Wednesday 22 January 2014

GreenInk 10: Private Eye Crook of the Year 2014 awards

(Hat tip: No2ID)

Sadly, there seems to have been no space in the latest edition of Private Eye for the following letter:
From: David Moss
Sent: 10 January 2014 14:05
To: Letters to the editor
Subject: The Gnome Business Awards for 2013, p.32, Eye #1357

Sir

Gnome awards Crook of the Year 2013 to James McCormick. He bought novelty golf ball-finders and sold them as explosives detectors to governments whose gullibility or corruption must also be award-winning.

When it comes to the 2014 awards, perhaps Gnome's panel would like to consider the McCormicks selling mass consumer biometrics technology which is meant to identify us uniquely and verify our identity.

Three world-class experts reviewed the literature and determined that biometrics is "out of statistical control". I.e. it's not a science [1]. By way of a practical example, they cite the charade at the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).

Under the terms of the USA PATRIOT Act 2001 section 403(c)(1), NIST have to certify all biometrics systems before they are deployed to federal law-enforcement agencies. What the scientists at NIST say in their certificates is: "This evaluation does not certify that any of the systems tested meet the requirements of any specific government application". By issuing certificates, NIST abide by the Act even if the certificates say that they haven't got a clue whether the biometrics systems work.

It's not just the USA. The panel will be spoilt for choice [2]. Governments all over the world are handing over public money to McCormicks talking biometricsballs.

Yours

David Moss

2. http://www.planetbiometrics.com/
If only they had seen ENISA's latest report.

ENISA is the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security and in eID Authentication methods in e-Finance and e-Payment services they say:
6.1 Biometrics adoption related risks
The results of the survey show that very few professionals incorporate biometrics as an eIDA method solution for e-banking. The rationale behind this phenomenon is that institutions must be able to comply with the GDPR. There exist legal issues when dealing with personal information (different legislation for every country). In Europe, a specific authorization from customers is required, which is a difficult task, since the majority of people do not feel comfortable with granting permission on the storage of their biometric information (i.e. personal body patterns). This, in general, is only manageable if a strong juridical base exists and the use is adequate, relevant and not abusive in correspondence with the goals and reasons for biometric data to be collected, used or saved, resulting in an important challenge to be addressed.

Moreover, there exist high associated risks, mainly due to the potential attacks to a centralised data base storage of biometrics parameters. The risk of compromise of the biometric information DB (even if it’s encrypted, hashed, etc.) is real and non-acceptable for CISOs and directors of the e-banking sector. The sensitive nature of biometric information: data is compromised forever (i.e. it’s not possible to change the hand print, Iris, fingerprints, etc.), resulting in both high risk, and great responsibility to be accepted, especially if other eIDA methods are suitable.

Another important factor is the usability, since current technologies do not provide 100% of accuracy at the first try. There are still open issues related to the False Rejection Rate (FRR) and the False Acceptance Rate (FAR), which remain open even in scientific experiments or proof of concepts.

In summary, because of the associated risks, the financial sector is still not prepared to use biometry neither as a unique authentication factor nor a second authentication factor.

Biometry is used in emerging countries, where there are no other means of unique identification of the persons, due to lack of governmentally supported credentials, and also in countries where Personal Data protection is not a priority, like it is in EU.

Specialists are working in finding a solution to the high risk associated to using the biometry, and one solution that is being analysed and starting to be implemented is the local storage of biometric identification profiles. This has three advantages: 1) the responsibility of the storage is transferred to the end user, 2) the chances of a successful threat to steal large amount of biometric information is low, because the threat should be successful on many devices and stores, 3) the biometric identification vector doesn’t have to travel over the network.
If the banks don't think that today's mass consumer biometrics are up to the job, why do governments waste our money on this magical non-technology?

GreenInk 10: Private Eye Crook of the Year 2014 awards

(Hat tip: No2ID)

Sadly, there seems to have been no space in the latest edition of Private Eye for the following letter:
From: David Moss
Sent: 10 January 2014 14:05
To: Letters to the editor
Subject: The Gnome Business Awards for 2013, p.32, Eye #1357

Sir

Gnome awards Crook of the Year 2013 to James McCormick. He bought novelty golf ball-finders and sold them as explosives detectors to governments whose gullibility or corruption must also be award-winning.

