Showing posts with label PKI. Show all posts
Showing posts with label PKI. Show all posts

Sunday, 28 October 2012

Alarm – adult human being found still working at the Cabinet Office

Thank goodness for Andy Smith. Whoever he is. And even if he isn't.
audio
video (slide to 1:31:30)

Hat tip: Philip Virgo

25 October 2012, and Whitehall held one of its endless conferences/talking shops where people who work for acronyms get together and speak in acronyms. The 9:20 welcome and introduction, for example, were given by John Robertson MP, Chair, apComms and Chi Onwurah MP and Stephen Mosley MP, Co-Chairs, PICTFOR.

All was set fair for a normal day of incomprehensible talk to be minuted and then forgotten when, according to the BBC, Andy Smith, PSTSA Security Manager, Cabinet Office, was asked a question about using social networks:
A senior government official has sparked anger by advising internet users to give fake details to websites to protect their security.

Andy Smith, an internet security chief at the Cabinet Office, said people should only give accurate details to trusted sites such as government ones.

He said names and addresses posted on social networking sites "can be used against you" by criminals.
Andy Smith is quite properly very hard to track down. He's got something to do with security at the PSTSA. The PSTSA has got something to do with the Public Services Network. The security of the PSN is assured in part by the use of PKI, the public key infrastructure, and that, in turn, depends on digital certificates.

In their chart-topping release of 31 July 2012, PSN Certificate Policy IPsec IL3, PSN say:
5.4.8.2 Each CA and RA must ensure that its PKI services are accredited by the PSTSA Accreditation Board (PSAB) to impact levels 4-4-4 and included within an RMADS prior to live operation.
DMossEsq can help a bit here. A CA is a certification authority and an RA is a registration authority but, after that, you're on your own. You could try the glossary at the back of the report where you'll find that RMADS is the Risk Management and Accreditation Document Set but, rather charmingly, under PSTSA it just says "Public Services ???".

So there's Andy Smith, a man who speaks fluent acronym, who works for an acronym so secret that even PSN don't know what it stands for (DKWISF), a man who has something to do with the deepest levels of the security of PSN and when he's asked about social networks, his informed security advice is don't tell them any more of the truth than you have to for your purposes.

Meanwhile, back at the robot Government Digital Service (GDS), the senior boys in charge were getting ready on Monday 22 October 2012 to announce that we should all communicate with the government using our trusty Facebook and Google+ user IDs. But they bottled out of it. It's too ridiculous. Even a child couldn't take the suggestion seriously.

Thank goodness for Andy Smith. Whoever he is. And even if he isn't.

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Cribsheet
4 October 2012, IndependentNational 'virtual ID card' scheme set for launch (Is there anything that could possibly go wrong?): "The Government will announce details this month of a controversial national identity scheme which will allow people to use their mobile phones and social media profiles as official identification documents for accessing public services ... The public will be able to use their log-ins from a set list of “trusted” private organisations to access Government services, which are being grouped together on a single website called Gov.uk ... The system will be trialled when the Department of Work & Pensions starts the early roll out of the Universal Credit scheme, a radical overhaul of the benefits system, in April ... Details of the 'identity assurance' scheme are being finalised amid growing concerns over identity theft and other forms of cybercrime ... Members of the Cabinet Office team travelled to the White House in May to exchange ideas with American counterparts working on the National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace (NSTIC) ...".

4 October 2012, Government Digital Service, Less About Identity, More About Trust: "If you’d like to know more the Q&A in The Independent gives a pretty good overview (the only thing we’d really quibble with is the headline)".

25 October 2012, Philip Virgo, Government official gives practical security advice - shock horror: "This morning I ... received yet another e-mail covering the latest nonsenses in the ongoing saga of expensive displacement activity that passes for Government (US, EU, HMG etc.) electronic ID policy ...".

