Showing posts with label Marek Rejman-Greene. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Marek Rejman-Greene. Show all posts

Sunday, 30 September 2012

30 September 2012, a big day – Dame Helen Ghosh and ex-Guardian man Mike Bracken

30 September 2012. It's a big day today. Dame Helen Ghosh's last day as permanent secretary at the Home Office. What will change when she's gone?
    • Will Sarah Rapson, chief executive at the Identity & Passport Service (IPS), be allowed to carry on over-charging us Brits for passports to the tune of £300 million a year?
    • IPS has never recovered from its failure under Sir David Normington and James Hall to implement government-issue ID cards. They suffered something like a corporate nervous breakdown. Isn't it time now at last for a new name and a re-launch?
    • Will Jackie Keane be able to carry on spending money like water on IABS, the Immigration and Asylum Biometric System?
    • Will assistant commissioner Mark Rowley at the National Policing Improvement Agency stop wasting money on mobile fingerprint equipment?
    • Will Rob Whiteman, chief executive of the UK Border Agency (UKBA), be able to maintain the high standards and success rates of that organisation?
    • Will Brian Moore's successor as chief executive of the UK Border Force ditto?
    • Isn't it time now to stop hosing money at CSC and VF Worldwide Holdings for their biometrics-based visa application work abroad?
    • Will IBM be allowed to stop bashing its head against the brick wall that is eBorders?
    • Is Alex Lahood (the Director of Identity Management, no less, at UKBA, please see p.9) still testing biometrics in Croydon? If so, why?
    • Is Marek Rejman-Greene still Senior Biometrics Advisor at the Home Office Scientific Development Branch? Ditto.
    These are just some of the questions for Dame Helen's successor to ponder.

    Today is also the last day for the Government Digital Service (GDS) to announce the approved suppliers of the UK's much-touted Identity Assurance Service (IAS). It really is a big day.
    • Will GDS meet the deadline? (Six hours to go ...)
    • Will they dare appoint Google and Facebook as "identity providers" to the UK?
    • If not, will the NSTIC folk in the US cross them off the Christmas card list?
    • Will Martha Lane Fox ditto?
    • When Universal Credit fails, will DWP get the blame or GDS?
    • Will the Department for Business Innovation and Skills stop pretending to want midata?
    • If ex-Guardian man Mike Bracken (executive director of government digital services and senior responsible officer owner for the identity assurance programme) can't make Estonia come to the UK, will he go there?
    • Will GDS's dream of inserting GOV.UK into our national payment systems come true? If so, how many weeks before we are reduced to a barter economy? Two? Or one?
    • Will GOV.UK replace the Government Gateway?
    • Will GDS's IAS succeed where James Hall's ID cards failed?
    • Can GOV.UK operate successfully on a cloud service operated by Skyscape, the one-man company?
    These are just some of the questions that probably won't be answered tomorrow.

    30 September 2012, a big day – Dame Helen Ghosh and ex-Guardian man Mike Bracken

    30 September 2012. It's a big day today. Dame Helen Ghosh's last day as permanent secretary at the Home Office. What will change when she's gone?

    Wednesday, 9 May 2012

    Safran's directors generously give away their shareholders' intellectual property and $1.6 billion of their shareholders' money



    Safran press release, Paris 26 July 2011:
    Safran completes the acquisition of L-1 Identity Solutions Becomes world leader in biometric identity solutions

    After completing all required approval procedures, Safran (NYSE Euronext Paris: SAF) today announced that it has finalized the acquisition of L-1 Identity Solutions, Inc., a leading identity management solutions provider in the United States, for a total cash amount of $1.09 billion ($12 per share), which was originally announced in the press release on September 20, 2010. Following this transaction, Safran becomes the world leader in biometric identity solutions ...

    L-1 will join Safran’s existing security business, operating as Morpho, and will be renamed MorphoTrust. The new company will be partly managed as a proxy structure, thus providing appropriate protection for U.S. national security ...

    Jean-Paul Herteman, Chairman and CEO of Safran, said: "We are delighted to have finalized this transaction, which is perfectly aligned with the Group’s development strategy in the security business..."
    At the date of purchase, L-1 Identity Solutions, Inc., had never made a profit. Hardly surprising. The company was a ragbag of failed biometrics businesses, including Visionics Corp., Identix, Inc., and Viisage.