When it comes to the 2014 awards, perhaps Gnome's panel would like to consider the McCormicks selling mass consumer biometrics technology which is meant to identify us uniquely and verify our identity.

Three world-class experts reviewed the literature and determined that biometrics is "out of statistical control". I.e. it's not a science [1]. By way of a practical example, they cite the charade at the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).

Under the terms of the USA PATRIOT Act 2001 section 403(c)(1), NIST have to certify all biometrics systems before they are deployed to federal law-enforcement agencies. What the scientists at NIST say in their certificates is: "This evaluation does not certify that any of the systems tested meet the requirements of any specific government application". By issuing certificates, NIST abide by the Act even if the certificates say that they haven't got a clue whether the biometrics systems work.

It's not just the USA. The panel will be spoilt for choice [2]. Governments all over the world are handing over public money to McCormicks talking biometricsballs.

Yours

David Moss

2. http://www.planetbiometrics.com/
If only they had seen ENISA's latest report.

Tuesday 21 January 2014

RIP IDA – Obama fails to consult Maude

No need to say it, it goes without saying, it should be obvious to all but, just in case it isn't obvious to all, IDA is dead.

IDA is the Cabinet Office Identity Assurance programme. And it's dead.

----------

Last week, the US Identity Ecosystem Steering Group (IDESG) held a three-day conference, 14-16 January 2014 at the Georgia Tech Research Institute. It's all very international and there was a one-hour slot on the Wednesday for An Overview of 2014 Plans for the UK Identity Assurance Program. The talk was given by David Rennie of the Government Digital Service (GDS). The sound recording below is for any Brits who might also be interested in our government's plans for us:



The subject matter is identity assurance (IDA), not everyone's cup of tea, and you don't have to listen to all 55'44". There is a summary appended below.

But you might consider sampling odd snatches. Between 21'10" and 21'35", for example, Mr Rennie states that GDS are working with OIX, the Open Identity Exchange, to draft the rules for the trust framework within which the UK's "identity providers" (IDPs) will have to work.

We hoi polloi need to know that we can trust the IDPs. Otherwise we would be imprudent to use them in our on-line dealings with government. And if we don't, then GDS's digital-by-default initiative is a dead duck (RIP).

Steve Wreyford, Mr Rennie's colleague at GDS, told us about this on 15 April 2013, please see his amusing blog post Delivering Identity Assurance: You must be certified where we are advised to trust IDPs only if they have been certified trustworthy by tScheme.

The millions of readers of the DMossEsq blog are already up to speed on this one but not necessarily so the IDESG conference. How are they supposed to know about tScheme?

So DMossEsq submitted an on-line question to the conference and you can hear the result in the 43 seconds between 29'48" and 30'31". Mr Rennie tells the conference that:
"All the identity providers will have to be certified by tScheme before we go to full live. They're all going through the certification process at the moment.
There are five UK IDPs. Digidentity, Experian, Mydex, the Post Office and Verizon. You can check on the tScheme website – Experian is the only IDP currently certified and Verizon is the only one that has applied for certification.

So is Mr Rennie right when he says that all the IDPs are "going through the certification process at the moment"? There is some doubt there. It looks as though three of them haven't even applied for certification yet.

It must all be getting a bit tense. GDS want to start Beta-testing IDA behind closed doors "in the next few weeks" (9'00") with a view to going live "at the end of the summer":
  • What happens if the certification process hasn't finished by that time?
  • Suppose that one or more of the IDPs fail their certification. What happens then?
  • What's the point of doing IDA tests with IDPs who might fail to get their tScheme certification?
  • Wouldn't it be better for them to be certified before the tests start?
  • Better still if they were certified before they were appointed as IDPs in the first place.
  • Eight IDPs had been appointed by 16 January 2013. What happened to the other three (Cassidian, Ingeus and PayPal)? Why did they pull out of IDA?
  • What have Digidentity, Mydex and the Post Office been doing all year? Why haven't they even applied to tScheme yet?
  • And are there really five IDPs left or only two?
That last is a question raised by Charlotte Jee's article Beta launch for identity assurance this year on the government computing news website – "an official from the IDA programme ... explained that the first two identity providers will start supporting the scheme from the end of November ...".