25 October 2012, BBC, Give social networks fake details, advises Whitehall web security official: "Mr Smith, who is in charge of security for what he described as the 'largest public services network in Europe', which will eventually be accessed by millions of people in the UK, said giving fake details to social networking sites was 'a very sensible thing to do ... Don't put all your information on websites you don't trust ... When you put information on the internet do not use your real name, your real date of birth', he told a Parliament and the Internet Conference in Portcullis House, Westminster ... 'When you are putting information on social networking sites don't put real combinations of information, because it can be used against you' ...".

26 October 2012, Wendy Goodman, I thought her head was going to explode: "For the record, I think it's clear that Smith gave good security advice ...".

26 October 2012, dropsafe, Andy Smith of the #CabinetOffice is a Epic Fucking #Security Hero: "I have said much the same – worse/moreso, even, by suggesting that folk randomise their personal information so that your mother’s maiden name was F3JlfIrOH8 and your favourite colour is uAfhaR." – kindly includes the links to audio and video of the conference above.

26 October 2012, Daily MailUse fake names on Facebook and Twitter, says the head of government internet security: "... It comes at a time when the government is considering allowing people to use their existing log-ins for social networking sites to access a new government website to apply for benefits, passports and driving licences ...".

26 October 2012, GuardianBeing wary of handing over personal details to websites isn't 'outrageous': "I'm not sure making up data is necessarily the best advice Smith could have given, but you can see where he was coming from: if you are suspicious about why a site is asking for your details, don't give them ... you should be a bit discerning about who you share your details with and how much you give out ... Earlier this year, a report into US identity fraud found it was on the rise, in part because of the incredible amount of personal information being shared on public social media profiles ...".

26 October 2012, Dave Birch, The battle of the internet security experts: "Andy is spot on ...".

From the archives
30 October 2008, Daily Mail, Brown's ID card claims 'absolute bunkum' says Government electronic security expert from GCHQ: "Gordon Brown's claims for the £4.5billion ID cards project have been disputed by one of the Government's own electronic security experts ... The Prime Minister and Home Secretary Jacqui Smith have repeatedly said that ID cards will help thwart terror attacks ... Mr Brown said a national ID card scheme could 'disrupt terrorists' while Miss Smith has claimed ID cards will be a 'robust defence' against terrorists using false identities ... But Harvey Mattinson, a senior consultant at the IT security arm of GCHQ, the Government's listening station, said the claims were 'absolute bunkum' ...".

Harvey Mattinson then. Andy Smith now. Should they decide to accept it, there is another mission for the security services, to save us from GDS and their friends by unwinding the contracts HMRC and GDS have signed with Skyscape Cloud Services Ltd:
CESG have rescued the nation before from other-worldly decisions taken by Whitehall. The Home Office wanted to use DWP’s National Insurance number database as the National Identity Register for the ID cards scheme. CESG pointed out that it was inappropriate and that was the end of that.

Let’s hope that they repeat the trick in their review of Skyscape. I look forward to a small piece appearing in the technical press somewhere out of the way regretting that for security reasons which cannot be given the HMRC [and GDS] contract[s] with Skyscape [have] had to be revoked.

Alarm – adult human being found still working at the Cabinet Office

Thank goodness for Andy Smith. Whoever he is. And even if he isn't.
audio
video (slide to 1:31:30)

Hat tip: Philip Virgo

25 October 2012, and Whitehall held one of its endless conferences/talking shops where people who work for acronyms get together and speak in acronyms. The 9:20 welcome and introduction, for example, were given by John Robertson MP, Chair, apComms and Chi Onwurah MP and Stephen Mosley MP, Co-Chairs, PICTFOR.

Wednesday, 21 March 2012

Stillborn (mort-né) French biometric ID card scheme killed by crude mistake in technocrats' design

Remember France? Remember 6 March 2012 when the French parliament decided to introduce national biometric ID cards? In a scheme reminiscent of Vichy? Time to take a look at the quality of the design decisions taken at this early stage. Do the technocrats know what they're doing?

