Showing posts with label PA Consulting. Show all posts
Showing posts with label PA Consulting. Show all posts

Monday, 12 November 2012

Whitehall governance, and GDS's fantasy strategy

For some time now, the Government Digital Service (GDS) have made the meaning of their digital-by-default agenda clear – they want the UK to be like Estonia.

It is thanks to the fact that practically every service in Estonia is delivered over the web that, back in 2007, Russia was able to bring the country to its knees in a matter of days. If GDS succeed with their "modernisation" plans, there will be nothing to stop that happening here in the UK.

GDS are in awe of the financial success and popularity of Apple, Amazon, eBay/PayPal, Google and Facebook. With no experience of government behind them, the over-promoted software engineers at the head of GDS want to bring their heroes' tricks to the delivery of public services in the UK.

Sensible people will see Facebook et al as latter-day Pied Pipers of Hamelin – sensible people, including the tens of thousands of public servants who will be laid off and replaced by GDS's computers when government is, as they say, "transformed".

Many of these organisations are famous for avoiding tax on their UK profits and for using their near-monopolies to tyrannise their suppliers and to milk their customers. But GDS somehow maintain their naïve veneration and on 6 November 2012 they published their Government Digital Strategy.

This fantasy strategy is an elaboration of Martha Lane Fox's ideas, set out in her October 2010 letter to Francis Maude, Directgov 2010 and beyond: revolution not evolution. Ms Lane Fox is the Prime Minister's digital champion, she's a historian, and when she says "revolution" she means it.

Her revolutionary fervour is carried over into last week's GDS strategy, which Sir Bob Kerslake – head of the home civil service, permanent secretary at the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) and previously the chief executive of first the London Borough of Hounslow and then Sheffield City Council – has greeted with a post on GDS's blog, Welcoming the Digital Strategy:
Our reform plan also made a clear commitment to improve the quality of the government’s digital services, and to do this by publishing a Government Digital Strategy setting out how we would support the transformation of digital services [how does publishing a wishlist improve the quality of public services?].

We fulfilled that commitment yesterday with the launch of the Government Digital Strategy, Digital Efficiency Report and Digital Landscape Report and I very much welcome their publication.
But why? Why does Sir Bob "welcome" this emmental cheese of a strategy? It's full of holes. Consider the governance of Whitehall for example.

In 1952 Professor GW Keeton published his book The Passing of Parliament. Keeton was Dean of the Faculty of Laws at University College, London, and according to him:
The relentless growth in size and functions of the Department of State and the relatively high level in calibre of those who staff them, coupled with the steady decline in importance of and function of MPs, has led to a gradual transfer of power and influence from the floor of the House of Commons to the private rooms of permanent civil servants.
60 years later, there are still Whitehall outsiders who believe that politicians make policy. Mainly political journalists, deeply conservative people with a love of tradition and an antique belief in the supremacy of parliament. No-one else believes it.

A few outsiders, unpleasant cynics, the awkward squad, are convinced that policy is made by the European Commission or big business or the trades unions or the US military or the Church of England. But the nice outsiders, the majority, have caught up with Keeton and Yes Minister and for them, policy is made by Sir/Dame Humphreys with a First in Greats.

Apparently the nice outsiders are wrong. Apparently the tail is wagging the dog and policy is made by GDS website designers, who also control the purse-strings and to whom the rest of Whitehall defers.

Back in October 2010 Martha Lane Fox wrote:
[GDS] should own the citizen experience of digital public services and be tasked with driving a 'service culture' across government which could, for example, challenge any policy and practice that undermines good service design ...

It seems to me that the time is now to use the Internet to shift the lead in the design of services from the policy and legal teams to the end users ...

[GDS] SWAT teams ... should be given a remit to support and challenge departments and agencies ... We must give these SWAT teams the necessary support to challenge any policy and legal barriers which stop services being designed around user needs ...

I recommend that all digital teams in the Cabinet Office - including Digital Delivery, Digital Engagement and [GDS] - are brought together under a new CEO for Digital.

This person should have the controls and powers to gain absolute authority over the user experience across all government online services ... and the power to direct all government online spend.

The CEO for Digital should also have the controls and powers to direct set and enforce standards across government departments ...
Last week's Government Digital Strategy says:
Cabinet Office will help departments to recruit suitably skilled individuals. Newly appointed Service Managers will be supported by Cabinet Office through a specialist training programme run by the Government Digital Service. This will include the hands-on process of designing and prototyping a digital service ...

Government digital services are inconsistent and often do not meet the standards that users expect. To ensure that users receive a consistently high-quality digital experience from government, Cabinet Office will develop a service standard for all digital services. No new or redesigned service will go live unless they meet this standard ...

Cabinet Office will lead in the definition and delivery of a range of common cross-government technology platforms, in consultation with departments to ensure they meet business needs. These will underpin the new generation of digital services. Departments will be expected to use these for new and redesigned services, unless a specific case for exemption is agreed ...

The guidance and tools supporting the [digital by default] standard will help service owners to design trusted, cost-effective government services that are embraced by users and meet their needs first time. Government Digital Service will ensure there is a common understanding across government of what outcomes are required to meet the standard. This understanding must be shared by everyone involved in the development and life of a new or redesigned digital service ...

A new Digital Leaders Network was established in early 2012 to drive forward the digital agenda across government. The network is run by the Government Digital Service ...
Who, in GDS, as a matter of interest, is responsible for the nation's education policy? Or transport policy? What rank do GDS-trained "Digital Leaders" enjoy at the MoD?

Will we soon see GDS SWAT teams patrolling the Ministry of Justice and terrorising its denizens into standardisation? Will HM Treasury ring ex-Guardian man Mike Bracken and ask permission every time they want to spend a bob or two? Will the Department of Health really trust GDS to recruit staff for them? (No.) Will HMRC really hold up a web enhancement to their tax-farming implements because GDS tell them to?

The Home Office have a ruinously expensive contract with CSC to develop and maintain the nation's passport application website. What is GDS's locus there? How can they intervene? They don't have the contract – CSC do.

Suppose that GDS actually had all the power suggested by Martha Lane Fox and the Government Digital Strategy. Are they ready to accept the responsibility that comes with it? There are three references to accountability in the strategy document. But what do they amount to? Will anyone be fined? Or demoted? Or fired? Or is "accountability" just a word?

Whitehall departments were meant to co-operate with the Home Office on the ID cards scheme. They said they would co-operate. But according to BBC Radio 4's File on 4 programme on the subject, July/August 2007, when it came to it, either the departments sent someone too junior to the meetings or they sent no-one at all.

"Silo government" they call it in the BBC programme, and something similar put paid to the Cabinet Office's 2005 Transformational Government plan. Co-operation evaporated. GDS's digital-by-default agenda is Transformational Government MK 2 and the same outcome must be expected – co-operation will evaporate.

To us outsiders, Whitehall looks like a set of independent, powerful satrapies with no emperor in control in the centre. The engaging Sir Richard Mottram effectively said as much in his review of the handover from Sir-Gus-now-Lord O'Donnell to the new dispensation.

The repeated attempt to take control of the satraps has always failed, Sir Richard suggests. What reason is there to believe that the time has come now for the empire of the website designer?

Where there should be answers to these questions in the Government Digital Strategy there are just holes. Revolution is proposed with no justification. And yet Sir Bob, the head of the home civil service, welcomes this fantasy.

Whitehall governance, and GDS's fantasy strategy

For some time now, the Government Digital Service (GDS) have made the meaning of their digital-by-default agenda clear – they want the UK to be like Estonia.

It is thanks to the fact that practically every service in Estonia is delivered over the web that, back in 2007, Russia was able to bring the country to its knees in a matter of days. If GDS succeed with their "modernisation" plans, there will be nothing to stop that happening here in the UK.