    Identix is particularly well known in the UK. In 2004, the UK Passport Service conducted a year-long trial of biometrics which proved that they are not reliable enough for use in passports, ID cards, residence permits, visas, driving licences and the like, please see cribsheet below. The trial was carried out using Identix products (Appendix C, p.254ff).

    "$1.09 billion" may seem like a very precise number. It isn't. Unmentioned in the press release above, Safran took on about $500 million of L-1's debt in addition to buying the company. Safran's shareholders' initial stake is therefore a lot higher than $1.09 billion, please see for example this 16 May 2011 Bloomberg article:
    Safran, a Paris-based maker of airplane engines for Airbus SAS and Boeing Co., agreed to buy L-1 for $12 a share, or 48 percent more than L-1’s 20-day trading average before it was first reported July 15 that Safran was considering a purchase of L-1. The offer is valued at $1.58 billion including net debt.
    And for that, Safran doesn't even get unfettered control. There's a "proxy structure" in there "providing appropriate protection for U.S. national security". Pleading national security, Safran's US Federal and State contracts could be switched to the all-American 3M Cogent, leaving Safran with nothing to show for $1.58 billion.

    You can see why L-1 would be pleased with this deal. It's not obvious what's in it for Safran.


    This isn't the first time that shareholders and equity analysts will have had qualms about Safran's venture into biometrics.

    On 7 October 2009, when their subsidiary Morpho was still known as "Sagem Sécurité", Safran issued this press release in Paris:
    Sagem Sécurité chosen by IBM to support United Kingdom’s National Identity Assurance Service (NIAS)

    Sagem Sécurité (Safran group) has signed a contract with IBM to supply and maintain a biometric management solution for British travel and identity documents, on behalf of the British Home Office’s Identity and Passport Service (IPS). The project is a core element of the Government’s plans to upgrade to biometric passports and enhance the security of the UK border.

    Sagem Sécurité will provide multibiometric facial and fingerprint recognition technology that was assessed for speed, accuracy and cost in competitive trials developed and run by IBM, using in excess of 10 million images. The technology will enable IBM to help IPS and the UK Border Agency to deliver the next generation of secure and reliable identity documents to British citizens, residents and people requesting asylum, while minimising the risk of fraud ...
    How did Safran/Sagem Sécurité/Morpho get this contract with IBM?

    The answer is provided in a witness statement submitted by Mr Nicholas Swain in a case heard in the British courts, EA/2001/0081 (please see the entry for 20 July 2011). IBM organised a demonstration of biometric capability for the UK Home Office. Mr Swain is a Commercial Director at IBM and he says:
    10. As part of IBM's bid, during late 2008 and early 2009, IBM carried out a series of tests with specialist biometric software providers who were bidding to be part of ... IBM's solution for the NBIS project as part of the Demonstration ...

    11. IBM negotiated the commercial arrangements with each of the biometric service providers, including Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDAs) to protect their commercially sensitive information (see further below). Six suppliers participated in the Demonstration ...

    14. Thereafter, on 1 May 2009, IBM signed a contract to provide NBIS with the Home Office and, shortly afterwards, entered a sub-contract with Sagem (now Morpho), one of the suppliers who participated in the Demonstration, to provide the specialist biometric software needed for NBIS. In August 2010 this contract was revised and the programme was re-named IABS ...

    18. All of the suppliers involved in the Demonstration made significant investment in time and provided IBM with more details about their products performance than is generally available. The information provided included business-critical intellectual property of the suppliers, representing the results of major investment in software research and development ...
    In 2008 and 2009 IBM had no particular expertise in biometrics. They have remedied that thanks to Safran, who gave them "business-critical intellectual property ... representing the results of major investment in software research and development".

    IBM have played a blinder. They won a £265 million contract from the British government. And they acquired the fruits of several decades of Safran's R&D. All in return for a piece of paper, an NDA. You can see why IBM would be pleased with this deal. It's not obvious what's in it for Safran.

    Safran's products can be tested without handing over the crown jewels. IBM and the Home Office only need to know whether Safran's products work, not how they work.


    The directors of Safran gave the shareholders' intellectual property to IBM and they gave $1.6 billion of shareholders' money to L-1. What did they give to get their contract with UIDAI, the organisation responsible for issuing electronic IDs to 1.2 billion Indians?