We must start as ever with the immaculate speech given by Serge Blisko on 13 July 2011 ("the speech that just keeps on speaking"):
Le groupe socialiste au Sénat s’est d’ailleurs interrogé sur le fait que cette deuxième puce « services » soit gérée par le ministère de l’intérieur. Avez-vous besoin, en qualité de ministre de l’intérieur, de connaître les habitudes d’achat et de consommation ou les allées et venues de millions de citoyens ? Nous sommes là dans un monde tel que décrit par Orwell dans 1984, et dont l’obsession du contrôle me semble hors de propos s’agissant de la protection contre l’usurpation d’identité. Ce véritable problème ne demande pas un déploiement stratosphérique permettant de tracer les déplacements et les achats des individus !
The new ID card will have two chips (puces) in it, one of them to allow you to deal with the State (the puce régalienne) and the other for eCommerce (the puce commerciale). M. Blisko says that the effect of the latter would be to open your life to minute surveillance, the Minister of the Interior could learn all your buying preferences and he or she could know everywhere you go.

That Panopticon facility goes way beyond the putative objective of the legislation, which is meant to be restricted to identity theft (l’usurpation d’identité). In fact according to M. Blisko, it leaves the planet altogether and launches into the stratosphere.

Source: University of Tennessee, Knoxville
RECIPE: Mix plastic cards (50 million) and surveillance (24/7) into a large pan. Stir in taxpayers' money (several billion Euros) ...

Let's leave those ingredients to simmer for a while.

In the interim, consider instead this point. If each card is 1mm thick and if you need 50 million of them to certify the French population then, if you placed the cards one on top of the other, you would have a pile of plastic 50km high. M. Blisko is right. Your pile of plastic cards would reach from the Assemblée Nationale all the way up to the top of the stratosphere. (NB: Mont Blanc = 4.81km)

If you had been a Tsar of all the Russias, what wouldn't you have given for plastic cards to use in your propiska system! The прописка was an early form of Russian ID card issued in the nineteenth century to help to govern the population. Plastic – that twentieth century invention – would obviously have made propiski more durable than the mere paper that was available to the Tsars. If only plastic had been available, the Tsars would have ordered a 50km high pile of it like a shot.

They would. But we can't. We know that the earth and the seas are already polluted with too much plastic. If there is any alternative, we should use it and not add to the pollution. Is there an alternative?

What are the plastic cards needed for? Answer, to carry the puces which support secure transactions, whether régalienne or commerciale. Couldn't we put the puces in something else, instead of yet another plastic card? Yes. We could put them in a mobile phone (a portable).

As it happens, not only could we put chips in mobiles phones, we already are putting chips in mobile phones, as the redoutable M. Blisko effectively says:
Aux débuts du commerce sur internet, il y avait beaucoup de fraudes. Actuellement, afin de permettre un échange sécurisé, en particulier lors d’achats dépassant certains montants, il existe des mots de passe, des codes à utilisation unique qui peuvent être envoyés sur téléphone portable, des confirmations par mail, etc.
Payment systems – and therefore identity management systems – are moving to mobile phones. Everything is moving to mobile phones. The mobile phone is an ineluctable evolutionary process in society. Nothing can stop it. Anything that gets in the way is mown down contemptuously.

That includes the old 85mm x 54mm plastic card business. It's outdated and irrelevant. It's dead. As dead as leech-farming (la cultivation des sangsues?). And there's no point trying to revive it. Any tax money thrown at it is tax money wasted.

Today's Tsar of all the Russias would issue digital certificates, not plastic cards. And he would transmit them to people's mobile phones, he wouldn't post them. But not, apparently, today's French technocrat.

A true forget-nothing-learn-nothing Bourbon, the modern French technocrat is prepared to ignore the advent in the last millennium of the mobile phone. He is happy to propose a nineteenth century scheme for use today. In the ancien régime he still inhabits, so what if that means polluting the planet? And so what if it means wasting stratospheric amounts of taxpayers' money?