GDS are in awe of the financial success and popularity of Apple, Amazon, eBay/PayPal, Google and Facebook. With no experience of government behind them, the over-promoted software engineers at the head of GDS want to bring their heroes' tricks to the delivery of public services in the UK.

Sensible people will see Facebook et al as latter-day Pied Pipers of Hamelin – sensible people, including the tens of thousands of public servants who will be laid off and replaced by GDS's computers when government is, as they say, "transformed".

Many of these organisations are famous for avoiding tax on their UK profits and for using their near-monopolies to tyrannise their suppliers and to milk their customers. But GDS somehow maintain their naïve veneration and on 6 November 2012 they published their Government Digital Strategy.

This fantasy strategy is an elaboration of Martha Lane Fox's ideas, set out in her October 2010 letter to Francis Maude, Directgov 2010 and beyond: revolution not evolution. Ms Lane Fox is the Prime Minister's digital champion, she's a historian, and when she says "revolution" she means it.

Her revolutionary fervour is carried over into last week's GDS strategy, which Sir Bob Kerslake – head of the home civil service, permanent secretary at the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) and previously the chief executive of first the London Borough of Hounslow and then Sheffield City Council – has greeted with a post on GDS's blog, Welcoming the Digital Strategy:
Our reform plan also made a clear commitment to improve the quality of the government’s digital services, and to do this by publishing a Government Digital Strategy setting out how we would support the transformation of digital services [how does publishing a wishlist improve the quality of public services?].

We fulfilled that commitment yesterday with the launch of the Government Digital Strategy, Digital Efficiency Report and Digital Landscape Report and I very much welcome their publication.
But why? Why does Sir Bob "welcome" this emmental cheese of a strategy? It's full of holes. Consider the governance of Whitehall for example.

Monday, 27 February 2012

UIDAI and the textbook case study of how not to do it, one for the business schools

The Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) came under attack. Its very existence was threatened. Naturally enough, UIDAI decided to defend itself.

It's worked. UIDAI survives for the moment.

But theirs is a Pyrrhic victory. The UIDAI defence could undermine the credibility of every public authority in the world which has nailed its colours to the mast of biometrics – which is most of them – and could destroy the multi-billion dollar mass consumer biometrics industry.

The job of the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) is to use biometrics to identify every resident of India and to issue them with a unique corresponding number, a so-called "Aadhaar number".

"Aadhaar" means foundation or support and the idea is that, once everyone has an identifying number, it will be easier for the various arms of government to build systems on that foundation to provide social security benefits, for example, and to facilitate national security. And beyond government, the banks will supposedly find it easier to authenticate payments.

UIDAI is not without its critics:
  • The Standing Committee on Finance (SCoF), a committee of the Indian Parliament, has considered the National Identification Authority of India Bill, 2010. That Bill would establish UIDAI on a statutory basis if it was ever enacted, but it hasn't been. Meanwhile, UIDAI is operating under executive order only. It's not operating very well according to the SCoF report and it's about time UIDAI came under the control of Parliament.
  • And then there's the Ministry of Home Affairs. They're a properly constituted body and not just a creature of the Executive. And they have a competing identity management scheme, NPR (the National Population Register). Result – a turf war, Aadhaar v. NPR.
SCoF and the Ministry of Home Affairs pressed their case with the Prime Minister but UIDAI proved too adept for them. The Chairman threatened to resign, which would be embarrassing for the prime Minister – good move no.1. Good move no.2 – UIDAI arranged some convenient PR with the compliant Economist magazine. And then they published not one but two reports making unprecedented claims for the reliability of the biometrics used in Aadhaar:
Oops. Bad move. There are five problems here:
  1. Both reports are produced by UIDAI only. There is no sign that they have been audited by any independent expert body.
  2. Both reports quote reliability figures. No other public authority in the world does that. Not operational figures – figures measuring the reliability of biometrics in the field, at the border, for example. They should. But they don't. Now, thanks to UIDAI, they will all come under pressure to quote independently audited figures themselves, figures for reliability, to justify their investment of public funds. It is likely that the public are going to be shocked at just how unreliable the biometrics are, that their governments are using. The public will at last understand why their governments have been so reluctant for so long to quote any figures.
  3. Why is that likely? Because the figures quoted by UIDAI are hundreds of times better than anything anyone else has ever claimed following tests of biometrics. Hundreds.
  4. The second report says that (a) Aadhaar uses flat print fingerprinting and iris scanning, (b) the two biometrics are fused to form one composite biometric, so-called "multi-modal" biometrics, and (c) UIDAI use not one matching algorithm, but three of them. Any large-scale identity management scheme that doesn't do the same, they say – (a), (b) and (c) – is doomed to "catastrophic failure".
  5. The suppliers of biometric technology have never had to give public warranties before. Now they will have to.
Great. Now suppose you're the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service. You've spent millions of dollars of public money deploying smart gates at Australian airports as a security measure. These gates depend on face recognition biometrics. Not on UIDAI's list (a). The Australian (and new Zealand) border security system is doomed to "catastrophic failure". Don't take my word for it. Ask UIDAI.

You've spent years refusing to divulge any figures about the reliability of your technology:
Customs refused to disclose the rates at which the system inaccurately identified people.

"For security reasons, Customs does not disclose the false positive and false negative rates," a spokesman said.
Now UIDAI have released figures, how are you going to hold the line? You can't.

You could say that UIDAI's figures haven't been audited and may turn out to be false. Now you've got a fight with UIDAI on your hands. And what's the best result you can hope for? UIDAI's figures turn out to be a pack of lies and actually the reliability of Aadhaar is just as appalling as the Australian system. Not what you wanted. It doesn't help to explain why you've been squandering your own citizens' tax money on joke technology.

The same applies to the UK, of course, and our planned deployment of smart gates at airports. Another catastrophic failure? And all those states in the US busy incorporating face recognition biometrics into driving licences. These people – the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, UK Border Agency, et al – are not going to be pleased with UIDAI. UIDAI have let the cat out of the bag and have almost certainly started a fresh collapse of confidence in public administration as a result.

And neither are the biometrics suppliers going to be pleased. How are Morpho going to sell their products now without giving warranties? They're not.

And how are IBM and CSC going to be able to sign any more nine-figure biometrics contracts with credulous governments? They're not.

And how are PA Consulting going to sell any more biometrics assignments? They're not.

UIDAI are going to be persona non grata worldwide. Especially in India, where the Prime Minister may yet regret his decision to carry on funding them. And stop. He may give almost any reason but the big reason, the one several people have pointed out for a long time, is that far from curtailing corruption, Aadhaar was simply going to automate it.

A tragedy with a happy ending, the only people who will be pleased is absolutely everyone else in the world, who can now keep some of their tax money and spend it themselves rather than paying public authorities to waste it for them.

UIDAI's Pyrrhic victory? From now on it's going to be known as an "Aadhaar victory". At least it will when the business schools write it up and teach it all around the world. And when the Economist faithfully report UIDAI's defence, under the heading "Poison pill – that's not the way to do it".

UIDAI and the textbook case study of how not to do it, one for the business schools

The Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) came under attack. Its very existence was threatened. Naturally enough, UIDAI decided to defend itself.

It's worked. UIDAI survives for the moment.

But theirs is a Pyrrhic victory. The UIDAI defence could undermine the credibility of every public authority in the world which has nailed its colours to the mast of biometrics – which is most of them – and could destroy the multi-billion dollar mass consumer biometrics industry.

Sunday, 27 November 2011

PerishTheThought: the public interest 2

In view of the impending retirement of Sir Gus O'Donnell, Sir Richard Mottram conducted a review of Whitehall and identified seven abiding problems, problems which existed before the advent of Sir Gus and which persist still.