Her article was published on 22 October 2013, when November 2013 was still in the future and it made sense to have two IDPs supporting IDA. In the event, there was no IDA to support in November. Or December. What happened? Why were the tests postponed to January or February 2014? Have three more IDPs pulled out? Which three? Why?

We don't know. There has been no explanation. Attendees at Code for America's CfA Summit 2013 conference are going to be pretty surprised. Ex-Guardian man Mike Bracken CBE, the executive director of GDS, told them on 16 October 2013 that "the first [IDA] services run out with our tax system this month". He also told them that "we have about eight or nine companies already providing identity to us". Take your pick – 2, 5, 8, 9, ...


There is a danger here that the Americans are being misled by GDS. The British public, too – we could be being misled.

But that's not all. It seems possible that GDS are misleading themselves. They have two IDA tests coming up in the next few weeks and at 15'25" Mr Rennie calls that having IDA "up and running" and says that GDS have achieved "real live delivery". Only for very low values of "up", "running", "real", "live" and "delivery".

Is misleading themselves becoming endemic?

That seems unfortunately to be entirely possible. Unfortunately, because GDS are in the trust framework as well, not just the IDPs and the public.

The earlier IDA test with Warwickshire County Council which Mr Rennie referred to at 18'05" was reviewed by OIX and was severely criticised. Words like "significant barrier", for example, and "shortcomings" were used. "Considerably more thought needs to be applied", the OIX report said and carried on with "convoluted process", "reluctant", "struggled", "not clear" and "annoying".

And how does Mr Rennie describe the same IDA test? He says it showed that "identity assurance will support the move to digital by default, simplify and improve the customer experience and make service providers more efficient.  In short, a virtuous circle of reduced effort, reduced cost and improved customer satisfaction".

And then a kind correspondent sent a link to an extraordinary article in the Huffington Post. Like ex-Guardian man Mike Bracken CBE telling CfA last October to be more like GDS if they want to get on in this world, his political boss Francis Maude has some diplomatic advice for Obama himself:
Cabinet Office Minister Francis Maude Decries 'Old Style' Obamacare Insurance Website
The Huffington Post UK | By Paul Vale
Posted: 09/01/2014 02:43 GMT | Updated: 09/01/2014 03:47 GMT

Speaking on Wednesday, the Cabinet Office minister said that the American government should have learned from the British approach to providing online access to public services, and in particular the success of the UK government's digital programme, including the gov.uk site ...

The minister added that his department had not been consulted by the Obama administration but suggested that they "probably should" get in touch due to the global interest in the British government's IT roll-out ...

"This is something that is a problem for countries that do not have an ID card system and a national ID database," he said. "So it is an issue for countries like ourselves and the UK. The US is going down the same path as we are, but they are some distance behind."
----------

Summary of the points made in David Rennie's talk to IDESG
and of the subsequent question and answer session:

David Rennie's talk
"In the next few weeks", two applications will be used to test IDA. Initially, the tests will be "private Betas" (9'00"), the Betas will go public some time in the summer of 2014 (10'25"), the services will go live at the end of the summer and in the next 12 months or so GDS expect IDA to have about 600,000 people on it.

Application #1 will be an on-line record of people's driving licence endorsements (11'40"), with the data available to DVLA, drivers and insurance companies. Application #2 will be a facility for people to amend their tax code (12'40"), with the data available to HMRC and taxpayers.

In the terminology of IDA, DVLA and HMRC are so-called "relying parties" (RPs). They rely on the so-called "identity providers" (IDPs) -- the Post Office, Digidentity, Experian, Mydex, and Verizon -- to assert that you are the driver or taxpayer that you say you are. There are different Levels of Assurance (LoAs), some services will require a high level (4) and others can get by with a lower one (1). The RPs, IDPs, drivers, insurance companies and taxpayers are all linked by GDS's so-called "ID hub" in the confines of a national "trust framework".