    Cribsheet – the failure of biometrics
    Using L-1/Identix biometrics technology, the Home Office conducted trials of face recognition, fingerprinting and iris scanning back in 2004. The report on the trial was published by Atos Origin in May 2005 and even after many months of massage the figures still demonstrated failure.

    10% of able-bodied participants in the trial couldn't register their irisprints in the first place, and that figure rises to 39% for the disabled participants. These people would quite simply not exist if public services only recognised people by their irisprints.

    Face recognition biometrics failed with 31% of the able-bodied participants and 52% of the disabled. We would all do better to toss an unbiased coin than to rely on face recognition, a technology with an uninterrupted history of failure.

    Which leaves us with fingerprints.

    Understand that we're not talking here about traditional fingerprinting. The technology trusted by law enforcers worldwide for over a century now. Rolled prints. Taken using ink. By a police expert. Acceptable as evidence in a court of law. A technology so accurate that when there's a disagreement independent experts are flown in to resolve the matter.

    No, we're talking instead about a modern, cheap, clean, quick technology, no expert required, a sort of glorified photocopying process, utterly unreliable, with a 19 or 20 percent failure rate. 19% for the able-bodied and 20% for the disabled. A technology that doesn't work well with old people, manual labourers, people from East Asia and women (p.34).

    So much for L-1's biometrics technology. No-one is going to fly in independent experts from abroad to investigate 19 or 20 percent of all disputed matches and non-matches. Flat print fingerprinting, to put it loosely, doesn't work.

    If the right to public services or the right to work or the right to vote or the right to a pension or the right to get married or the right to live in your municipal area or the right to travel beyond it – the right to cross an invisible eBorder – ever depend on flat print fingerprinting, then 19 or 20 percent of people legitimately entitled to those benefits will be wrongly denied them.

    Do Morpho's other biometrics products work any better than L-1's?

    So far, the public has not been told. Not in the UK, not in France, nowhere. Public money – your money and mine – is being invested by the UK Home Office and by Interior Ministries around the world, with no justification given.

    Given that the only report on the reliability of biometrics published to date by the UK government demonstrates that the technology doesn't work, we need to see some independent and academically scrupulous evidence that our money isn't being wasted.

    For all we know, the belief in the reliability of today's mass consumer biometrics is as foolish as the belief in astrology.

    As Professor Ross Anderson, the king of IT security engineering, points out, the banks don't trust mass consumer biometrics technology. Otherwise they'd use it. So why does the government trust this technology? And why should we?

    With no answers forthcoming, for all we know our money is being wasted on snake oil.

    Safran's directors generously give away their shareholders' intellectual property and $1.6 billion of their shareholders' money



    Safran press release, Paris 26 July 2011:
    Safran completes the acquisition of L-1 Identity Solutions Becomes world leader in biometric identity solutions

    After completing all required approval procedures, Safran (NYSE Euronext Paris: SAF) today announced that it has finalized the acquisition of L-1 Identity Solutions, Inc., a leading identity management solutions provider in the United States, for a total cash amount of $1.09 billion ($12 per share), which was originally announced in the press release on September 20, 2010. Following this transaction, Safran becomes the world leader in biometric identity solutions ...

    L-1 will join Safran’s existing security business, operating as Morpho, and will be renamed MorphoTrust. The new company will be partly managed as a proxy structure, thus providing appropriate protection for U.S. national security ...

    Jean-Paul Herteman, Chairman and CEO of Safran, said: "We are delighted to have finalized this transaction, which is perfectly aligned with the Group’s development strategy in the security business..."
    At the date of purchase, L-1 Identity Solutions, Inc., had never made a profit. Hardly surprising. The company was a ragbag of failed biometrics businesses, including Visionics Corp., Identix, Inc., and Viisage.

    Identix is particularly well known in the UK. In 2004, the UK Passport Service conducted a year-long trial of biometrics which proved that they are not reliable enough for use in passports, ID cards, residence permits, visas, driving licences and the like, please see cribsheet below. The trial was carried out using Identix products (Appendix C, p.254ff).