One of those problems is for the Cabinet Office to take control of the big departments of state, which currently operate as autonomous fiefdoms or over-powerful satrapies, way beyond the control of politicians and beyond the control even of Sir Gus:
... the coalition government has given increasing priority to improving the efficiency of the civil service and the wider public service under a Cabinet Office group ...
On 21 November 2011, Francis Maude, Cabinet Office minister, gave a speech on The Crown and suppliers: a new way of working. Mr Maude considers several ways in which Whitehall makes procurement too difficult. Among others, he lights on the use of management consultants:
... too often in the past we have defaulted into a comfort zone of hiring external consultants to run any kind of complex procurements. This has two effects.

It reduces the need and ability for public officials to develop the necessary skills. And it can happen that consultants being paid on day rates have no incentive to get procurements finished speedily, nor to drive simplicity.

Far too many procurements feature absurdly over-prescriptive requirements. We should be procuring on the basis of the outcomes and outputs we seek ...
This practice of hiring management consultants has been followed "too often" to be in the public interest. What's the minister going to do about it?
... we will ensure that in future we focus on outputs and outcomes. And we now forbid the use of consultants in central government procurements without my express agreement.
Forbid? Express agreement? Let's hope so. The minister is quite right. But will the other departments of state seek his permission to hire management consultants? And abide by his decision to forbid it? Can Maude make it stick?
Francis "Glendower" Maude:
I can call spirits from the vasty deep.

Sir Humphrey (shame it's not Percy) "Hotspur" Appleby:
Why, so can I, or so can any man;
But will they come when you do call for them?
That is the question.

----------
Hat tips: Tony Collins, W Shakespeare

PerishTheThought: the public interest 2

In view of the impending retirement of Sir Gus O'Donnell, Sir Richard Mottram conducted a review of Whitehall and identified seven abiding problems, problems which existed before the advent of Sir Gus and which persist still.

Saturday, 26 November 2011

PerishTheThought: the public interest 1

Sir Gus O'Donnell, Cabinet Secretary, Permanent Secretary at the Cabinet Office and Head of the home civil service, gave evidence to the Public Administration Select Committee on 23 November 2011. No transcript available yet but, according to the Guardian:
The Freedom of Information act is a mistake, and is having a negative effect on governing, Britain's top civil servant said. Sir Gus O'Donnell told the Commons public administration select committee that it had stymied full and frank discussion of options by ministers and others in government. The 2001 act gives members of the public and journalists the right to ask for publication of official documents.

"The problem is, virtually everything [in such documents] is subject to a public interest test. If asked to give advice, I'd say I can't guarantee they can say without fear or favour if they disagree with something, and that information will remain private. Because there could be an FoI request.

"It's having a very negative impact on the freedom of policy discussions."
What possible interest could we the public have in how the unelected Sir Gus, or his unaccountable office, spends £710 billion of our money for us this year?

Whitehall often claim, as here in front of the Public Administration Select Committee, that they couldn't do their job properly if they had to operate in the open. They couldn't serve the public interest.

Whitehall do not operate in the open at the moment. Their deliberations go largely unreported. And yet, despite the putative benefit of this secrecy, when their performance is reported, mostly by the National Audit Office, after the event, all too often, it transpires that Whitehall aren't doing their job properly.

It transpires that, too often, Whitehall has become an irresponsible and unbusinesslike and undignified machine for transferring public money to a small group of management consultants, contractors and PFI financiers, against the public interest.

Pace Sir Gus, secrecy is not working. Sir Gus is wrong. The smug technocrat's insider view that Whitehall is currently doing a good job is untenable, mendacious, self-deception. Looking in from the outside, Whitehall seems regularly to be guilty of misfeasance in public office.

Openness might be part of the answer. Openness might help Whitehall to do its job properly. Openness might be in the public interest.

PerishTheThought: the public interest 1

Sir Gus O'Donnell, Cabinet Secretary, Permanent Secretary at the Cabinet Office and Head of the home civil service, gave evidence to the Public Administration Select Committee on 23 November 2011. No transcript available yet but, according to the Guardian:
The Freedom of Information act is a mistake, and is having a negative effect on governing, Britain's top civil servant said. Sir Gus O'Donnell told the Commons public administration select committee that it had stymied full and frank discussion of options by ministers and others in government. The 2001 act gives members of the public and journalists the right to ask for publication of official documents.

"The problem is, virtually everything [in such documents] is subject to a public interest test. If asked to give advice, I'd say I can't guarantee they can say without fear or favour if they disagree with something, and that information will remain private. Because there could be an FoI request.

"It's having a very negative impact on the freedom of policy discussions."
What possible interest could we the public have in how the unelected Sir Gus, or his unaccountable office, spends £710 billion of our money for us this year?

Thursday, 24 November 2011

Your Money And How They Spend It – interim report

Episode 1 of this Nick Robinson programme went out last night. Let's wait until we've seen episode 2 before making a final judgement.

In the interim, there are a few questions:
  • Who is "they"? After watching Mr Robinson's programme, you could be forgiven for thinking that it was an unnamed politician who spent our money on a new regional network of control centres for the fire brigade. It wasn't. It was Dame Mavis McDonald and Sir Peter Housden who had control of the cheque book. They were somehow omitted from the tale.
  • Who gets "your money"? There was no mention of PA Consulting, who picked up £42 million for project management and no mention of Cassidian, who built the useless control centres.
  • And we weren't told "how" they spend it. The indefatigable Tony Collins has another story today about how public money is actually spent, Officials pay supplier invoices – then raise purchase orders, based on another report from the equally indefatigable Amyas Morse at the National Audit Office: "the Equality and Human Rights Commission, in up to 35% of cases, raises its purchase order after it gets the invoice from suppliers".
Explaining why this is the wrong way round would presumably have detracted from the agreeably chummy atmosphere of Mr Robinson's interviews with Alan Johnson et al. But it might have been a more helpful use of a whole hour of airtime.

Tony Collins has remembered another example of the scandalous insouciance with which our money is spent: "On the C-Nomis IT project for prisons, the National Offender Management Service paid £161m without keeping any record of what the payments were for".

There's a lot for him to fit into episode 2. Will Mr Robinson do his job?

Your Money And How They Spend It – interim report

Episode 1 of this Nick Robinson programme went out last night. Let's wait until we've seen episode 2 before making a final judgement.

In the interim, there are a few questions:
  • Who is "they"? After watching Mr Robinson's programme, you could be forgiven for thinking that it was an unnamed politician who spent our money on a new regional network of control centres for the fire brigade. It wasn't. It was Dame Mavis McDonald and Sir Peter Housden who had control of the cheque book. They were somehow omitted from the tale.
  • Who gets "your money"? There was no mention of PA Consulting, who picked up £42 million for project management and no mention of Cassidian, who built the useless control centres.
  • And we weren't told "how" they spend it. The indefatigable Tony Collins has another story today about how public money is actually spent, Officials pay supplier invoices – then raise purchase orders, based on another report from the equally indefatigable Amyas Morse at the National Audit Office: "the Equality and Human Rights Commission, in up to 35% of cases, raises its purchase order after it gets the invoice from suppliers".
Explaining why this is the wrong way round would presumably have detracted from the agreeably chummy atmosphere of Mr Robinson's interviews with Alan Johnson et al. But it might have been a more helpful use of a whole hour of airtime.

Tony Collins has remembered another example of the scandalous insouciance with which our money is spent: "On the C-Nomis IT project for prisons, the National Offender Management Service paid £161m without keeping any record of what the payments were for".

There's a lot for him to fit into episode 2. Will Mr Robinson do his job?

Sunday, 20 November 2011

Your Money And How They Spend It – BBC2 9pm 23 & 30 November

Could be worth a watch.

The programme is made by Nick Robinson, Political Editor at the BBC, who trailed it in the Telegraph.