GDS hope that, a long way down the line, we will be able to access our health records via IDA (14'20").

GDS are assisted by OIX, the Open Identity Exchange, in developing IDA:
  • OIX publish white papers on IDA matters, including for example the IDA test conducted with Warwickshire County Council (18'05").
  • OIX is the forum where GDS are considering upgrading the ID hub (18'55") to become an "attribute exchange", e.g. the hub should be able to answer questions like "is person X entitled to a Blue Badge, yes/no?".
  • OIX are investigating the involvement of the mobile phone companies (20'30").
  • And OIX is the place where the rules of the trust framework are agreed (21'10").
Question and answer session
Rules of engagement for IDPs (23'10"): the ID hub is entirely GDS's work (24'05") and is built using SAML 2.0; negotiating contracts with the IDPs was difficult (26'20") but the outcome is that they have to agree their procedures with GDS in advance.

Identifiers, e.g. email addresses (28'00"): any identifiers can be used, it's up to the IDPs, as long as they can authenticate who you are and as long as they follow GDS's security standards.

Trust framework (29'50"): it is true that only one of the IDPs currently has tScheme certification (30'20") but all five will eventually have to achieve that standard and they have all begun the process to achieve it.

Existing credentials (30'35"): GDS tried to get the banks to act as IDPs, they were too busy but may yet agree to join the trust framework. Meanwhile, it's up to the IDPs and not GDS to find reliable credentials and to register people.

Business users (32'45"): citizens dealing with government already discussed, for businesses dealing with government GDS plan to provide APIs (33'30"), e.g. there should be an API that allows a new business that has gone through the process of setting up a bank account to be able to use that when registering with Companies House and HMRC, and maybe an API that allows you to start the process of applying for a new passport while booking your summer holiday.

Multiple IDs, pseudonymity, anonymity (35'40"): it's up to the IDPs to decide what satisfies them and it's up to the RPs, too; there are different LoAs, at LoA1 (self-certification) you can use any name you like.

Unobservability (41'10"): GDS is advised on key-signing by GCHQ; the ID hub is designed so that IDPs don't know which RP is asking for identity assurance and RPs don't know which IDP has responded; thanks to No2ID/BBW/PI/...; it's hard to explain to users how the ID hub handles privacy (45'00") but one day it may be possible for them to barter privacy for utility.

OIX (46'15"): the rôle of OIX includes liaising with other national schemes -- US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand; there is an international committee for trust frameworks (54'10").

Trust elevation (52'00"): requirements for LoA3 will be published by the end of the year; a document-checking service will be provided (passports and driving licences) for IDPs.

RIP IDA – Obama fails to consult Maude

No need to say it, it goes without saying, it should be obvious to all but, just in case it isn't obvious to all, IDA is dead.

IDA is the Cabinet Office Identity Assurance programme. And it's dead.

----------

Last week, the US Identity Ecosystem Steering Group (IDESG) held a three-day conference, 14-16 January 2014 at the Georgia Tech Research Institute. It's all very international and there was a one-hour slot on the Wednesday for An Overview of 2014 Plans for the UK Identity Assurance Program. The talk was given by David Rennie of the Government Digital Service (GDS). The sound recording below is for any Brits who might also be interested in our government's plans for us:



The subject matter is identity assurance (IDA), not everyone's cup of tea, and you don't have to listen to all 55'44". There is a summary appended below.

But you might consider sampling odd snatches. Between 21'10" and 21'35", for example, Mr Rennie states that GDS are working with OIX, the Open Identity Exchange, to draft the rules for the trust framework within which the UK's "identity providers" (IDPs) will have to work.

We hoi polloi need to know that we can trust the IDPs. Otherwise we would be imprudent to use them in our on-line dealings with government. And if we don't, then GDS's digital-by-default initiative is a dead duck (RIP).

