here are Jo’s own, not necessarily those of Which?
The benefits of midata that Ms Swinson manages to name are all available already without midata and have been for decades – BIS's initiative is otiose. The other benefits are vague, unnamed and hypothetical – unreliable, in other words, dubious marketing.

And Ms Swinson fails to warn her readers how these mysterious benefits will be earned. By storing all our personal data on the web with a third party we have no reason to trust. She doesn't tell us that. Standard behaviour for a politician, perhaps, but well below the standards for openness expected of Which?.

Is a disclaimer enough, though? The headline on the post is under Which?'s control and reads What if companies gave me control of my data?. midata offers consumers no control over their data that we don't already have. Its advocates keep promising control. But they can never answer the question how midata will confer additional control. It won't. Because it can't.

But Which? are in deeper than a misleading headline. BIS's 3 November 2011 press release lists the organisations which support midata, including Which?. It will take more than a disclaimer to undo the reputational damage that will follow when consumers discover how midata works. Ms Swinson can plead ignorance. Which? can't.

Jo Swinson on midata – How and Which?

Ms Swinson can plead ignorance. Which? can't.

Writing successful publicity material is hard. Quite beyond DMossesq. And, it seems, Jo Swinson, minister of state at the Department for Business Innovation and Skills (BIS). Here she is, trying to write with unfeigned enthusiasm about midata:
Recently I was chatting to the owner of an independent bookshop, who told me animatedly about his Christmas recommendations. In particular which ones I might enjoy most given what other books I had recently read and loved.

How great, I thought, to have that personal, tailored advice, and wouldn’t it be great if I could get that everywhere else?
That gem appears on the blog run by Which? magazine and you can see why the consumer champion Which? wants a disclaimer at the bottom of Ms Swinson's post:
Which? Conversation provides guest spots to external contributors. This is from Jo Swinson MP. All opinions expressed here are Jo’s own, not necessarily those of Which?
The benefits of midata that Ms Swinson manages to name are all available already without midata and have been for decades – BIS's initiative is otiose. The other benefits are vague, unnamed and hypothetical – unreliable, in other words, dubious marketing.

Tuesday 11 December 2012

GDS's identity assurance story continues to unravel

The Potential Provider shall complete Phase 1 by 31 December 2012
DWP, the Department for Work and Pensions, is by far the biggest spender in government, having clocked up £242.3 billion in 2011-12, see HM Treasury's Public Spending Statistics July 2012 (p.53), including £93 billion on pensions.

On 1 March 2012 GDS, the Government Digital Service, wrote: "Today the cross-Government Identity Assurance programme sanctioned DWP to publish a tender to procure Identity services for all of Government", see Identity: One small step for all of Government.

Sanctioned?

Somehow DWP put up with this condescension. GDS would be well-advised not to try it on with our next biggest spender, the Department of Health, £121.3 billion.

GDS went on in their blog post of last March to refer to the procurement of identity assurance services, needed by DWP for their Universal Credit initiative: "The initial DWP services will be required to provide identity assurance for approximately 21 000 000 claimants ... To support the rollout of universal credit and personal independence payments, identity assurance suppliers will be selected in summer 2012 and systems will need to be fully operational from spring 2013".

Let's say that GDS mean that identity assurance services "will need to be fully operational" on or before 22 June 2013.

Question – how did GDS come up with that timetable?

Before you answer, consider – there must have been some reasoning behind GDS's choice of date. They must have had some idea which suppliers will be involved and how they will satisfy DWP's needs.

Yesterday, 10 December 2012, GDS published the details of an identity assurance contract they put out for tender and which they have now awarded. This contract is for qualitative research into the way people could use multiple identity providers to access public services.

Almost every sentence in GDS's invitation to tender (ITT) is contentious. But let's content ourselves with just one, para.4.2.4, the opening sentence of this post: "The Potential Provider shall complete Phase 1 by 31 December 2012".

This is fundamental research for the Identity Assurance Programme. It won't be finished until 31 December 2012. GDS have the option to extend it by up to three months. 31 March 2013. And then there's Phase 2.

The chances of DWP getting its identity assurance services before 22 June 2013? Nil.

GDS's ITT wasn't even completed until 12 November 2012, eight months after they sanctioned DWP's ITT. GDS must have known then that their timetable is a fantasy.

Meanwhile there are 21 million potential claimants out there, waiting for GDS, whose priorities are clearly elsewhere.

If anybody asks you what "misfeasance" means, misfeasance in Whitehall, just point them at GDS.

(Hat tip: Toby Stevens)

GDS's identity assurance story continues to unravel

The Potential Provider shall complete Phase 1 by 31 December 2012
DWP, the Department for Work and Pensions, is by far the biggest spender in government, having clocked up £242.3 billion in 2011-12, see HM Treasury's Public Spending Statistics July 2012 (p.53), including £93 billion on pensions.

On 1 March 2012 GDS, the Government Digital Service, wrote: "Today the cross-Government Identity Assurance programme sanctioned DWP to publish a tender to procure Identity services for all of Government", see Identity: One small step for all of Government.

Sanctioned?