    "$1.09 billion" may seem like a very precise number. It isn't. Unmentioned in the press release above, Safran took on about $500 million of L-1's debt in addition to buying the company. Safran's shareholders' initial stake is therefore a lot higher than $1.09 billion, please see for example this 16 May 2011 Bloomberg article:
    Safran, a Paris-based maker of airplane engines for Airbus SAS and Boeing Co., agreed to buy L-1 for $12 a share, or 48 percent more than L-1’s 20-day trading average before it was first reported July 15 that Safran was considering a purchase of L-1. The offer is valued at $1.58 billion including net debt.
    And for that, Safran doesn't even get unfettered control. There's a "proxy structure" in there "providing appropriate protection for U.S. national security". Pleading national security, Safran's US Federal and State contracts could be switched to the all-American 3M Cogent, leaving Safran with nothing to show for $1.58 billion.

    You can see why L-1 would be pleased with this deal. It's not obvious what's in it for Safran.


    Thursday, 10 November 2011

    Whitehall on trials

    Appendix
    Home Secretary, somewhat late in the day, herewith the appendix promised in my open letter to you dated 8 November 2011.

    The fourth enquiry – into the efficacy of the biometrics used by UKBA and the Home Office generally – has at its disposal a lot of evidence in the form of correspondence with the Home Office, the UK Border Agency, the Identity & Passport Service, the Home Office Scientific Development Branch, the Information Commissioner and the Information Rights Tribunal available here, herehere and here. The enquiry may also be assisted by reading the reports on biometrics here, here and here.

    The hypothesis that the enquiry needs to test is that:
    For 10 years the Home Office have been investing public money unwisely in projects which depend for their success on mass consumer biometrics technology being reliable – it isn't.
    There is a lot of respectable evidence suggesting that the technology chosen by the Home Office is not reliable and no respectable evidence suggesting that it is. The enquiry may conclude that for 10 years public money has been wasted.

    In the matter of Brodie Clark, the implication is that the Home Office's chosen biometrics cannot enhance border security. It is therefore inept to fire the man for not using it.

    The further implication is that you, Home Secretary, have been lured by your officials into talking nonsense about strengthening and relaxing border controls – to the extent that those controls depend on biometrics, the technology available cannot enhance border security and can only weaken it by diverting UKBA staff into useless procedures.

    There is so much evidence available that the enquiry may welcome some guidance on the best routes to take as they travel through it. It is suggested that the first route they take should be as shown in the timeline below. It's hard to stay awake as you read through it but there is a dénouement to look forward to, so please persevere.

    Facial recognition biometrics and smart gates at UK airports
    August 2008 Back in August 2008, the UK Border Agency started a trial of so-called "smart gates" at Manchester Airport. UKBA issued a press release about the trial here. Don't bother clicking on the link, the press release has been deleted.

    With smart gates, travellers walk into one end of a booth, stick their ePassport (electronic passport) in a reader and stand in front of a camera. Face recognition software compares the face on camera with the "template" stored on a chip in the ePassport. If the two images match, according to the computerised threshold tests, then the exit gate opens and that's the traveller done, successfully through passport control.

    No UKBA passport control staff needed. They can be laid off. There will be considerable cost savings and – the matching process having been performed by computers – it will be more reliable than mere human beings, the security of the border will have been enhanced.

    That was the idea. In the event, there was some adverse coverage of the equipment in the Daily Telegraph and on the BBC News website:
    19 August 2008 – Machines to scan faces of travellers at UK airports
    19 August 2008 – Passengers test new face scanners
    4 October 2008 – Security fear over airport face scanners
    5 April 2009 – Airport face scanners 'cannot tell the difference between Osama bin Laden and Winona Ryder'

    But that was just unionised UKBA staff moaning about losing their jobs. Wasn't it?
    So far so simple. UKBA, playing it by the book, have got this new equipment that takes advantage of the facilities offered by ePassports. Does the equipment work? They don't know in advance. So they conduct a trial. Depending on the result of the trial, either the idea can be dropped, because the equipment doesn't work, or it works well and UKBA can start to deploy these smart gates at airports elsewhere.

    24 February 2009 Six months after the start of the Manchester Airport trial, UKBA announced a 10-point delivery plan, which comprised 10 "pledges". Pledge no.7 was, by August 2009, to "have completed delivery of new facial recognition technology in 10 terminals, giving British passengers a faster, secure route through the border".