Thursday 16 January 2014

"The cloud is a giant security and reliability disaster waiting to happen"

Computer Weekly magazine:
Banks should never use the cloud

By Karl Flinders on January 15, 2014 2:44 PM

I have been working on a feature today and going through my interviews have found some interesting stuff.

This one comes from an unnamed source within banking IT. This is what he said when asked about the cloud's role in banking.

"None at all hopefully. The cloud is a giant security and reliability disaster waiting to happen. Banks should keep their systems safely locked away in their own data centres and do all they can to protect the infrastructure and physical security. I hope the cloud is only used for holiday snaps and music. Banks should not go there. We have to remember there are bad guys out there trying to crack into these systems millions of times a day around the world. And they only have to get it right once to cause a major disaster! I would not bank with a firm using the cloud to operate my account or hold my details."

So that's pretty clear then.

I recently wrote this article after an event about the cloud in banking: Is cloud computing almost too good to be true for banks?.
So who should use the cloud? For whom doesn't it matter that the cloud is a giant security and reliability disaster waiting to happen?

"The cloud is a giant security and reliability disaster waiting to happen"

Computer Weekly magazine:
Banks should never use the cloud

By Karl Flinders on January 15, 2014 2:44 PM

I have been working on a feature today and going through my interviews have found some interesting stuff.

This one comes from an unnamed source within banking IT. This is what he said when asked about the cloud's role in banking.

"None at all hopefully. The cloud is a giant security and reliability disaster waiting to happen. Banks should keep their systems safely locked away in their own data centres and do all they can to protect the infrastructure and physical security. I hope the cloud is only used for holiday snaps and music. Banks should not go there. We have to remember there are bad guys out there trying to crack into these systems millions of times a day around the world. And they only have to get it right once to cause a major disaster! I would not bank with a firm using the cloud to operate my account or hold my details."

So that's pretty clear then.

I recently wrote this article after an event about the cloud in banking: Is cloud computing almost too good to be true for banks?.
So who should use the cloud? For whom doesn't it matter that the cloud is a giant security and reliability disaster waiting to happen?

Tuesday 14 January 2014

Whitehall schizophrenia – the cartoon

We have noted before that Whitehall is at one and the same time advising individuals and businesses (a) that the web is dangerous and (b) that we should put all our personal data on-line in the cloud. Please see The on-line safety of the mooncalves, 4 July 2013.

Six months later and it's happening again.

The nice Dr Jekyll at the Home Office issued a press release the other day, New campaign urges people to be 'Cyber Streetwise':
A new campaign to change the way people protect themselves from falling victim to cyber criminals has been launched by the government.

The ‘Cyber Streetwise’ campaign aims to change the way people view online safety and provide the public and businesses with the skills and knowledge they need to take control of their cyber security. The campaign includes a new easy-to-use website and online videos.
Meanwhile, thanks to all the nasty Mr Hydes, Whitehall departments are shunting their systems into the cloud as fast as possible with our data in them. No more efficient way of losing control of our data has yet been discovered.

We're used to the schizophrenia.

That's now been joined by infantilism.

We already have a grown-up website giving us advice how to protect ourselves on the web, Get Safe Online. The new website seems to have been designed for children, Cyber Streetwise.

What did we do in our previous lives to deserve this:


----------

Updated 14.2.14

It transpires that the National Cyber Security Programme is spending £4 million on the Cyber Streetwise campaign, which is said to "look like a site aimed at children rather than adults and business owners". The Office of Cyber Security & Information Assurance (OCSIA) whose campaign it is comes under Francis Maude.

Whitehall schizophrenia – the cartoon

We have noted before that Whitehall is at one and the same time advising individuals and businesses (a) that the web is dangerous and (b) that we should put all our personal data on-line in the cloud. Please see The on-line safety of the mooncalves, 4 July 2013.

Six months later and it's happening again.

The nice Dr Jekyll at the Home Office issued a press release the other day, New campaign urges people to be 'Cyber Streetwise':
A new campaign to change the way people protect themselves from falling victim to cyber criminals has been launched by the government.