Will Mr Robinson observe polite convention and pretend that politicians are responsible? He might. He says:
Keeping old hospitals open is popular ... So too is building expensive new developments in the regions. Take fire control centres, which it was promised would use the latest technology to track emergency vehicles by satellite to keep us all safer in the event not just of fire, but floods and terrorist attacks. Just one problem: the technology didn’t work. Eight centres are open but empty. Just one will be costing not far short of £100,000 a month for the next 24 years.
Does he really believe that FiReControl, the disastrous project he alludes to, was all John Prescott's fault and nothing to do with officials?

Or will Mr Robinson spread the blame a little wider and recommend more openness?
We can all hope, though, that once this crisis is over we will have learnt to have a more honest, more open, more realistic debate about your money and how they spend it. 

Your Money And How They Spend It – BBC2 9pm 23 & 30 November

Could be worth a watch.

The programme is made by Nick Robinson, Political Editor at the BBC, who trailed it in the Telegraph.

Will Mr Robinson observe polite convention and pretend that politicians are responsible? He might. He says:
Keeping old hospitals open is popular ... So too is building expensive new developments in the regions. Take fire control centres, which it was promised would use the latest technology to track emergency vehicles by satellite to keep us all safer in the event not just of fire, but floods and terrorist attacks. Just one problem: the technology didn’t work. Eight centres are open but empty. Just one will be costing not far short of £100,000 a month for the next 24 years.
Does he really believe that FiReControl, the disastrous project he alludes to, was all John Prescott's fault and nothing to do with officials?

Or will Mr Robinson spread the blame a little wider and recommend more openness?
We can all hope, though, that once this crisis is over we will have learnt to have a more honest, more open, more realistic debate about your money and how they spend it. 

Thursday, 10 November 2011

Oborneiana – Theresa May and Brodie Clark

Peter Oborne had an article published on the Daily Telegraph website dated 9 November 2011, 'Theresa May’s attempts to pass the buck make for a distressing spectacle'. The article provoked a strong desire to help him.

Not to help him just once:
You really couldn't be more wrong about Whitehall, Mr Oborne, if you tried.

Whitehall has become a law unto itself, unelected, unaccountable, out of political control, wasting public money by the lorryload, operating in secret, to an unknown agenda. (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmpubadm/715/715vw.pdf, see Ev W7)

Look at FiReControl, the project to establish regional centres for 999 calls to the fire brigade. The National Audit Office estimate that a minimum of £469 million of public money has been wasted. Do you seriously believe that that is all John Prescott's fault? (http://www.dmossesq.com/2011/10/its-all-johns-fault.html)

Look at NPfIT, the NHS computerisation plan that is costing us £11 billion. Even the intervention of the Prime Minister can't turn Sir David Nicholson's head. (http://www.dmossesq.com/2011/10/less-for-more.html)

Never heard of Sir David Nicholson? That's the problem. Massive openness needed. More reporting of Whitehall needed, in the nationals, by Peter Oborne and others.

Ministers do what their officials tell them. Otherwise they get spat out, like Liam Fox.

Theresa May is trussed up by her officials. The question isn't why she didn't follow the sensible plan Mr Oborne advances. It's why Whitehall didn't. And there, Mr Oborne, we have to look to you to investigate and report. (http://www.dmossesq.com/2011/11/brodie-clark-alone.html)
Not just twice:
Mr Oborne

As you must know, senior officials don't get booted out of Whitehall just for incompetence. That's one of the recruitment criteria. And they don't get booted out for disobeying ministers. That's the job. So why was Brodie Clark suspended/fired/"resigned"?

It's a rare event and there's only ever one explanation -- vested interests are threatened.

What vested interests?

Perhaps Mr Clark will tell us on Tuesday. Or perhaps you will start doing some investigating and reporting. I've made a start for you -- http://www.dmossesq.com/2011/11/brodie-clark-alone.html Look out for the connections between Mr Clark, Raytheon, IBM, Morpho, CSC, VFS Global, ...
But three times:
Mr Oborne

As you must know, Whitehall doesn't like a public fuss. They don't want Theresa May and Yvette Cooper talking nonsense about biometrics in the House. It makes Whitehall look incompetent. Horror.

Think what happened the last time. Sir David Normington and Sir Gus O'Donnell called in the police to find Chris Galley, the Tory mole in the Home Office. Damian Green ended up in the nick for nine hours and the House of Commons was invaded by the police for the first time since the Civil War.

So the Home Office won't have wound up poor Theresa May and pointed her at the microphones unless there was a serious requirement to take the risk of making a fuss.

Brodie Clark must have been about to say something. Or John Vine must have been about to reveal something. That's what Mr Vine is paid to do and he's good at it.

Whatever the threatened revelation, it was enough for O'Donnell, Normington, Ghosh and maybe others to press the panic button.

Don't waste our time, Mr Oborne, talking nonsense about ministerial responsibility and an inviolably perfect Whitehall. Get on with finding out what rattled Sir Gus O'Donnell's cage and Sir David Normington's and Dame Helen Ghosh's -- especially hers, as she's likely to be appointed by O'Donnell and Normington as our next head of the home civil service.

You have a job to do, Sir. In the national interest. Get to it.

http://www.dmossesq.com/2011/11/brodie-clark-alone.html
http://www.dmossesq.com/2011/10/its-all-johns-fault.html
http://www.dmossesq.com/2011/10/you-just-cant-keep-good-man-down.html
http://www.dmossesq.com/2011/10/whose-bust-is-it-anyway.html

Oborneiana – Theresa May and Brodie Clark

Peter Oborne had an article published on the Daily Telegraph website dated 9 November 2011, 'Theresa May’s attempts to pass the buck make for a distressing spectacle'. The article provoked a strong desire to help him.

Tuesday, 8 November 2011

Brodie Clark alone

Rt Hon Theresa May MP
Open letter
Secretary of State for the Home Department
Marsham St
London W1 SW1
8 November 2011

Dear Home Secretary

Brodie Clark alone
I write to suggest the right course of action to follow now.

You have started three enquiries. You must start a fourth.

Without that fourth enquiry, although you may keep your job, your name will be tarnished.

With it, even if you lose your job, your reputation will be enhanced. You will eventually be recognised as having struck a blow in favour of the businesslike investment of public money and against the present practice of Whitehall wasting it by the lorryload. And you will eventually be recognised as having struck a blow in favour of democracy and against the present practice of rule by an unelected and unaccountable Whitehall.

The media are convinced, to a man and a woman, that the biometrics chosen by the Home Office, to defend the border, work. Increase the use of those biometrics, and you get a better defended border, they say. Reduce it, and border security automatically suffers.

If that relationship between the chosen biometrics and border security holds, then you’re guilty, Brodie Clark is guilty, you’re both out of the job and your names will be Mudd.

But does it? Does that relationship hold true? Why do the media believe in the efficacy of the Home Office’s chosen biometrics? Why do they make that assumption?

If you assembled the entire corps of Whitehall editors, home affairs editors and political correspondents of the press and of the broadcast media, you wouldn’t find a single biometrics expert among them. Not one. They don’t know what they’re talking about when it comes to biometrics, and they haven’t bothered to check.

Which means that when you launch your fourth enquiry – into the efficacy of the biometrics chosen by the Home Office – the corps shouldn’t find it difficult to change their tune.

Once they realise that there is a substantial amount of respectable evidence against the biometrics chosen by the Home Office, the media story will change. Once they realise that there is no respectable evidence in favour of these biometrics, the media will start at last to ask the right questions.

Why has so much public money been wasted on investments in a technology that doesn’t work? Why have the public been consistently misled by politicians about its efficacy?