    (UKBA's 10-point delivery plan used to be available here, on the bia.homeoffice.gov.uk domain. Don't bother clicking. The domain has long since disappeared. There is what looks like an accurate copy available here down at the bottom of the page.)
    Presumably the Manchester Airport trial must have been a success. Presumably the equipment was found to work, presumably it was established that it was a wise investment of public money to deploy smart gates equipment at 10 airport terminals around the country, and presumably it was accurate to assure the public that their experience of automated passport control would be "faster" and "secure".

    16 April 2009 Always worth checking these things. Someone wrote to Sir David Normington, permanent secretary at the Home Office, reminding him of the uninterrupted history of failure of biometrics based on facial recognition, asserting that the public would be sceptical about smart gates, and saying:
    I suggest that the way to overcome that scepticism is to place the matter in the hands of the Office of National Statistics. The use of mass consumer biometrics in public services, I suggest, should be based on official statistics. If rigorous academic evaluation suggests that mass consumer biometrics have a part to play, well and good. If not, then don't let's waste our time and money on them.
    There was no answer from Sir David.
    26 June 2009 But a couple of months later, an answer came through from Brodie Clark, Head of the Border Force at UKBA.

    "Your letter has been passed to me to respond", said Mr Clark, and:
    UKBA commenced testing our Automated Clearance System (ACS) at Manchester and Stansted in August and December last year, to assess the accuracy and reliability of the technology. The Home Secretary’s pledge to introduce gates at a total of 10 UK airport terminals by August, includes the two current sites at Manchester and Stansted. It will provide a further opportunity to test the technology on larger numbers of passengers, across a broader range of locations. It also means that the gates will be available to British and EEA citizens throughout the busy summer holiday period.
    Asked to confirm that smart gates would be "faster" and "secure", was Mr Clark, on behalf of Sir David, going to try to get away with saying only that they were "available"? Asked to confirm that the Manchester Airport trial had been a success, was he going to say simply that the technology would benefit from further testing?

    No. Mr Clark adds:
    The test’s findings demonstrated considerable improvement in this field [facial recognition], and confirmed that the technology could be applied successfully in a one-to-one (verification) mode*
    and
    We recognise that the vast majority of the travelling public are legitimate, law-abiding passengers and believe that the gates will deliver an improved service† to our customers whilst allowing us to deploy our staff intelligently to areas of greater risk.
    ----------
    * Some of us harbour the suspicion that Mr Clark had to be leant on to write that.
    † As we now know, the only way to deliver an improved service is to abandon use of the smart gates.
    3 February 2010 The history of biometrics based on facial recognition really is a history of failure. If UKBA now had reliable facial recognition equipment, then some sort of a technology revolution must have taken place. Someone, in a letter dated 4 August 2009, asked Brodie Clark to publish the revolutionary Manchester Airport trial results. The same request was made of his boss, Lin Homer, chief executive of UKBA, in a letter dated 8 August 2009.

    The trial results were not published then and still haven't been published. There is still no respectable evidence in the public domain that UKBA's facial recognition technology works.

    On 3 February 2010, Lin Homer wrote:
    UKBA is currently trialling the use of automated gates using facial recognition technology at 10 sites across the UK ... The technology used has proved reliable within the operational environment ...
    and
    Evaluation of Manchester gave us enough confidence to proceed to expand the trial.
    23 February 2010 Lin Homer kindly arranged a meeting, which took place at the Home Office on 23 February 2010. The meeting was attended by someone and by Karen Kyle (UK Border Agency), Marek Rejman-Greene (Home Office Scientific Development Branch), Alex Lahood (UK Border Agency), Henry Bloomfield (Identity & Passport Service), and Mike Franklin (UK Border Agency).

    No useful information about the reliability of UKBA's facial recognition technology was imparted at the meeting.

    In his informal minutes of the meeting, Alex Lahood wrote:
    Marek Rejman-Greene explained that we are under no illusion that the systems are 100% accurate but that there is adequate evidence/information about the level of performance to warrant embarking on a trial.
    A year after the 10 "pledges" of the UKBA delivery plan assured the public that the technology works, Lin Homer and Alex Lahood are still talking about trials. Why?
    It is normal to publish the results of trials. It is suspicious when trial results are not published.