Our dish of plastic cards and surveillance is ready now. And very unappetising it looks, next to mobile phones:
  • People voluntarily pay for mobile phones themselves ...
  • ... and they voluntarily take their mobile phones with them wherever they go.
  • Mobile phones can be tracked. They have to be. That's how the mobile phone networks work. So you can be tracked.
  • The networks record who you call and who calls you. They have to. To connect the calls and to charge for them. The effect is that the networks know who your contacts are ...
  • ... as well as where they are.
  • And what's more, unlike the national biometric ID card, the mobile phone actually exists and has all these facilities for traçage now.
  • As we move around with our mobiles switched on, we are already all of us permanently projecting our identity onto the record, as we have been for years.
Children identify with their mobile phone and their mobile phone identifies them. The mobile phone is an ID card. It just is. It is the culmination of his dreams for any totalitarian (le comble de ses rêves?). It is a rich and succulent main course whereas by comparison the old-fashioned and unimaginative, pedestrian and under-powered plastic card scheme proposed by the French government is a sickly, thin gruel.

Which suggests a surprising conclusion. Inattendu (unexpected) but just for once, perhaps M. Blisko is wrong?

Perhaps the Interior Minister isn't interested in the ID card as an instrument of surveillance as M. Blisko alleges? The Minister's already got mobile phones for that.

The plastic cards are a mistake. They mean that the scheme cannot work for surveillance or for anything else, including the fight against identity theft. The national biometric ID card scheme is not yet born but it is already dead. So why does the Minister want it? It's a mystery.

When in doubt, follow the money. Then it can become clearer.

There are two big transfers going on:
  • Firstly, with the introduction of digital signatures under the Minister's scheme, risk is being transferred from the banks to the accountholders, and money therefore is being transferred the other way.
  • Second, a collection of suppliers, including astrologers and stamp-collectors and as we now know latter-day leech-farmers, will be paid public money to create a new identity management network that's not needed – it's not needed because France already has several mobile phone networks.
More and more, this Vichy law of 6 March 2012 looks like nothing more than an illegal State subsidy to a number of favoured industries, at least one of which (85x54 plastic cards) is already dead.

Stillborn (mort-né) French biometric ID card scheme killed by crude mistake in technocrats' design

Remember France? Remember 6 March 2012 when the French parliament decided to introduce national biometric ID cards? In a scheme reminiscent of Vichy? Time to take a look at the quality of the design decisions taken at this early stage. Do the technocrats know what they're doing?

Monday, 19 March 2012

The French parliament wants to comply with the European Commission by making France more like Pakistan

Remember France? Remember 6 March 2012 when the French parliament decided to introduce national biometric ID cards? In a scheme reminiscent of Vichy? Time to take a look at the journey France is making – where did this scheme come from and where is it going to?

The recent history of biometric ID card schemes in Europe begins with the European Commission. In 1999, as part of the eEurope five-year plan, the Commission initiated a project to specify a system for pan-European biometric identity management. The specification job was given to eESC, the eEurope Smart Card forum and in 2003 they delivered OSCIE, the open smart card infrastructure for Europe.

It's a bit daunting, there are 2,000 pages of OSCIE, but perhaps the best thing is to concentrate on the paper on electronic identity, a mere 66 pages. That is the tune that France is marching to. The tune of 27 unelected and unaccountable satraps in the Berlaymont who have given up the job of governing people, it's too difficult, and decided instead to govern electronic identities.

The advocates of biometric ID always say that the cards are intended to make your life easier. With a biometric ID card, it will be easier to get a passport or to open a bank account or to move jobs, they say. But we can already get a passport and open a bank account and move jobs without a biometric ID card.

What the advocates of biometric ID cards mean is that, once we have OSCIE, life without a card will be impossible. The card will be required for every transaction, every communication, every state benefit, including healthcare and education. No card, no life. Life's optional and so the card is optional. The logic is impeccable.