Nobody expects politicians to know anything in detail about the “false non-match rates” and the “receiver operating curves” that constitute the study of biometrics. We just expect you to be properly briefed. So who has been misleading the politicians? There are only two possible answers. The biometrics suppliers themselves – but they presumably don’t have daily access to ministers. And the Whitehall officials who do have access to ministers. Officials who have apparently acted as unpaid salesmen for certain biometrics products and who have given part of the industry an unsolicited and undeserved testimonial.

For about 48 hours after the story broke on Friday evening, the media focused on Brodie Clark alone. One man. Decades of experience in policing and prisons, a man capable of running 20,000 staff doing a dangerous job in the interest of national security, a man at the height of his powers – he didn’t go barmy one day and just decide to stop bothering with passport checks on a whim.

It takes one small change in the reporting of this case and Brodie Clark becomes a hero. If he is described correctly as a professional having to do a very hard job – quite beyond the powers of any of his detractors – while being lumbered with useless technology by a bunch of dilettantes in Whitehall, then the focus changes.

The focus has already changed, of course, the media now have you in their sights. They have skipped from the Head of the Border Force to the Home Secretary without taking into account any of the intervening people responsible. You have to get the media to start joining the dots.

Brodie Clark doesn’t run UKBA on his own.

He’s one member of the Board. What were the other directors doing while he was supposedly impairing national security? Looking the other way? What were the non-executive directors doing? Do they turn up to Board meetings just for the sandwiches? What about the Chief Executive of UKBA, Robert Whiteman? He was appointed in July 2011. Lin Homer, the previous Chief Executive, moved on in December 2010 to become Permanent Secretary at the Department of Transport. Why did it take so long to find a replacement?

UKBA is an executive agency of the Home Office. How come we haven’t heard from Dame Helen Ghosh, the Permanent Secretary at the Home Office? Is she responsible for UKBA or isn’t she? And where’s Sir Gus O’Donnell while the shrapnel’s flying? He’s Head of the Home Civil Service. He’s responsible for everything. He’s the man with a budget of £710 billlion of public money for the year 2011-12. Why don’t the media find out from the horse’s mouth what’s going on? This is an operational matter. The media should be quizzing the operators.

And that’s where your fourth enquiry comes in. Who chose these useless biometrics? James Hall. No-one’s ever heard of him. One of Whitehall’s numerous imports from Accenture, James Hall was Chief Executive of the Identity & Passport Service (IPS) until the 2010 election, when he was allowed to go quietly into retirement. No public recriminations against him for having spent £292 million on the National Identity Service with nothing to show for it. Nothing whatever. By contrast, some of the newspapers are keen to tarnish Brodie Clark’s good name, deprive him of his bonus, gloat at his salary and question whether he should be allowed his pension.

James Hall reported to Sir David Normington, Permanent Secretary at the time at the Home Office. He retired at the end of last year, his KCB was uprated to a GCB and he is now our First Civil Service Commissioner. He is garlanded. Brodie Clark is pilloried. But it’s Sir David who had operational responsibility for IPS and UKBA ever since John Reid pointed out that the latter was not fit for purpose. No questions about Sir David’s pension. Why?

The Home Office was advised on biometrics by the Home Office Scientific Development Branch (HOSDB) and by external consultants. Marek Rejman-Greene was the biometrics expert at HOSDB at the time and has moved on smoothly to advise the Cabinet Office on identity assurance. Still in the job, still on the public payroll, and no impertinent questions about his bonus, if any, for Mr Rejman-Greene.

Who are the external consultants? PA Consulting. See Helping the UK Border Agency International Group to deliver a world-class biometric visa service on the PA Consulting website. That’s the same firm of management consultants who charged £42 million for project management on John Prescott’s FiReControl fiasco, a project which the National Audit Office (NAO) assures us will waste a minimum of £469 million of public money.

Who provides the biometric technology being used by the Home Office? Morpho. Once again, no-one will have heard of them. They used to be called "Sagem Sécurité". They're a subsidiary of Safran Group, the French equivalent of BAe. And they're the world leaders in biometrics, selling their unreliable wares to Australia, the US and India as well as us and presumably the poor unfortunate French.

PA Consulting and Morpho would benefit from a close inspection by the UK’s media quite as much as, if not more than, you and Brodie Clark.

You would have some powerful support for a fourth enquiry from the NAO and from the chairmen of the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee (whose excellent report on the Home Office’s ID cards plan was rudely and unwisely ignored), the Public Accounts Committee and the Public Administration Select Committee. Margaret Hodge at PAC has a wide selection of adjectives to describe the wisdom with which public money is spent by Whitehall and Bernard Jenkin at PASC doesn't seem to be too impressed with the quality of public administration in the UK either.

You would also have the support of the unions. They want to protect their members’ jobs. Faced with the prospect of replacing thousands of UKBA frontline staff with computer technology that doesn’t work, you, too, may want to protect the border by protecting their jobs.

The Guardian, of course, won’t support you. Not because you’re a Conservative. But because they believe in a state where a grateful populace is wisely served by an all-knowing cadre of public officials. Men from the ministry. Whitehall. Which is why their editorial today asks everyone to turn the rhetoric down.

Don’t start the fourth enquiry and then wait patiently for its findings to be announced in six months time. Make them report publicly once a week, orally and/or with interim written reports and plenty of press releases. The only reason Whitehall have been able to waste our money on unreliable biometrics for the best part of ten years is that they operate in secrecy.

Behind closed doors, Whitehall seem to make one unbusinesslike, irresponsible and downright illogical decision after another. They desperately need to operate more openly to keep their noses clean. And we the public desperately need them to keep their noses clean – we can’t afford for Whitehall to carry on wasting our money like this.

The enquiry could find itself going to unexpected places. Don’t be surprised to see the European Commission figuring large. The European Commission's white paper on electronic identity will be one important source. The Commission's plans for Project STORK will be another. And the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) also will figure large. Via the eBorders scheme, the DHS get access to all UK API data (advance passenger information) whenever we fly, whether domestically or internationally.

eBorders must be included in the enquiry. Partly because it depends to a large extent on biometrics. And partly because this is the Home Office system which manages UKBA’s watchlists for terrorists and criminals which Brodie Clark is accused of not using.

The BBC’s File on 4 programme, ‘Open Borders?’, explains why Mr Clark might well not use eBorders.

The last government appointed Raytheon as the lead contractors on eBorders. One of the first acts of the coalition government was to fire Raytheon for breach of contract. It’s never been explained what breach took place. IBM have now taken over as lead contractors.

For £1 billion, in the 21st century, we’re getting a computerised system that would disgrace the 19th century.

eBorders relies on little scraps of paper being delivered to the desks of UKBA border force staff. Sometimes, these little bits of paper go astray. And then anyone can get into the country, even “Sheikh [Raed] Salah, an Arab-Israeli activist, [who] flew into the UK last month [June 2011], days after Home Secretary Theresa May had signed an order denying him entry to the UK”.

Let’s see the media grill Raytheon and IBM as well as Brodie Clark and you.

We elect politicians. You politicians seem to be immediately trussed up by officials who control your every move, only allow you to take the calls they put through, attend the meetings they arrange, see the letters and papers they choose. We do not elect officials. But who has the power? Certainly you politicians keep taking the responsibility. But power? It looks as though that lies with Whitehall. That is the unacknowledged fact of our present democracy. It is not the democracy the public thinks it partakes in.

There’s a lot riding on the fourth enquiry. I append an outline of the first topic to research. There’s a lot more to come. If you would like it.

Yours faithfully
David Moss

Brodie Clark alone

Rt Hon Theresa May MP
Open letter
Secretary of State for the Home Department
Marsham St
London W1 SW1
8 November 2011

Dear Home Secretary

Brodie Clark alone
I write to suggest the right course of action to follow now.

You have started three enquiries. You must start a fourth.

Without that fourth enquiry, although you may keep your job, your name will be tarnished.