    The efficacy of biometrics has been asserted ever since 9/11, over 10 years ago. Public money has been spent throughout that period and continues to be spent on projects which depend for their success on biometrics being reliable.

    Not once have the Home Office supplied any trial results proving that they are investing public money wisely. For all we the public know, our money is being wasted on technology that doesn't work.

    If it doesn't work, using that technology cannot improve the security of the UK border. In which case the Home Secretary and the Shadow Home Secretary are talking nonsense when they say that failing to do biometric checks impairs the security of the border. And it is nonsensical to pillory Brodie Clark and force him out of UKBA for not using technology that doesn't work.

    5-7 May 2010 By this stage we have had it confirmed to us by UKBA press releases, newspaper articles, letters from Brodie Clark and Lin Homer and the informal minutes produced by Alex Lahood that UKBA conducted trials of facial recognition technology at Manchester Airport.

    Mr John Vine CBE QPM is the Independent Chief Inspector of the UK Border Agency. He conducted an inspection of Manchester Airport between 5 and 7 May 2010. In his report, Mr Vine lists a number of problems with the smart gates in use there. And then, at para.5.29, he writes:
    We could find no overall plan to evaluate the success or otherwise of the facial recognition gates at Manchester Airport and would urge the Agency to do so [as] soon as possible.
    It is hard to believe that the Home Office have been wasting public money on biometrics. But if we must entertain that thought, must we also make room for the thought that the Home Office haven't even been conducting the trials they keep talking about? How else are we to understand the Independent Chief Inspector's words, "We could find no overall plan to evaluate the success or otherwise of the facial recognition gates at Manchester Airport"?

    Whitehall on trials

    Appendix
    Home Secretary, somewhat late in the day, herewith the appendix promised in my open letter to you dated 8 November 2011.

    The fourth enquiry – into the efficacy of the biometrics used by UKBA and the Home Office generally – has at its disposal a lot of evidence in the form of correspondence with the Home Office, the UK Border Agency, the Identity & Passport Service, the Home Office Scientific Development Branch, the Information Commissioner and the Information Rights Tribunal available here, herehere and here. The enquiry may also be assisted by reading the reports on biometrics here, here and here.

    The hypothesis that the enquiry needs to test is that:
    For 10 years the Home Office have been investing public money unwisely in projects which depend for their success on mass consumer biometrics technology being reliable – it isn't.

    Tuesday, 8 November 2011

    Brodie Clark alone

    Rt Hon Theresa May MP
    Open letter
    Secretary of State for the Home Department
    Marsham St
    London W1 SW1
    8 November 2011

    Dear Home Secretary

    Brodie Clark alone
    I write to suggest the right course of action to follow now.

    You have started three enquiries. You must start a fourth.

    Without that fourth enquiry, although you may keep your job, your name will be tarnished.

    With it, even if you lose your job, your reputation will be enhanced. You will eventually be recognised as having struck a blow in favour of the businesslike investment of public money and against the present practice of Whitehall wasting it by the lorryload. And you will eventually be recognised as having struck a blow in favour of democracy and against the present practice of rule by an unelected and unaccountable Whitehall.

    The media are convinced, to a man and a woman, that the biometrics chosen by the Home Office, to defend the border, work. Increase the use of those biometrics, and you get a better defended border, they say. Reduce it, and border security automatically suffers.

    If that relationship between the chosen biometrics and border security holds, then you’re guilty, Brodie Clark is guilty, you’re both out of the job and your names will be Mudd.

    But does it? Does that relationship hold true? Why do the media believe in the efficacy of the Home Office’s chosen biometrics? Why do they make that assumption?

    If you assembled the entire corps of Whitehall editors, home affairs editors and political correspondents of the press and of the broadcast media, you wouldn’t find a single biometrics expert among them. Not one. They don’t know what they’re talking about when it comes to biometrics, and they haven’t bothered to check.

    Which means that when you launch your fourth enquiry – into the efficacy of the biometrics chosen by the Home Office – the corps shouldn’t find it difficult to change their tune.

    Once they realise that there is a substantial amount of respectable evidence against the biometrics chosen by the Home Office, the media story will change. Once they realise that there is no respectable evidence in favour of these biometrics, the media will start at last to ask the right questions.