That's where the project is coming from. And where's it going?

As it happens, there is a country that has been issuing multi-biometric ID cards since the year 2000. 120 million of them have been issued by NADRA, the National Database and Registration Authority. With their multi-biometric ID cards, 120 million people can now enjoy the pleasures of ePassports, electronic access control and attendance records at work, electronic driving licences, eCommerce, eVoting and many more.

And which is this country?

Pakistan.

The French parliament have fallen in with the European Commission plan to make France just that little bit more like Pakistan.

Why? What reason can the French government possibly give to explain this desire to become more like Pakistan?

They can hardly say that it's because they find governing people too difficult. Even if it's true. Nor can they get the population on-side by arguing that they are putty in the hands of the Commission, the Commission can mould them into any shape they please, France has to do what the Commission tells them to do. Even if it's true.

Instead, the French government deploys the identity theft gambit. In his 13 July 2011 speech, Serge Blisko (politely) pours scorn on this move:
Ficher potentiellement 45 à 50 millions de personnes – cette estimation a été avalisée par tous les interlocuteurs auditionnés en commission – dans le seul objectif de lutter contre l’usurpation d’identité qui touche quelques dizaines de milliers de Français par an, peut-il être considéré comme proportionné?
A moment's thought reveals that you don't fingerprint 50 million people just to try to reduce the incidence of identity theft which affects maybe 10,000 people, i.e. 0.02% of the people. It's not proportional.

Two moments' thought suggests that the incidence of identity theft is more likely to rise if you collect everyone's enrolments together in a national population register – if you create a single point of weakness, identity theft won't go down, it will go up.

And three moments' thought reveals that under the French scheme identity theft will become legally impossible anyway, not because cardholders won't be defrauded but because when they are, thanks to digital signatures, they'll be irrevocably liable for the loss themselves.

So identity theft can't be the reason. Not the real reason.

The acceptable reason for biometric ID cards according to the government is given in another part of M. Blisko's speech:
Il est vrai que la lutte contre l’usurpation d’identité est un enjeu industriel et commercial important pour la France puisque les entreprises dont nous avons auditionné les dirigeants sont championnes du monde dans ce domaine et qu’elles travaillent à 90 % à l’exportation.
France has plastic card manufacturers and chip manufacturers and biometric technology suppliers who are "world champions" and who contribute mightily, it is said, towards the country's exports. If the French people themselves will only agree to become walking advertisements for these industries, then exports will be assisted. It is every patriotic Frenchman's duty, according to this way of thinking, to become a human billboard in the marketing campaign of a few illegally subsidised companies. (No point complaining to the Competition Commissionner, of course, about that "unlawful state aid". It is the Commission's bidding that France is doing.)

Normally, advertisers pay for space. In this case, the tables are turned, and the mobile advertising space is paying the campaigners. The national biometric ID card scheme will cost billions of Euros. Those billions will not come out of thin air. They will be paid from the tax contributions of every French citizen and company.

It has a sort of Mephistophelean logic. It might work in some countries. But not France. Not in a nation with 246 different cheeses (© 1962 C. de Gaulle).

The French parliament wants to comply with the European Commission by making France more like Pakistan

Remember France? Remember 6 March 2012 when the French parliament decided to introduce national biometric ID cards? In a scheme reminiscent of Vichy? Time to take a look at the journey France is making – where did this scheme come from and where is it going to?

The French people kindly volunteer to pay for any mistakes their banks make

A quoi ça sert la ... signature électronique?

Remember France? Remember 6 March 2012 when the French parliament decided to introduce national biometric ID cards? In a scheme reminiscent of Vichy? Time to take a look at one aspect of this scheme – digital signatures (signatures électroniques). Someone needs to tell the French people what their government is letting them in for.