With it, even if you lose your job, your reputation will be enhanced. You will eventually be recognised as having struck a blow in favour of the businesslike investment of public money and against the present practice of Whitehall wasting it by the lorryload. And you will eventually be recognised as having struck a blow in favour of democracy and against the present practice of rule by an unelected and unaccountable Whitehall.

Tuesday, 1 November 2011

494 years later ...

... a profitable 22 minutes and 53 seconds may be spent by all, listening to the audio of Chris Chant's talk, given to the Institute for Government on 20 October 2011, available here and here:

In the first nine minutes, Mr Chant declares war on the Whitehall dispensation under Pope Augustine.

REFORMATION I
The Ninety-Five Theses on the Power and Efficacy of Indulgences (Latin: Disputatio pro declaratione virtutis indulgentiarum), commonly known as The Ninety-Five Theses, was written by Martin Luther in 1517 and is widely regarded as the primary catalyst for the Protestant Reformation. The disputation protests against clerical abuses, especially the sale of indulgences …

On the eve of All Saint’s Day, October 31, 1517, Luther posted the ninety-five theses, which he had composed in Latin, on the door of the Castle Church of Wittenberg, according to university custom.
REFORMATION II
OK, we don’t call it “reformation” now, we call it “transformational government”. But that’s what Mr Chant’s talking about, isn’t it. He didn’t nail his theses to the door, they were posted as an audio stream. But it comes to the same. And we don't buy indulgences any more, but we might as well, it might be more effective than paying PA Consulting and Computer Sciences Corporation.

What chance did Luther stand, with the powers ranged against him? To any sensible observer at the time, none. Ditto Mr Chant. But Luther won. Mr Chant (and we) might, too.

494 years later ...

... a profitable 22 minutes and 53 seconds may be spent by all, listening to the audio of Chris Chant's talk, given to the Institute for Government on 20 October 2011, available here and here:

In the first nine minutes, Mr Chant declares war on the Whitehall dispensation under Pope Augustine.

REFORMATION I
The Ninety-Five Theses on the Power and Efficacy of Indulgences (Latin: Disputatio pro declaratione virtutis indulgentiarum), commonly known as The Ninety-Five Theses, was written by Martin Luther in 1517 and is widely regarded as the primary catalyst for the Protestant Reformation. The disputation protests against clerical abuses, especially the sale of indulgences …

On the eve of All Saint’s Day, October 31, 1517, Luther posted the ninety-five theses, which he had composed in Latin, on the door of the Castle Church of Wittenberg, according to university custom.
REFORMATION II
OK, we don’t call it “reformation” now, we call it “transformational government”. But that’s what Mr Chant’s talking about, isn’t it. He didn’t nail his theses to the door, they were posted as an audio stream. But it comes to the same. And we don't buy indulgences any more, but we might as well, it might be more effective than paying PA Consulting and Computer Sciences Corporation.

What chance did Luther stand, with the powers ranged against him? To any sensible observer at the time, none. Ditto Mr Chant. But Luther won. Mr Chant (and we) might, too.

Saturday, 22 October 2011

It's all John's fault

This year, our government plans to spend £710 billion. That’s the figure that was published by Her Majesty’s Treasury when the Chancellor presented his Budget last March.

£710 billion. It’s a lot of money. Where does it come from?

£158 billion of it is our income tax and another £101 billion is the take from national insurance. It’s our money coming out of our pay packets. The government gets its cut when we earn money and when we spend it – they expect to collect £100 billion in VAT this year and a further £46 billion in excise duties on cigarettes, alcohol and road tax. They get another £26 billion out of us from Council Tax, and £73 billion from businesses, in the form of corporation tax and business rates.

When the figures don’t add up, when there’s a budget deficit, the government borrows money to close the gap, leaving us with new debts to pay off. £50 billion of the £710 billion above goes straight out of the door on interest payments. This year they’re planning to borrow another £121 billion.

All this money is public money. It is spent for us, on our behalf, by Whitehall. By civil servants. By officials.

Public money deserves to be spent extra wisely. How good are Whitehall at deciding how to spend it? How much public money is wasted? And how could the waste be reduced?

Examples of waste
Dial 999 and ask for the fire brigade, and you’ll be put through to one of 46 fire control centres around the country. When he was Deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott, now Lord Prescott, decided that instead of having 46 local control centres for fire brigades in England, there should be just nine regional centres.

That was his policy, the project to bring it about was called “FiReControl” and he was told by his officials that it would cost between 100 and 120 million pounds.

In the event, according to the National Audit Office, the “minimum that will be wasted as a result of the failure to deliver the project” is £469 million. The Public Accounts Committee weren’t impressed either:
The Department's ambitious vision of abolishing 46 local fire and rescue control rooms around the country and replacing them with nine state of the art regional control centres ended in complete failure. The taxpayer has lost nearly half a billion pounds and eight of the completed regional control centres remain as empty and costly white elephants ...

No one has been held to account for this project failure, one of the worst we have seen for many years, and the careers of most of the senior staff responsible have carried on as if nothing had gone wrong at all and the consultants and contractor continue to work on many other government projects.
Public Servant magazine tell us that “not only did nobody tell Prescott what was happening” but, quoting him talking about his officials:
"... they actually met, according to the committee, and said 'We don't need to tell the minister because it's going alright, we think we're getting it back on track', that's [the decision] they came to ...”
By convention, the only person who is to blame for this failure is John Prescott. Not the officials who decided not to tell him about the problems with FiReControl. Not the bankers. Not the consultants and not the contractors. Not the lawyers and not the accountants. Just John Prescott.

The Public Accounts Committee report came out in September 2011. It was a bumper month.

£469 million may seem like quite a lot of our money to go up in smoke, but what about £6,000 million? That same September, the Times newspaper carried a leader on NPfIT, the National Programme for IT, an NHS computerisation project which has been running for nearly ten years now. “The history of the NHS computer system is one of criminal incompetence and irresponsibility” say the Times, and:
The Cabinet Office’s major projects group has reviewed the National Programme for IT and decided, unequivocally, that it is not fit to provide the services that the NHS needs. It has concluded that the programme “cannot deliver to its original intent”: a damning indictment of a decade in which £6 billion of taxpayers’ money was spent with precious little to show for it.
The Department of Health agree that this is not a healthy situation and that some of what the Cabinet Office say is correct, but as with FiReControl no-one is accountable. And in this case the project hasn’t even been cancelled – there are plans to spend another £5 billion on NPfIT, taking the total to about £11 billion of public money. Our money. With “precious little to show for it”.

Let’s take a holiday from all these big numbers and consider a smaller one –  £53.74.

For the five years between May 1995 and May 2000, a 10-year adult passport in the UK cost £18. By September 2010, the price had gone up to £77.50, more than four times as much.

If the price of a 10-year adult passport had merely kept pace with RPI inflation, in September 2010 it would have been £23.76. It would not have been £77.50. There is a £53.74 difference. There’s our holiday number. £53.74. Every time we buy a passport, we are over-paying by £53.74. Or so it appears.

What used to be known as the Passport Office is now “IPS”, the Identity & Passport Service. You can ask IPS to explain what this extra £53.74 is spent on. They can’t tell you. You can ask the Treasury, the Home Office and the National Audit Office, too. Still no answer.

Figures released by IPS show the cost of passports broken down into several categories. According to Alastair Bridges, the Executive Director of Finance at IPS, the combined cost of running the passport application system and of producing passports doubled between May 2000 and June 2010 from about £21 per passport to £42. Why? No explanation. And during the same period, IPS’s overhead/administration cost more than doubled from just under £7 per passport to just over £16. How? No explanation.