    Why has so much public money been wasted on investments in a technology that doesn’t work? Why have the public been consistently misled by politicians about its efficacy?

    Nobody expects politicians to know anything in detail about the “false non-match rates” and the “receiver operating curves” that constitute the study of biometrics. We just expect you to be properly briefed. So who has been misleading the politicians? There are only two possible answers. The biometrics suppliers themselves – but they presumably don’t have daily access to ministers. And the Whitehall officials who do have access to ministers. Officials who have apparently acted as unpaid salesmen for certain biometrics products and who have given part of the industry an unsolicited and undeserved testimonial.

    For about 48 hours after the story broke on Friday evening, the media focused on Brodie Clark alone. One man. Decades of experience in policing and prisons, a man capable of running 20,000 staff doing a dangerous job in the interest of national security, a man at the height of his powers – he didn’t go barmy one day and just decide to stop bothering with passport checks on a whim.

    It takes one small change in the reporting of this case and Brodie Clark becomes a hero. If he is described correctly as a professional having to do a very hard job – quite beyond the powers of any of his detractors – while being lumbered with useless technology by a bunch of dilettantes in Whitehall, then the focus changes.

    The focus has already changed, of course, the media now have you in their sights. They have skipped from the Head of the Border Force to the Home Secretary without taking into account any of the intervening people responsible. You have to get the media to start joining the dots.

    Brodie Clark doesn’t run UKBA on his own.

    He’s one member of the Board. What were the other directors doing while he was supposedly impairing national security? Looking the other way? What were the non-executive directors doing? Do they turn up to Board meetings just for the sandwiches? What about the Chief Executive of UKBA, Robert Whiteman? He was appointed in July 2011. Lin Homer, the previous Chief Executive, moved on in December 2010 to become Permanent Secretary at the Department of Transport. Why did it take so long to find a replacement?

    UKBA is an executive agency of the Home Office. How come we haven’t heard from Dame Helen Ghosh, the Permanent Secretary at the Home Office? Is she responsible for UKBA or isn’t she? And where’s Sir Gus O’Donnell while the shrapnel’s flying? He’s Head of the Home Civil Service. He’s responsible for everything. He’s the man with a budget of £710 billlion of public money for the year 2011-12. Why don’t the media find out from the horse’s mouth what’s going on? This is an operational matter. The media should be quizzing the operators.

    And that’s where your fourth enquiry comes in. Who chose these useless biometrics? James Hall. No-one’s ever heard of him. One of Whitehall’s numerous imports from Accenture, James Hall was Chief Executive of the Identity & Passport Service (IPS) until the 2010 election, when he was allowed to go quietly into retirement. No public recriminations against him for having spent £292 million on the National Identity Service with nothing to show for it. Nothing whatever. By contrast, some of the newspapers are keen to tarnish Brodie Clark’s good name, deprive him of his bonus, gloat at his salary and question whether he should be allowed his pension.

    James Hall reported to Sir David Normington, Permanent Secretary at the time at the Home Office. He retired at the end of last year, his KCB was uprated to a GCB and he is now our First Civil Service Commissioner. He is garlanded. Brodie Clark is pilloried. But it’s Sir David who had operational responsibility for IPS and UKBA ever since John Reid pointed out that the latter was not fit for purpose. No questions about Sir David’s pension. Why?

    The Home Office was advised on biometrics by the Home Office Scientific Development Branch (HOSDB) and by external consultants. Marek Rejman-Greene was the biometrics expert at HOSDB at the time and has moved on smoothly to advise the Cabinet Office on identity assurance. Still in the job, still on the public payroll, and no impertinent questions about his bonus, if any, for Mr Rejman-Greene.

    Who are the external consultants? PA Consulting. See Helping the UK Border Agency International Group to deliver a world-class biometric visa service on the PA Consulting website. That’s the same firm of management consultants who charged £42 million for project management on John Prescott’s FiReControl fiasco, a project which the National Audit Office (NAO) assures us will waste a minimum of £469 million of public money.

    Who provides the biometric technology being used by the Home Office? Morpho. Once again, no-one will have heard of them. They used to be called "Sagem Sécurité". They're a subsidiary of Safran Group, the French equivalent of BAe. And they're the world leaders in biometrics, selling their unreliable wares to Australia, the US and India as well as us and presumably the poor unfortunate French.