The ‘Cyber Streetwise’ campaign aims to change the way people view online safety and provide the public and businesses with the skills and knowledge they need to take control of their cyber security. The campaign includes a new easy-to-use website and online videos.
Meanwhile, thanks to all the nasty Mr Hydes, Whitehall departments are shunting their systems into the cloud as fast as possible with our data in them. No more efficient way of losing control of our data has yet been discovered.

We're used to the schizophrenia.

That's now been joined by infantilism.

Seven professors and a virtuous circle

Interoperability between central and local government identity assurance schemes

The project highlighted the issue of accurate data matching, specifically the matching of names and addresses originating from different sources. (p.9)

The complexity of data matching may present a significant barrier to implementation by Service Providers. (p.10)

The project has highlighted shortcomings in the user journey arising from the technical implementation of the IDA Scheme. (p.10)

... considerably more thought needs to be applied in this area [stepping up from LoA1 to LoA2] if it is to become a viable proposition going forward. (p.10)

... at the time of this project, the functionality required to deliver user data directly within the IDA Scheme [to create a new account] had yet to be developed ... The consequence is that the user is faced with a convoluted process when using the IDA Scheme for the first time. (p.11)

User experience testing was performed in a laboratory environment and involved 5 [sic] users on a one-to-one basis with an experienced research facilitator provided by GDS. Each user had extensive experience of online services including internet banking, government services and social media such as Facebook and Twitter ... The feedback from the small sample of users was generally fairly consistent. (p.12)

Most users would be very reluctant to use their social media accounts with a government site, the prevailing view being that their social life is distinctly separate to doing “business” with government. The issue of privacy and the feeling that government would be able to “see my social life”, or that government transactions would appear in their social media profiles, was of concern. (p.12)

The Hub ... users often struggled as they sought to understand how this method of signing in to government services worked. The Hub service provided the user with a link to a video clip that described the scheme and its purpose ... (pp.12-3)

Users were not clear why private sector companies were being used to carry out identity assurance on behalf of government. (p.13)

Some aspects of the registration processes proved annoying to the users ... (p.13)
GDS, the Government Digital Service, used Warwickshire County Council to alpha test IDA, the identity assurance system they have been putting together for some years now.

The alpha was reported on by OIX, the Open Identity Exchange. A selection of their findings is reproduced alongside.

Certain words and phrases stand out. "Significant barrier", for example, and "shortcomings". "Considerably more thought needs to be applied", "convoluted process", "reluctant" and "struggled". "Not clear" and "annoying".

The alpha was also reported on by David Rennie, a member of GDS, in Steering Collaboration, 26 November 2013. He says:
The alpha project was used to test integration between identity providers and the identity assurance hub and provides insights about how users of local authority services respond to the concept. The alpha found that identity assurance will support the move to digital by default, simplify and improve the customer experience and make service providers more efficient. In short, a virtuous circle of reduced effort, reduced cost and improved customer satisfaction.
You wouldn't know he was talking about the same test, would you?

The disconnect is total.

What's going on?

In their book The Blunders of Our Governments Professors Anthony King and Ivor Crewe talk about several of the causes of failure in government projects. Among them, group-think, which they blame for the Poll Tax, for example.

Group-think was given its first academic treatment apparently by Irving J Janis, a US psychology professor. Messrs King and Crewe have this to say about it (pp.255-6):

According to Janis, whose views are now almost universally accepted, group-think is liable to occur when the members of any face-to-face group feel under pressure to maintain the group's cohesion or are anyway inclined to want to do that.

It is also liable to occur when the group in question feels threatened by an outside group or comes, for whatever reason, to regard one or more outside individuals or groups as alien or hostile.

Group-think need not always, but often does, manifest itself in pathological ways. A majority of the group's members may become intolerant of dissenting voices within the group and find ways, subtle or overt, of silencing them. Individual group members may begin to engage in self-censorship, suppressing any doubts they harbour about courses of action that the group seems intent on adopting. Latent disagreements may thus fail to surface, one result being that the members of the group come to believe they are unanimous when in reality they may not be.