Sarah Rapson, Chief Executive of IPS, confirms that IPS produce about five-and-a-half million passports per annum. If they were all 10-year adult passports and if the public is being over-charged by £53.74 per passport, then that would be £296 million a year going on holiday and never coming back. Money for which the public gets no value. Waste.

Competition
When you get prices increasing out of control, the natural reaction is to call for open markets and competition. What Whitehall needs, people say, is private sector methods of procurement and competition among suppliers. That will stop the public’s hard-earned money being wasted.

True. But not exactly news. Whitehall already uses private sector methods and has done for at least 30 years. Senior positions in Whitehall are occupied by personnel recruited from the private sector. And public contracts are put out to competitive tender.

For example, between 1999 and 2009 the private sector company Siemens were paid by IPS to develop and maintain the UK passport application system. Their 10-year contract was originally estimated to be worth between 80 and 100 million pounds. In the end, IPS paid Siemens £365 million, three or four times the original estimate. That’s obviously a terrible over-run. So when the Siemens contract ended, did IPS negotiate a new price something more like the original 80 to 100 million pounds? No. After a competition, they let the contract to another private sector company, Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC), for £385 million. The price is relentlessly ratcheting up. With nothing to show for the increase.

So something is missing in the way market disciplines have been introduced to Whitehall. They aren’t working. Some ingredients must have been omitted from the recipe. Whitehall has been reformed to some extent, and yet the wastage persists. Costs have gone up and at the same time the promised efficiency benefits have not materialised.

How else can we explain FiReControl and NPfIT, for example? Not to mention the £292 million of public money wasted on IPS’s ID cards scheme. Or the escalating costs of the passport application system.

Where does the money go?
Follow the money. Where’s it all going?

PA Consulting, the management consultants, were paid £42 million to advise on FiReControl. This very expensive advice doesn’t seem to have helped very much, with £469 million reduced to ashes.

PA also advised the Identity & Passport Service on ID cards. And on the procurement of passports. We don’t know how much PA Consulting were paid for their work on ID cards and passports. But one way and another, ID cards cost us £292 million and there’s nothing to show for it. And arguably we’re wasting something like £296 million a year on passports.

PA’s involvement in these three projects has not been obviously beneficial.

On the other hand, they did win a gold award from the Management Consultancies Association for their work on passports:
The winning project involved working with the IPS to procure a new passport provider. This complex and high-profile project required a redesigned passport which met the new international regulations for travel documentation, with enhanced security features to keep ahead of the threat of counterfeiting and the capability to store additional biometric information.

The team supported IPS and managed the £400m procurement process from start to finish. The process was completed four months earlier than scheduled and below budget. The quality and security of the passport exceeded expectations and the new passport service will generate savings in excess of £160 million (30% savings against the anticipated contract value) over the term of the contract.

Kevin Sheehan, Director of Integrity and Security at the IPS, said of the project: "This procurement has delivered a fantastic outcome for IPS by delivering a superior passport at exceptional value for money. This project exemplifies the benefit of co-operative working through bringing together IPS's world-class passport knowledge with PA's procurement expertise."
If, as PA say, they “managed the £400m procurement process from start to finish”, what were IPS doing?

Should PA have revealed that they made “30% savings against the anticipated contract value”? That’s valuable commercial information that would normally be kept confidential. Isn’t it utterly irresponsible to blow their own trumpet like this? It’s an invitation to suppliers to bid high next time.

And if, as Kevin Sheehan says, IPS have “world-class passport knowledge”, why did they need PA? We've been issuing passports since the Safe Conducts Act of 1414 – what do PA know about passports that the Crown doesn't?

The British public may be over-paying for passports by something like £296 million a year. Every year. Is that what Mr Sheehan means by “exceptional value for money”?

Computer Sciences Corporation is another destination for our income tax pounds and our national insurance pounds.

CSC won the contract for IPS’s new passport application system. They also have a contract with the UK Border Agency to conduct security checks on applicants for UK visas in India and Pakistan. And they are one of the two prime contractors on the NHS’s £11 billion National Programme for IT, the other being BT. NPfIT, remember, is the health system in which the Times detects “criminal incompetence and irresponsibility”.

CSC are trying to computerise health trusts in England using a software package called “Lorenzo”. They're having some trouble.

Lorenzo doesn’t work. We know that because that is the verdict of CSC’s own in-house delivery assurance review team, who said as early as 2008:
We could not deliver the solution set that we had contracted with the NHS ... the contract was a loser and CSC should have recognised a loss in 2008 ... The project is on a death march ...
Now that these internal reports have come to light, CSC’s shareholders feel deceived about the company’s prospects. CSC currently face a class action, brought by some of their major investors, headed by the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan.

Things aren’t going well for CSC. They’ve just had a run-in with the US Armed Services Board who have docked them $250 million. The SEC are investigating their accounting practices. And here in the UK, Pennine Care NHS Health Trust have refused to accept Lorenzo. A successful installation of Lorenzo at Pennine was a milestone on CSC’s deployment plan. Failure leaves CSC technically in breach of their NPfIT contract.

And what is the response from the custodians of our money? Thanks to the Guardian, we know the answer:
Ministers are considering offering one of the NHS's worst-performing IT contractors financial help to keep the company from ditching a troublesome software package which is "not fit for purpose", according to Cabinet Office documents.

The plan to offer the US group Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) one last chance to fix the software risks a furious backlash over "payments for failure", in the latest twist to a fiasco that has generated years of delays at considerable cost to the health service.

The move comes despite the Department of Health last week declaring that the £11.4bn National Programme for IT, started in 2002 under Labour, was to be scrapped because it was "not fit to provide the modern IT services that the NHS needs".
Who makes these decisions?
Who decided that PA Consulting should be paid £42 million to advise on FiReControl? How much were PA Consulting paid to advise the Home Office on ID cards? What passport procurement skills do PA Consulting possess that the Home Office don’t? How do Computer Sciences Corporation keep their contract with the NHS? How much are they paid to collect Indian and Pakistani fingerprints for the UK Border Agency? How can it cost £385 million for CSC to maintain a passport application system that we the public had just spent £365 million on and which seemed to be working?

Some quite extraordinary decisions are being taken. Who by?

The strange thing is that often, we don’t know.

The permanent secretary at the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister when the FiReControl project started life was Dame Mavis McDonald DCB. She was succeeded by Sir Peter Housden KCB. The prime contractor on FiReControl was Cassidian, a subsidiary of EADS, the aircraft company. Consultancy advice was provided by PA Consulting. None of these names appears in the Public Accounts Committee report. Not one.

No-one imagines that it was John Prescott’s job to negotiate the contracts with Cassidian and PA Consulting or to attend the progress meetings or to sign the cheques. That was the job of his officials. Dame Mavis and Sir Peter wasted £469 million of our money. Two people most readers will never have heard of.

We will spend £126 billion on healthcare in England this year. The man in charge of that budget must be one of the most powerful people in the world. Most readers will never have heard of Sir David Nicholson KCB CBE but he is the chief executive of the National Health Service and he is the man who wants to continue to pay Computer Sciences Corporation for Lorenzo, the software package they can't give away for free to the health trusts.

Sir David has seen off the criticisms of the Public Administration Select Committee, the Public Accounts Committee and the National Audit Office and he has emasculated the Cabinet Office, whose always limited authority must now be diluted to near-homeopathic concentrations. He has effectively been accused by the Times of “criminal incompetence and irresponsibility”. He still has his job.

The man in charge at the Identity & Passport Service while hundreds of millions of our pounds were wasted on ID cards was James Hall. He is also the man who signed the £385 million contract with Computer Sciences Corporation to re-write a passport application system that already worked. IPS is an executive agency of the Home Office. The permanent secretary at the Home Office throughout James Hall’s tenure at IPS was Sir David Normington GCB. Now you know. But you didn’t know before, did you.