Serge Blisko, député de Paris, has tried to tell them. Bravely. No British MP would try to talk about PKI (the public key infrastructure) and digital certificates. But M. Blisko did. In his immaculate speech of 13 July 2011. Three times:
Cette proposition de loi prévoit, dans son article 2, la création d’une carte d’identité biométrique, comprenant notamment les empreintes digitales des personnes, outre d’autres éléments tels que la taille et la couleur des yeux. L’article 3 crée une fonctionnalité supplémentaire qui pourrait être activée, de manière facultative il est vrai, par le détenteur de la carte nationale d’identité pour ses transactions commerciales sur internet et dans ses relations avec l’e-administration. Cette fonctionnalité lui permettrait de s’identifier sur internet et de mettre en œuvre sa signature électronique. Concrètement, la personne devra tout de même disposer d’un boîtier connecté à son ordinateur, ce qui n’apparaît pas très simple. Elle sera libre de choisir les données personnelles qu’elle veut transmettre ...
En 2005, malgré la technologie de l’époque, le débat était le même qu’aujourd’hui : la création d’une carte nationale d’identité électronique, contenant donc des données biométriques, était déjà envisagée ; elle ouvrait la possibilité de prouver son identité sur internet et de signer électroniquement ...
Dernier aspect déplaisant, sur lequel vous avez glissé un peu rapidement, monsieur le rapporteur : cette proposition de loi est une opportunité pour faciliter les échanges commerciaux. Je ne suis pas contre le fait de sécuriser la signature électronique sur internet pour déclarer ses impôts ou payer une amende au Trésor public, mais la proposition de loi va au-delà du domaine régalien et de ses extensions budgétaires.
France's new ID cards will include facilities for identifying yourself over the web and for signing documents digitally. Let's take an example. Let's say you're buying a car for €30,000. And the document you're signing digitally is the contract for sale.

As M. Blisko says, the exact process for digital signature remains undefined but, having once taken their leap in the dark, the French will find that however it works, it's "pas très simple".

That's a charming understatement. Implementing PKI properly is extremely complicated.

But suppose the French manage to do it. They're good at infrastructure. They've got good people working on the problem. They've got the will. It's a matter of national pride. Marianne, la patrie and all that. Let's assume that France can get a PKI system up and running with 50 million users. No-one else has ever managed that. But, just for the sake of argument, if and when France manage it, what then? What is the effect of signing a document digitally?

M. Blisko doesn't answer that question, for the good reason that he doesn't ask it. Perhaps he assumes that everyone already knows what digital signatures mean. Just in case they don't, though, here is the answer in one word – non-repudiation.

If you sign a document digitally, you cannot repudiate your agreement. You are committed. Irrevocably.

Further, the fact that the document is digitally signed means that you signed it. You cannot claim that someone else signed it. Even if it's true. Even if it is a case of identity theft/l’usurpation d’identité, that is no longer legally relevant. Legally, you signed the document and you owe the car company €30,000. That's the law, as far as digital signatures are concerned.

Without digital signatures, if your credit card is misused, by your daughter's dogy boyfriend for example, a fraud is perpetrated against the bank that issued the card, the bank made a mistake, they shouldn't have authorised the payment, it's their problem. With digital signatures, it's your problem. The risk has been moved from the bank to you.

Is that what you wanted, vous les autres les français? Is that what your parliament told you would happen? Are you happy to change the law and end up underwriting the banks? If the answer is yes, in each case, then my apologies for disturbing you with this irrelevant post, excusez-moi de vous avoir dérangé. But if the answer is no, you might like to have a little word with your député and ask him or her what on earth they think they're doing.

The French people kindly volunteer to pay for any mistakes their banks make

A quoi ça sert la ... signature électronique?

Remember France? Remember 6 March 2012 when the French parliament decided to introduce national biometric ID cards? In a scheme reminiscent of Vichy? Time to take a look at one aspect of this scheme – digital signatures (signatures électroniques). Someone needs to tell the French people what their government is letting them in for.