Meanwhile, the group is likely to become increasingly reluctant to engage with outsiders and to seek out information that might run counter to any emerging consensus. If unwelcome information does happen to come the group's way it is likely to be discounted or disregarded. Warning signs are ignored. The group at the same time fails to engage in rigorous reality-testing, with possible alternative courses of action not being realistically appraised.

Group-think is also, in Janis's view, liable to create “an illusion of invulnerability, shared by most or all the members, which creates excessive optimism and encourages taking extreme risks”. Not least, those indulging in group-think are liable to persuade themselves that the majority of their opponents and critics are, if not actually wicked, then at least stupid, misguided and probably self-interested.

It's not just the Warwickshire County Council alpha test. Once you've got the group-think idea in your head, the examples start to multiply.

For example, it is a year now since four professors published their draft review of GDS's digital strategy. They were not impressed. GDS's response? They have ignored the professors' criticisms. They have "discounted or disregarded" them.

Is that a problem? Or is it a "virtuous circle of reduced effort, reduced cost and improved customer satisfaction"?

Seven professors and a virtuous circle

Interoperability between central and local government identity assurance schemes

The project highlighted the issue of accurate data matching, specifically the matching of names and addresses originating from different sources. (p.9)

The complexity of data matching may present a significant barrier to implementation by Service Providers. (p.10)

The project has highlighted shortcomings in the user journey arising from the technical implementation of the IDA Scheme. (p.10)

... considerably more thought needs to be applied in this area [stepping up from LoA1 to LoA2] if it is to become a viable proposition going forward. (p.10)

... at the time of this project, the functionality required to deliver user data directly within the IDA Scheme [to create a new account] had yet to be developed ... The consequence is that the user is faced with a convoluted process when using the IDA Scheme for the first time. (p.11)

User experience testing was performed in a laboratory environment and involved 5 [sic] users on a one-to-one basis with an experienced research facilitator provided by GDS. Each user had extensive experience of online services including internet banking, government services and social media such as Facebook and Twitter ... The feedback from the small sample of users was generally fairly consistent. (p.12)

Most users would be very reluctant to use their social media accounts with a government site, the prevailing view being that their social life is distinctly separate to doing “business” with government. The issue of privacy and the feeling that government would be able to “see my social life”, or that government transactions would appear in their social media profiles, was of concern. (p.12)

The Hub ... users often struggled as they sought to understand how this method of signing in to government services worked. The Hub service provided the user with a link to a video clip that described the scheme and its purpose ... (pp.12-3)

Users were not clear why private sector companies were being used to carry out identity assurance on behalf of government. (p.13)

Some aspects of the registration processes proved annoying to the users ... (p.13)
GDS, the Government Digital Service, used Warwickshire County Council to alpha test IDA, the identity assurance system they have been putting together for some years now.

The alpha was reported on by OIX, the Open Identity Exchange. A selection of their findings is reproduced alongside.

Certain words and phrases stand out. "Significant barrier", for example, and "shortcomings". "Considerably more thought needs to be applied", "convoluted process", "reluctant" and "struggled". "Not clear" and "annoying".

The alpha was also reported on by David Rennie, a member of GDS, in Steering Collaboration, 26 November 2013. He says:
The alpha project was used to test integration between identity providers and the identity assurance hub and provides insights about how users of local authority services respond to the concept. The alpha found that identity assurance will support the move to digital by default, simplify and improve the customer experience and make service providers more efficient. In short, a virtuous circle of reduced effort, reduced cost and improved customer satisfaction.
You wouldn't know he was talking about the same test, would you?

The disconnect is total.

What's going on?

In their book The Blunders of Our Governments Professors Anthony King and Ivor Crewe talk about several of the causes of failure in government projects. Among them, group-think, which they blame for the Poll Tax, for example.

Group-think was given its first academic treatment apparently by Irving J Janis, a US psychology professor. Messrs King and Crewe have this to say about it (pp.255-6):

According to Janis, whose views are now almost universally accepted, group-think is liable to occur when the members of any face-to-face group feel under pressure to maintain the group's cohesion or are anyway inclined to want to do that.

It is also liable to occur when the group in question feels threatened by an outside group or comes, for whatever reason, to regard one or more outside individuals or groups as alien or hostile.