    PA Consulting and Morpho would benefit from a close inspection by the UK’s media quite as much as, if not more than, you and Brodie Clark.

    You would have some powerful support for a fourth enquiry from the NAO and from the chairmen of the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee (whose excellent report on the Home Office’s ID cards plan was rudely and unwisely ignored), the Public Accounts Committee and the Public Administration Select Committee. Margaret Hodge at PAC has a wide selection of adjectives to describe the wisdom with which public money is spent by Whitehall and Bernard Jenkin at PASC doesn't seem to be too impressed with the quality of public administration in the UK either.

    You would also have the support of the unions. They want to protect their members’ jobs. Faced with the prospect of replacing thousands of UKBA frontline staff with computer technology that doesn’t work, you, too, may want to protect the border by protecting their jobs.

    The Guardian, of course, won’t support you. Not because you’re a Conservative. But because they believe in a state where a grateful populace is wisely served by an all-knowing cadre of public officials. Men from the ministry. Whitehall. Which is why their editorial today asks everyone to turn the rhetoric down.

    Don’t start the fourth enquiry and then wait patiently for its findings to be announced in six months time. Make them report publicly once a week, orally and/or with interim written reports and plenty of press releases. The only reason Whitehall have been able to waste our money on unreliable biometrics for the best part of ten years is that they operate in secrecy.

    Behind closed doors, Whitehall seem to make one unbusinesslike, irresponsible and downright illogical decision after another. They desperately need to operate more openly to keep their noses clean. And we the public desperately need them to keep their noses clean – we can’t afford for Whitehall to carry on wasting our money like this.

    The enquiry could find itself going to unexpected places. Don’t be surprised to see the European Commission figuring large. The European Commission's white paper on electronic identity will be one important source. The Commission's plans for Project STORK will be another. And the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) also will figure large. Via the eBorders scheme, the DHS get access to all UK API data (advance passenger information) whenever we fly, whether domestically or internationally.

    eBorders must be included in the enquiry. Partly because it depends to a large extent on biometrics. And partly because this is the Home Office system which manages UKBA’s watchlists for terrorists and criminals which Brodie Clark is accused of not using.

    The BBC’s File on 4 programme, ‘Open Borders?’, explains why Mr Clark might well not use eBorders.

    The last government appointed Raytheon as the lead contractors on eBorders. One of the first acts of the coalition government was to fire Raytheon for breach of contract. It’s never been explained what breach took place. IBM have now taken over as lead contractors.

    For £1 billion, in the 21st century, we’re getting a computerised system that would disgrace the 19th century.

    eBorders relies on little scraps of paper being delivered to the desks of UKBA border force staff. Sometimes, these little bits of paper go astray. And then anyone can get into the country, even “Sheikh [Raed] Salah, an Arab-Israeli activist, [who] flew into the UK last month [June 2011], days after Home Secretary Theresa May had signed an order denying him entry to the UK”.

    Let’s see the media grill Raytheon and IBM as well as Brodie Clark and you.

    We elect politicians. You politicians seem to be immediately trussed up by officials who control your every move, only allow you to take the calls they put through, attend the meetings they arrange, see the letters and papers they choose. We do not elect officials. But who has the power? Certainly you politicians keep taking the responsibility. But power? It looks as though that lies with Whitehall. That is the unacknowledged fact of our present democracy. It is not the democracy the public thinks it partakes in.

    There’s a lot riding on the fourth enquiry. I append an outline of the first topic to research. There’s a lot more to come. If you would like it.

    Yours faithfully
    David Moss

    Brodie Clark alone

    Rt Hon Theresa May MP
    Open letter
    Secretary of State for the Home Department
    Marsham St
    London W1 SW1
    8 November 2011

    Dear Home Secretary

    Brodie Clark alone
    I write to suggest the right course of action to follow now.

    You have started three enquiries. You must start a fourth.

    Without that fourth enquiry, although you may keep your job, your name will be tarnished.

    With it, even if you lose your job, your reputation will be enhanced. You will eventually be recognised as having struck a blow in favour of the businesslike investment of public money and against the present practice of Whitehall wasting it by the lorryload. And you will eventually be recognised as having struck a blow in favour of democracy and against the present practice of rule by an unelected and unaccountable Whitehall.