The complete failure of the ID cards scheme and the spectacular inflation of passport costs did nothing to dent Sir David’s career prospects when he retired from the Home Office. His KCB was uprated to a GCB and he is now our First Civil Service Commissioner.

Which means that, among other things, he will help to choose the successor to Sir Gus O’Donnell GCB, who has been the £710 billion man, the head of the Home Civil Service, since 2005.

Lord Adonis is Director of the Institute for Government. politics.co.uk interviewed him in September 2011 and said:
The IfG's work extends beyond being a school for ministers. Adonis is very animated when he starts talking about the institutional weaknesses of the civil service. Not that there's anything wrong with individuals, he emphasises. "My criticisms are about the machine," he insists. "My own view is that the civil service is full of brilliant people who are terribly managed."

One of the biggest problems the IfG isn't keeping quiet about is the "laughably" named 'permanent civil service'. People change jobs because of a merry-go-round culture which makes no sense, Adonis argues. He says he had six directors of the academies programme in the eight years he was engaged with it. It's not a problem that's going away, either: since the general election ten of the 16 departments of state have had changes in their permanent secretary. "The machine really is very badly run."
The home civil service was in need of reform when Sir Gus took over six-and-a-half years ago. It still is now. He will retire at the end of the year. The Prime Minister has promised him a life peerage. And he will go out to a fanfare of plaudits, many of them no doubt deserved. But he leaves behind a home civil service which can still incinerate billions of pounds of our money with impunity.

Openness and accountability
You know all about Sir Stelios Haji-Ioannou and his successful airline, EasyJet. And Michael O'Leary, the Ryanair man. And Sir Richard Branson. These people run big companies. But nothing like as big as the UK public sector’s annual turnover of £710 billion.

Perhaps if Whitehall officials were as much in the news as, say, airline operators, we wouldn’t have so much of our money wasted. Is that one of the missing ingredients? Would competition start to work properly if there was more openness?

Rupert Murdoch has to take his medicine in public. He is hugely criticised in all the newspapers, on radio and on TV. He faces select committees. And he faces angry shareholders. He is accountable and he is being held to account.

Far from taking any medicine, far from being accountable for his failings, Sir Peter Housden KCB has gone on smoothly from the debacle of FiReControl to become permanent secretary to the Scottish government. (A rather clumsy permanent secretary, as it happens, but that's by the by. Good luck Scotland.)

Sir Peter, incidentally, was one of Sir Gus O'Donnell's first appointments after he became head of the home civil service. Sir David Nicholson was another.

Whitehall argue that they couldn’t do their job properly if they had to operate in the glare of publicity all the time. Sir Stelios seems to manage. So do Mr O’Leary and Sir Richard.

Our officials enjoy almost complete secrecy at the moment but that doesn’t stop a lot of our money being wasted. Secrecy doesn’t help them to do their job properly, as they pretend. Perhaps openness would.

The UK Border Agency operate their eBorders initiative without much interference from the media. eBorders is one of UKBA’s strategies to protect the UK’s borders.

In November 2007, Raytheon Systems Ltd, whose US parent company is the manufacturer of the Cruise missile, were appointed as prime contractors on eBorders.

In July 2010 the FT informed us:
May sacks Raytheon from e-borders contract
Raytheon has been removed from its lead role overseeing a £750m project to provide a secure border control system for the UK after the British government said it had “no confidence” in the US defence and security company. 

The decision by Theresa May, home secretary, to end Raytheon’s involvement will cause delays in the e-borders project, part of government attempts to control immigration and improve security against terrorists.

However, officials said the tough approach taken by ministers showed that the coalition government was far less willing than its Labour predecessor to put up with poor performance or delays on big contracts.
And then in August 2011, Raytheon sued the British government for over £500 million. Guess who’ll pay the bill if Raytheon win. Again, it’s hardly a testament to the efficacy of secrecy.

Horizon scanning
When the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee reviewed the Identity & Passport Service's plans for ID cards they declared themselves to be "concerned", "surprised", "regretful", "sceptical" and "incredulous" at their "confusion", "inconsistency" and "lack of clarity". Water off a duck's back, IPS carried on regardless. No mere politicians were going to stand in their way.

Ten times in their report, the Committee recommend that IPS should undertake "horizon scanning" activities. Good advice.

Which we should take. What is coming up on the horizon?

We need to keep an eye on NPfIT, the zombie project that just won't die until Sir David Nicholson has spent all the £11 billion he feels that he is entitled to.

We need to keep an eye on IPS's passport application system. James Hall has been replaced by Sarah Rapson. Will she be any better?

And there are three new projects which threaten to go the way of FiReControl and the ID cards scheme:

1. HMRC's RTI – Her Majesty's Revenue & Customs want Real-Time Information (RTI) on all wages and salaries.

2. DWP's UC – the Department of Work and Pensions want to introduce Universal Credit (UC), a simplification of the current labyrinthine benefits systems. UC depends on RTI. The success of RTI is not guaranteed.

3. The Cabinet Office's G-Cloud – the Cabinet Office want to centralise and standardise and consolidate all departmental computing into just a dozen or so gigantic data centres in which all our data will be shared between departments. At the same time they want all interaction with the public sector to be "digital by default", to take place in a government cloud, a G-Cloud, meaning that all public services will be applied for over the web.

Each of these projects will cost billions. Each of these projects could go wrong and the money be wasted.

Who are the Whitehall personnel involved? Who are the consultants? Who are the contractors? What is the budget? What are the consequences of failure for the Whitehall personnel, the consultants and the contractors?

In the main, we can't answer a single one of these questions. Sir Gus O'Donnell's ancien régime persists and will continue to do so as long as we remain uninterested in how Whitehall spends our money.

Conclusion
• We’re entrusting £710 billion to Whitehall this year alone. We want, need, deserve and pay for competent public administration.

• Whitehall officials need to operate more openly and more accountably.

• The spirit of public service would suggest that Whitehall should stoutly defend the public interest, but too often officials behave cravenly, as if they are beholden to their consultants and contractors.

• The doctrine of ministerial responsibility needs to be changed, the power of politicians is clearly very limited – we can’t afford to carry on this charade in which we pretend that everything is John Prescott’s fault.

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Updated 12.9.2014
'Poison pill' privatisation contracts could cost £300m-£400m to cancel

'Unprecedented' clauses guarantee firms 10 years of profits even if new government scraps controversial probation contracts

Taxpayers will face a £300m-£400m penalty if controversial probation privatisation contracts are cancelled after next May's general election under an "unprecedented" clause that guarantees bidders their expected profits over the 10-year life of the contract ...
More material for the next edition of Messrs Bacon and Hope's book, Conundrum: Why every government gets things wrong and what we can do about it. And for the next edition of Messrs King and Crewe's The Blunders of Our Governments.

How do markets work? Whitehall are still having trouble with that question. They're still on probation. Meanwhile, we pay.


Updated 16.9.14

Sir Peter Housden appears twice in the post above. First for his FiReControl achievements which cost us all £469 million. And then for his curious take on the independence of the civil service – he was accused of "a clear breach of civil service impartiality" by favouring the Scottish National Party.

That was back in 2011. The case was examined by Sir-Gus-now-Lord O'Donnell, Cabinet Secretary at the time and the man who appointed Sir Peter in the first place. Case dismissed.

Three years later, what do we read? Scotland's most senior civil servant 'intimidated bosses’ over referendum.

It's a bit late but perhaps Sir Gus would care to review the case?


Updated 16.2.15

Has Whitehall's record of waste improved in the three-and-a-bit years since the post above was written?

The Taxpayers' Alliance identify £5.1 billion of waste in 2013-14, £3 billion of it in the Ministry of Defence.

Whitehall's response to the demands for better value for taxpayers' money, more accountability and greater openness is to try to have the Public Accounts Committee closed down.